Does Malaysia have concrete counterterrorism strategies to mitigate potential terrorist attacks?

By: Munira Mustaffa

The Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM) Special Operations Command unit undergoing a tactical counterterrorism training. Source: Wikimedia

While Indonesia successfully demonstrated remarkable resilience with her defiant cry of “Kami tidak takut” (“We are not intimidated”) on social media after the January 2016 attack,[1] there are some uncertainties that the same level of fortitude can be witnessed in Malaysia should a Daesh-inspired attack happen.[2] This raises some pressing debates about Malaysia’s existing counterterrorism policies and resilience strategies.

It is already known that Daesh has issued warnings that they had planned attacks on Westerners in Kuala Lumpur.[3] To date, there has been one attempt by local Daesh’s sympathisers which was successfully disrupted by members of the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) in January.[4] Last month, in the latest government crackdown on local terror cells, over 100 individuals were detained for suspected involvement with the core Daesh militancy.[5] In previous arrests since 2013, many of them were reportedly first-time offenders who were radicalised online.[6]

However, capturing ringleaders or copycats do not guarantee our safety or guarantees against terrorist attacks. If anything, as demonstrated by open source media, the fact that Daesh as an organisation is weakening does not mean that it will not influence groups abroad.[7] Daesh supporters may be even more determined to intensify their overseas strategies.[8]

The probability that Kuala Lumpur could be the next target is rather sobering.[9] Filled with complex and multi-ethnic communities, along with abundant international visitors, countless international corporates and multi-national companies centred around an urban hub, one could argue that these factors make Kuala Lumpur a high-value target. Moreover, Putrajaya is currently being encumbered by grand corruption controversies involving the country’s sovereign wealth that could erode its “moderate Islam” image and status as the custodian of Malaysia Muslims’ religious interests.[10] The fact that Kuala Lumpur is highly populated by a large percentage of Muslims who Daesh sympathisers might consider as takfiri could be a potential concern.[11]

The Malaysia experience

Malaysia is no stranger to asymmetric warfare. Much of Malaysia’s experience and formation of current antiterrorism laws and legislation are legacies of the days of Malayan insurgencies. Post-insurgency, homegrown radical militant groups began to surface in the late 1960s, slowly evolving into today’s mujahideen extremists who are enjoying a revival and enthusiastically responding to the rallying call for global Muslim solidarity.[12] Although not all of them agree with Daesh’s brand of violence, one thing is clear: Daesh does make a convenient vehicle for them to realise their Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State) ambitions in this region that imposes stricter Islamic interpretation of the law and way of life.[13]

Malaysia’s current counterterrorism (CT) measures

On the morning of November 26, 2014, Prime Minister Najib Razak tabled a white paper in Parliament entitled, “Towards countering threats posed by Islamic State Militant Group”.[14] Delivered entirely in Malay, Najib condemned the violence propagated by Daesh, encouraged support from the public to reject extremist ideas, and promised to increase efforts in reducing the threat of terrorism.[15]

It has been a little over a year since the submission of the white paper, which is available only in scanned copy online (and difficult to find).[16] Upon review, what was striking about the concluding remarks in the document was that the only solution proposed was to further stiffen existing anti-terror laws. These included the Security Offences (Special Measures Act) (SOSMA), Prevention of Crime Act (POCA) and the Penal Code. No other policy recommendations were provided to substantially elevate the current threat. This is worrying, considering the questionable way Malaysia’s anti-terror laws and legislation could be enforced and regulated.

For instance, in the past, opposition activists of the incumbent government have been arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA) that was originally intended as a preventive measure against communist threats that no longer exist.[17] When the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 2015 was introduced as a response to the emerging Daesh threats, there were serious and justifiable concerns that it was just “a reincarnation of the ISA”.[18] Furthermore, the Communications and Multimedia Ministry recently submitted a proposal to the Attorney General for legal amendments to be made on the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998. If passed, this new law will require the registration of political blogs and online news portals with the government as an effort to counter “defamatory news” and “inflammatory opinions”.[19] Antithetical to the current administration’s previous pledge in 2012 to repeal the Sedition Act for more freedom of expression,[20] this proposal is a grim reminder how freedom of speech and Internet freedom in the country are being tightly scrutinised and regulated.[21]

Absence of robust policy framework and lack of public engagement

If we are to believe that the Najib administration is serious about mitigating terror threats at domestic level, then some further research, serious reassessments and critical revisions should be carried out to improve current policies. Information should be available in an efficiently accessible form that can be promptly found and used to maintain public interest, and keep them in the loop. As it stands, apart from the crackdowns, arrests and promises to tighten the law, it is difficult for the rakyat to gauge if other preventive measures have been implemented.[22] This lack of transparency and accountability in leadership creates unnecessary political vulnerabilities and heightens anxiety.

Dissidents would argue that the current administration benefits from the rakyat’s ignorance because the dynamics of the power play here allows more room for manipulation of the general public. In reality, the inadequate effort in engaging the public signifies how much the Malaysian government undervalues public contribution. Key security strategies should always include engaging the public as part of a concerted state effort to mitigate terrorism. Support from the public is crucial in assisting local law enforcement agencies, be it for crime prevention or counterterrorism. Everyone should be encouraged to feel like they are part of the nation-building narrative and meaningful governing process. The desired outcome could motivate people to step up to be part of the solution. Increasing community capabilities in acknowledging legitimate social problems, dispelling disruptive views and identifying suspicious behaviour would be productive, as opposed to citizens relying on false assumptions on what terrorism is or looks like.[23]

At present, there is no document or policy paper that is readily available online (or otherwise) that could comprehensively explain to the Malaysian public the nature of threat we are currently facing and how the government plans to react to terrorist threats or emergencies. Officially-released notices bear no semblance of even a formal presentation that could help distinguish them easily from rumours, which further exacerbate fear-mongering. One such instance is the Federal Territories Minister Tengku Adnan Tengku Mansor (aka Ku Nan) who decided to “notify” the public of the “list of targets” in possession of the captured Daesh members. It was not even within his jurisdiction to release such statement, of which even the PDRM themselves were mystified as to where and how did he receive his intelligence.[24] Regardless of the motive behind the public disclosure of the list of targets, Ku Nan’s action was not viewed favourably by the public at all – in fact he was slammed for being an alarmist.[25]

This is why many Malaysians feel excluded, mishandled and abandoned by top-level officials. Unless they are full of praise (such as the recent PR disaster of the #RespectMyPM Twitter campaign) or they carry certain myopic viewpoints that are supported from within the government, critical debates and discussions are actively discouraged.[26] For example, a popular Malaysian news portal, The Malaysian Insider, which has been blocked several times for allegedly publishing “inflammatory content” finally shuttered to a close after persistently reporting on the PM’s alleged misuse of sovereign funds.[27] More significantly, foreign journalists were recently deported for asking uncomfortable questions about the corruption allegations directed at the PM.[28] So when it was revealed last month that there was a terror plot to kidnap PM Najib Razak, of course it was greeted with a great collective disbelief.[29]

Counterproductive Outcomes

These latest episodes serve as a stark reminder that the Malaysian public’s value, trust and well-being are not a priority for the incumbent government. If anything, their reluctance to acknowledge their hand in the growing problem at the domestic level, and their stubbornness to adopt a more sensible policy-building approach is greatly impacting the situation. Considering that the ruling party has shown a lack of accountability and failed at fulfilling their political pledges on more than just one occasion, it is no wonder that the public is becoming exceedingly distrustful of it.

Meanwhile, despite assertions in news reports of the “success” of Malaysia’s de-radicalisation programmes which have been boasted as “the best in the world”, there is no official indication how these government programmes were planned or assessed for implementation.[30] Additionally, there is no clear definition for what “success” means in the programme’s introduction either.[31] Even more worrying, one of the agencies involved in the process is the controversial Islamic Development Department (JAKIM), well-known for their invasive and boundary-violating “moral-policing” activities which aimed to “preserve the chastity of Muslims” everywhere in the country.[32] In short, the question whether or not Malaysia is capable of coping with the growing terrorist threat remains unanswered.

Conclusion: rethinking security policies

It is true that Daesh’s brand of extremism has limited appeal in the Southeast Asia.[33] The Jakarta attack itself was poorly executed and, at best, amateurish. The probability of a Daesh attack to occur in Kuala Lumpur is still considerably low and and its threats should not be overestimated. However, the growing indoctrination, radicalisation and rising extremist views amongst Malay-Muslims continue to be worrying security conundrums and should be seen as a major counterterrorism challenge.[34]

There is also a disconcerting number of high-level people who are only too quick to shift the blame to external factors such as liberal values and pluralism, Jewish conspiracies, and Wahhabism/Salafism, of which local religious authorities are only too eager to distance themselves from.[35] Compound these all together, they build a grave picture that shows how far removed and complacent the Malaysian government can be from the reality of the current global threat.

While there is no doubt that the PDRM have been successful in their anti-terror sting operations, nevertheless tactical operations alone are not sufficient without robust counterterrorism policies and resilience strategies in place. More conscious efforts should also be made to improve cohesiveness amongst the diverse communities in Malaysia as part of a nation-wide strategy of building resilience against terrorism. The government would significantly benefit from public confidence in their capabilities. In turn, a mutually rewarding collaborative relationship could be forged.

Nonetheless, with the Prime Minister’s loss of legitimacy in the storm of his corruption scandal, fractured inter-community relations, and growing demands from the conservatives for a more Islamic and divisive Malaysia, one thing is certain, however: the country’s security landscape will become increasingly turbulent should things stay the way they are.

 

 

Munira Mustaffa is a strategic intelligence analyst and due diligence consultant for a private London-based firm. She earned her Master’s degree in Countering Organised Crime and Terrorism from the University College of London. She tweets at @FleetStGir1.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1][1] Rishi Iyengar, ‘Indonesians display defiance toward Jakarta attackers through rallies and social media’, Time, January 15, 2016, http://time.com/4182106/jakarta-rally-attacks-kami-tidak-takut/

[2] Zachary Abuza, ‘Terror attack could rip apart Malaysian society’, Southeast Asia Globe, March 7, 2016, http://sea-globe.com/terrorism-in-malaysia-zachary-abuza/

[3] Tom Batchelor, ‘ISIS targets Malaysia: terror group ‘very real’ threat after jihadis warn of reprisals’, Express, January 26, 2016, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/638163/Islamic-State-Malaysia-terror-attacks-Jakarta-bombing

[4] Eileen Ng, ‘Malaysian police foil suicide blast hours before planned attack in Kuala Lumpur’, Stuff, January 17, 2016, http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/asia/75970763/Malaysian-police-foil-suicide-blast-hours-before-planned-attack-in-Kuala-Lumpur

[5] Victoria Ho, ‘Malaysia detains 13 suspected ISIS militants’, Mashable, March 24, 2016, http://mashable.com/2016/03/24/13-arrests-isis-malaysia/

[6] Elina Noor, ‘Identifying the root causes of terrorism’, New Straits Times, March 22, 2016, http://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/03/134311/identifying-root-causes-terrorism

[7] Henry Johnson, ‘Mapped: the Islamic State is losing its territory – and fast’, Foreign Policy, 16 March, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/16/mapped-the-islamic-state-is-losing-its-territory-and-fast/

[8] Joshua Holland, ‘Here’s what a man who studied every suicide attack in the world says about ISIS’ motives’, The Nation, December 2, 2015, http://www.thenation.com/article/heres-what-a-man-who-studied-every-suicide-attack-in-the-world-says-about-isiss-motives/

[9] James Chin, ‘Malaysia: clear and present danger from the Islamic State’, Brookings, 16 December, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/12/16-malaysia-danger-from-islamic-state-chin

[10] Daniel Woker, ‘In Malaysia and Turkey, are we witnessing the end of moderate Islam?’, The Interpreter, 5 August, 2015, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/08/05/In-Malaysia-and-Turkey-the-end-of-moderate-Islam.aspx

[11] Hayat Alvi, 2014, ‘The diffusion of intra-Islamic violence and terrorism’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 38-50.

[12] Mohd. Mizan Aslam, 2009, ‘The thirteen radical groups: Preliminary research in understanding the evolution of militancy in Malaysia’, Jati, 14, p.145-161

[13] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Counterterrorism conundrum: rethinking security policy in Australia and Southeast Asia’, Foreign Affairs, 17 December, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeast-asia/2014-12-17/counterterrorism-conundrum

[14] NajibRazak.com, ‘Ucapan pembentangan kertas putih ke arah menangani ancaman kumpulan Islamic State’, 26 November, 2014, https://najibrazak.com/bm/blog/ucapanpembentangan-kertas-putih-ke-arah-menangani-ancaman-kumpulan-islamic-state/

[15] Razak is the patronymic and refers to the Prime Minister’s father’s administration. In this essay, we will use Najib to denote this current administration.

[16] Malaysia, ‘Ke Arah Menanangani Ancaman Kumpulan Islamic State’, Dewan Rakyat/Dewan Negara, 2014, http://www.airforce.gov.my/images/PENERBITAN/kertasputihislamicstate.compressed.pdf

[17] Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/malaysia-bck-0513.htm

[18] Munira Mustaffa, 2015, ‘Can POTA counter the ISIL threat in Malaysia?’, Strife, 9 May, 2015, https://strifeblog.org/2015/05/09/can-pota-counter-the-isil-threat-in-malaysia/

[19] Shazwan Mustafa Kamal, ‘Putrajaya weighing new leash for news portals, blogs’, The Malay Mail Online 16 March, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/putrajaya-weighing-new-leash-for-news-portals-blogs

[20] Centre for Independent Journalism – CIJ Malaysia, ‘[Malaysia] Disappointments and promises in freedom of expression’, Southeast Asian Press Alliance, 6 May, 2015, https://www.seapa.org/disappointments-and-promises-in-freedom-of-expression/

[21] Mong Palatino, ‘Malaysia will likely force “political blogs” and news websites to register with the government,’ Global Voices, 23 April, 2016, https://globalvoices.org/2016/04/23/malaysia-will-likely-force-political-blogs-and-news-websites-to-register-with-the-government/

[22] Malay word for “ordinary citizens”.

[23] Munira Mustaffa, ‘Dismantling terrorism myths’, The Malay Mail Online, 22 February, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/what-you-think/article/dismantling-terrorism-myths-munira-mustaffa

[24] Eunice Au, ‘Top KL tourist areas cited as possible terror targets’, The Straits Times, 17 January, 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/top-kl-tourist-areas-cited-as-possible-terror-targets

[25] Sebastian Loh, ‘Malaysian minister under fire for naming IS targets in Kuala Lumpur’, Asian Correspondent, 18 January, 2016, https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/01/malaysian-minister-under-fire-after-naming-is-targets-in-kuala-lumpur/

[26] BBC, ‘#RespectMyPM: Online war breaks out in Malaysia’, March 7, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-35742118

[27] Jahabar Sadiq, ‘Eight proud years of being “The Malaysian Insider”’, The Bangkok Post, 22 March, 2016, http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/906004/eight-proud-years-of-being-the-malaysian-insider

[28] BBC, ‘Australian journalists leave Malaysia after avoiding charges’, March 15, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-35800172

[29] Amy Chew, ‘ISIS, Malaysia, and the risks of lost moral authority’, The Diplomat, March 22, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/isis-malaysia-and-the-risks-of-lost-moral-authority/

[30] The Star, ‘Zahid Hamidi: Malaysia’s deradicalisation programme “best in the world”’, 20 February, 2016, http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/02/20/zahid-hamidi-malaysia-deradicalisation-programme-best-in-the-world/

[31] New Straits Times Online, ‘Malaysia’s deradicalisation process a success’, 22 January, 2016, http://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/01/123407/malaysias-deradicalisation-process-success

[32] Kamles Kumar, ‘Moral policing driving youths away from Islam, Ku Li tells Jakim’, Malay Mail Online, 5 December, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/moral-policing-driving-youths-away-from-islam-ku-li-tells-jakim

[33] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘ISIS reaches Indonesia’, Foreign Affairs, 8 February, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeast-asia/2014-12-17/counterterrorism-conundrum

[34] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Malaysia’s ISIS Conundrum’, Brookings, 21 April, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/04/21-malaysia-isis-conundrum-liow

[35] The Malay Mail Online, ‘Putrajaya in espionage, psychological warfare against “liberal” Islamic groups, minister says’, 18 March, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/putrajaya-in-espionage-psychological-warfare-against-liberal-islamic-groups;

Robert Fulford, ‘Malaysia: a hotbed of anti-Semitism’, National Post, 2 January, 2016, http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/robert-fulford-malaysia-a-hotbed-of-anti-semitism;

The Malay Mail Online, ‘No place for Wahhabism in Malaysia, fatwa council says’, 1 March, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/no-place-for-wahhabism-in-malaysia-fatwa-council-says

 

The limits of US security cooperation in Jordan

By: Peter Kirechu

President Barack Obama Meets with King Abdullah II of Jordan in the Oval Office on 26 April, 2013. Source: Wikimedia.

The most notable feature of President Barack Obama’s partnership-based counterterrorism doctrine­–roughly defined–is its central focus on training and arming local security services to independently deal with emerging terrorism threats. The President’s doctrine is unfortunately fraught with inconsistent performance of US-trained security services, especially among fragile states in the Middle East and beyond. Whether in Iraq, Yemen, or Afghanistan, singular focus on capacity building within the security sector has failed to remedy the governance failures that fuel instability within the region.

In Jordan, the United States (US) enjoys a long history of sustained political, economic and military cooperation which dates back to 1951. However, since the self-styled Islamic State established a cross-border presence in Syria, concerns with the contagion of trained militants across Jordan’s borders have led to substantial increases in US security assistance. In February 2015, the United States expanded its annual aid to Jordan from $660 million to $1 billion. The funds were directed towards core counterterrorism priorities (border protection, C4ISR, quick-reaction airlift capabilities) and also the immediate humanitarian demands incurred by the Syrian refugee crisis.

Though the US-Jordanian security relationship is less fraught with discord when compared with other states in the region, this assessment slightly deceives a growing angst within the Jordanian public. Since the brutal loss of Jordanian pilot, Muath al-Kasaesbeh, to the Islamic State in 2014, the public is increasingly apprehensive of its government’s support of US policy prerogatives. The pilot’s death stood as a stark reminder of the costs paid by the Jordanian military–and the public writ large–in small part due to the government’s role within the US-led anti-Islamic State coalition.

Despite this fomenting anxiety, the United States appears squarely focused on the more proximate security threats borne by the Syrian conflict. But as the Salafi-Jihadist landscape evolves throughout the region, Jordan will remain an attractive target due to the available reservoir of disenchanted locals eager for a brighter economic future and resentful of the government’s stunted reforms. Unless the United States adopts a more balanced security assistance approach, one that emphasizes comprehensive governance reforms, the current policy will remain inadequate to the underlying causes of domestic instability. 

Jihadist entreaties on a vulnerable public

Since 2013, Jordan has served as the training and staging ground for Syrian rebels battling the Islamic State in Southern Syria. This training effort has slowly expanded and now includes the provision of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) to various US-supported rebel factions. This covert effort proceeded under limited public scrutiny until the Islamic State’s capture and subsequent beheadings of several western journalists and aid workers. These gruesome executions ultimately triggered the US-led aerial bombing campaign against the jihadist group in both Iraq and Syria.

The Jordanian government joined the US effort, viewing its participation as a necessary measure aimed at shoring up Jordan’s national security. At the outset, the public’s response was initially quite supportive but subsequent research polls conducted by the Arab Center for Research and Studies revealed that a majority of respondents viewed the campaign as more beneficial to the United States, Israel and Iran, rather than to Jordan’s security and stability. Though Jordanians expressed early support for their government’s role within the coalition, many did not consider the country’s security interests under direct threat.

But once Lt. Muath al-Kasasbeh was captured and gruesomely executed, his death elevated formerly muted discontent with Jordan’s role within the coalition. Those who not normally involve themselves with the ebbs and flows of foreign affairs found themselves participants in a growing conversation on the merits of their government’s continued involvement in the US-led coalition.

Nonetheless, the participation of roughly 2,200 Jordanian citizens in active battlefronts in Syria and Iraq underscores the government’s concerns with the return of trained militants who may seek to undermine the current governing order. As such, the government’s participation in the US-led coalition appears to be a reasonable response to the rising threat of both domestic and foreign militancy.

On the domestic front, Jordanian authorities have banned cleric that are sympathetic to the Islamic State from delivering public sermons. Other measures include the release of some prominent Salafist clerics with the intent of enlisting their assistance in combatting jihadist rhetoric within the public domain. The government has also adopted a more repressive approach to public dissent, detaining Muslim Brotherhood members and introducing new amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Law. These changes have criminalized the criticism of foreign countries and their leaders while permitting the prosecution of journalists and activists for speech-related crimes–as widely interpreted by the State Security Court.

The crackdown on public speech under the cover of combatting terrorism weighed heavily on Jordan’s decline from a ‘Partially Free’ to a ‘Not Free’ State according to the Freedom’s House  Freedom in the World rankings. This ranking has endured since 2010 and is not likely to improve under current conditions. Unfortunately, the government’s embrace of these policy prerogatives harms the state’s long-term security by ignoring legitimate public grievances and broadening public apathy with stagnated reforms that were once viewed as a bulwark against domestic instability.

Crises of Socio-Economic Patronage

The Hashemite Kingdom’s most urgent economic ails are grounded in the patronage and subsidy system which secures the monarchy’s rule. Regime loyalty underscores the long-running history of generous welfare benefits accorded to East Banker tribes and the pervasive use of personal friendships and tribal relationships to secure professional positions throughout the government. The patronage system is particularly acute within some sectors of the security services, where political and personal relationships often supersede professional conduct and competency.

The unprecedented nine to ten percent increase of the overall Jordanian population as a result of Syrian refugees has pushed the import-heavy Jordanian government into further reliance on foreign financial aid. Through IMF, EU, and US financial support, the country’s budget deficits have narrowed though public debt remains at 90 percent and unemployment increased from 14 percent to 22 percent in 2014. Due to the government’s overdependence on a politically motivated patronage system, systemic reforms are anathema to those who have historically thrived under public benefits. Thus efforts to curb this reliance ultimately undermine the Monarchy’s ability to institute meaningful economic changes. Nonetheless, progress towards this difficult objective remains a worthwhile goal for Jordan’s overall security.

The international community’s traditional responses to Jordan’s precarious economic position often focus on broadening the country’s financial reserves through infusions of foreign aid. But as long as foreign direct investments serve as the preferred model of external financial support, the government should channel these funds towards economic activities that utilize the immense labor reserves offered by the refugee population and Jordan’s unemployed youth.

By adopting economic policies that target this readily available labor pool, the government can provide opportunities for a highly vulnerable population in the low-skill manufacturing, agriculture, and construction sectors. Due to the widespread destruction of Syria’s manufacturing output, and the slow disappearance of formerly productive commercial centers and trade routes, the Jordanian government has the opportunity to develop these lost capabilities within its borders. Such an approach similarly coopts the potential diversion of marginalized youths and refugees into criminality or radicalization.

This approach not only addresses the socio-economic grievances that threaten the government’s long-term stability, but also changes public perceptions of the government’s commitment to meaningful reforms.

Due to the inflamed crises that characterize the Jordan’s neighborhood, the opposition movement has so far restrained itself from overt agitation for regime change. This patient resolve is perhaps rooted in the hopes that meaningful change might emerge through cooperation with the monarchy, rather than the revolutionary violence that has resulted in widespread human suffering elsewhere in the region. Unlike other places in the region, the government has the unlikely benefit of a relatively subdued opposition movement. It should capitalize on this level of calm agitation for change and dedicate more of its foreign assistance toward addressing the full breadth of opposition grievances.

The Limits of Narrow Counterterrorism Approaches

It is likely that the more visible results of effective counterterrorism support occur on the operational theater. Local security services elevate their targeting, surveillance, and response capabilities and gain an operational edge against insurgents and terrorist networks through US training and equipment support. However, when partner states accept US assistance, these transactions are also de facto political decisions with immense implications on the governed.

Recipient governments that focus their enhanced counterterrorism capabilities on regime survival or personal enrichment, as seen in Iraq, are unlikely to survive in the long-term. For others, security assistance and cooperation becomes a publically poisonous symbol of US encroachment on state sovereignty as seen in Yemen and Pakistan. In these environments, security-centered assistance is commonly squandered and US national interests harmed in the long-term.

The United States must therefore balance its security-dominant engagement with the Jordanian government and dedicate more resources to the socio-political and economic factors addressed herein. Placing governance and economic reform conditions on US security assistance, is the first step towards changing the United States’ reception within the Jordanian public. These conditions also incentivize the Jordanian government to balance security-based expenditures with the socio-economic investments that target the governance roots of instability. Over time, it is these investments that build economic, political, and social resilience throughout the Jordanian public and prevent radicalization among the most vulnerable sectors of the general public.

 

 

Peter Kirechu is a graduate student at the Mercyhurst Institute for Intelligence Studies where he focuses on civil strife, insurgencies and counterterrorism. Mr. Kirechu was also a 2013 Boren Scholar to Jordan where he studied the security and humanitarian effects of Syria’s civil conflict. Twitter: @PeterKirechu

Turning technology from an asset into a liability: using big data to fight ISIS

By: Sabina Ciofu

Source: http://www.datafloq.com

Unlike any other terrorist organisation, the so-called Islamic State has consistently and efficiently made use of social media tools for self-promotion and recruitment. With an estimated 200,000 tweets a day for at least the last couple of years, it is by far the most aggressive social media offensive we have ever seen from a radical group. Western powers, often focused on traditional military and political responses to conflict and aggression, have initially reacted in a weak and fragmented manner to the wave of social media activity. It is only recently that concerted action has been taken by national and regional counter-terrorism authorities to respond to the threat of online radicalisation and recruitment. This has led to some decrease in the number and activity of English-speaking ISIS accounts, but it is still far from achieving the dismantling of their online networks.

That there is no coordinated military and political solution to the crisis in Syria and Iraq is getting more and more obvious by the day. The Western powers cooperate with the Arab countries and Sunni groups on one side, while Russia is closely working with Iran and the Shia militias on the other. With such a complex landscape of strategic interests, it is no surprise that coming up with a coherent approach to ending the war in Syria is proving a big mountain to climb. However, the latency to counteract ISIS’ charm offensive on social media – even when it targets Western citizens who have in significant numbers fallen for the Islamist rhetoric – is far more problematic.

Public-private cooperation

Following a slow initial response, in recent times several meetings have taken place between Western governments and the largest American internet platforms in an attempt to cooperate in fighting ISIS propaganda online. The US government has, upon a number of occasions, asked the private sector for assistance, most recently enlisting Facebook, Instagram and Twitter to assist in the fight against terrorism. The French government has also contacted the US companies for support in removing online propaganda material, following the Charlie Hebdo attacks, while the UK Parliament had previously put blame on internet platforms, claiming that they are instrumental in spreading terrorist ideology. Far from a synchronized effort to find a common strategy to combat terrorism online, it oftentimes looks like a desperate cry for help from some governments, when they realise that what goes on online is strongly linked to national security threats. And this picture is further twisted by the complexity of the international law system, where tech companies are left with the decision of balancing out questions of freedom of expression, censorship and the difference between dissemination and promotion of online propaganda.

Using Big Data to draw patterns

What if one could turn one of the mightiest ISIS weapons into a liability? What if, by using big data analytics, one can look into the huge amount of content provided by ISIS-related websites, traditional media and social media accounts, to be able to draw relevant patterns? This may already be underway in highly classified intelligence programmes, where advanced algorithms may be used to track and determine potential terrorist activity. For example, in domestic law-enforcement domains, this is a model already being explored in some parts of the United States. By making use of mathematical and analytical techniques, police authorities are able to determine patterns that could lead to predicting criminal activity.

Apply that same technique for counter-terrorism and the value of big data analytics increases substantially. Having the technical ability to follow the data patterns, the footprints and the online records, looking into location, travel, profiles and messages of potential terrorists is a gold mine for national security authorities. It is easy to estimate that advanced big data analytics will outpace the computational ability of ISIS users to fake their identity and hide their location, as there are already a significant number of failings, even when instructed to hide their GPS location. There are situations where ISIS buildings and hotspots have been targeted by Western military forces, after users had accidentally pinpointed their location on social media. Ultimately, there is very little ISIS propagandists can do to completely hide online, if the organisation’s aim is to use the internet to spread the ideology, promote the mission and recruit new fighters.

As a general rule, recent research shows that social media analytics can be used for creating detailed profiles of potential terrorists and then looking for places where a high percentage of the local population matches the profile. Although this would seem a pretty straightforward approach, it has been shown that looking into the motivations and backgrounds of confirmed terrorists doesn’t necessarily lead to one single profile. However, sketching using big data analytics can define some widely-valid characteristics. For instance, ISIS recruits tend to be predominantly young and male and the ones originating in the EU and the US tend to come from a middle class background, with a high level of education. Drawing patterns out of huge amounts of available data has, however, obvious downsides, as it would only be a perfect profiling system if both the data and the algorithm were perfect. Therefore, privacy concerns are ultimately justified and any such governmental initiatives should duly take them into account.

Existing Big Data analytics projects

A massive data mining project by Qatar Computing Research Institute in Doha looked at social media data to figure out the origins of support for the Islamic State. Over a three month period, scientists looked into more than three million tweets, highlighting common patterns and attributes between pro and anti-ISIS messages. The algorithm was successful in “guessing” the sentiment in 87% of the cases, which is amazingly high for any big data project.

The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency (IARPA) – the high-tech research arm of the U.S. intelligence community – is also focusing several programmes on using big data analytics to tackle some of the challenges ISIS has created online. For instance, they are currently focusing efforts on a facial recognition programme, based on imagery collected from available sources, be they high resolution cameras, or mobile phones, and even devices with less reliable resolution or lighting. Of course, the process is proving to be a difficult one, especially when algorithms are in charge of creating one face and recognising it from imagery in various angles, with varying lighting and quality.

Aside from its facial recognition programme, IARPA is also focusing on analytics results based on online video searching, through its code-named Aladdin programme. This implies designing new big data search methods for video content, that does not simply target tag words or user-generated content, but scans the video itself for elements that can describe what the movie is about. While terrorists may be clever enough not to tag videos where, for instance, they explain how to make explosives in view of a potential terrorist attack, their videos would be easily inspected and tracked down if a search method non-reliant on tags would be developed. Thus, while YouTube has been doing a great job in taking down such content almost in real time and while ISIS has moved these activities to the dark web to be less visible and thus less searchable, these movie samples may provide very valuable insight to national security experts, using advanced big data analytics to extract information from video material.

Moreover, the bigger the data, the better the big data analytics will be. Shared information for national security purposes has been something friendly governments have been focused on doing ever since 9/11. The precision and quality of information coming out of a big data project will always rely on the amount of data analysed, thus making it obviously necessary that countries cooperate in exchanging the information they have. The Dfuze system, for instance, is a database that allows such information exchange across multiple countries. National security experts can use the platform to access large amount of data shared by various actors and thus draw possible trends and patterns that can assist with prevention and preparation in view of potential terrorist attacks. There are already 40 countries using this product, which is an indication that such big data application can be very powerful tool in terrorism prevention and control.

Conclusion

This is not to say that big data, alone, can prevent terrorist attacks. Lone wolves will always be a difficult category to track, hunt and make sense of. This is to say, however, that big data can have a very significant input in creating and tracking the kind of patterns needed for effective intelligence gathering. It can also have a very important part to play in prediction, especially when it comes to planned, organised and coordinated terror attacks. Significant human reasoning and expertise will have to be attached to this, to distinguishing between real attacks and online bluff, between facts and intentionally deceptive mass-upload of messages. But that is the case for any intelligence method – human reasoning will continue to be at the centre of decision-making. And while it will always be the case that intelligence failures will be blamed for terrorist attacks – and hence also the failure of the people involved and the tools used – we simply don’t know how many terror plots have already been foiled and how many anti-ISIS military operations have already been successful with input from big data analytics.

 

 

Sabina Maria Ciofu is a first year MPhil/PhD candidate in Defence Studies, at King’s College London, where she explores the relationship between big data and US foreign policy. She is also a policy advisor in the European Parliament, working on digital economy, foreign affairs and trade issues. Sabina holds a BA in Classics from Cambridge and a MA in War Studies from King’s College London. @SabinaCiofu

ISIS and the Flood: the hydro-politics behind the rise (and fall) of Daesh

EDITORS NOTE: This is the fourth and final article in a four-part series which explores the role of water in human conflict and politics. The series marks (though is not affiliated with) World Water Day 2016, a UN initiative to promote awareness of water issues. More information on World Water Day can be found here. The first, second, and third, articles in the series can be found here,  here, and here, respectively.

By: Harris Kuemmerle

The Euphrates River edging against the desert. Source: Wikimedia

The average person can only survive 3-7 days without water before ultimately (and inevitably) succumbing to a painful death. Likewise, there is not a single nation-state on earth whose day-to-day existence is not entirely and utterly dependent upon the economic, agricultural, political, cultural, and fundamentally life giving qualities of that all-important molecule. Water is the lowest common denominator. There is no substitute, and there is no cure for its absence. In a very real sense, governments live by the tap, and die by the tap; and the so called Islamic State are no exception.

After all, their rise occurred against the backdrop of profound underlying hydrological factors and issues in the run-up to the destabilisation of Syria in 2011, namely one of the worst droughts in half a century. A drought which was primarily the result of a confluence of factors mainly including climate change, and ineffectual and short-sighted hydrological management and agricultural policies on the part of the Assad government. Make no mistake, droughts are very bad for business, and a recent report by UN-Water (the inter-agency UN organisation designed to assist states promote water quality and availability) suggested that as many as four-fifths, or about 78%, of all jobs globally are moderately or heavily dependent upon a stable supply of water.[1]

This is especially true in the rural Syrian north east where the traditional reliance on agriculture is made possible by the large areas of arable land, compared to the rest of Syria. Indeed, the area of Al-Hasakeh in particular is responsible for around 75% of Syria’s total wheat production.[2] This bounty, however, also makes the north east region heavily dependent upon reliable water supplies for life and living. Therefore, it seems likely that such a major drought would have hit Syrian employment hard as agricultural falters in its traditional regions. And indeed, the result of this drought was the large scale unemployment of around 800,000 people; which in turn resulted in thousands of young men moving from the rural areas to the cities in search of work.[3] This arguably both added to existing stresses and tensions and had the unintended consequence of creating a large and desperate pool of young men for groups like Daesh to exploit.[4] While it would be simplistic to claim that the drought caused the Syrian uprising and resultant civil war by itself, it was an undeniable stress multiplier which Daesh were deftly able to exploit. However, water issues have also been an integral factor in the rise of Daesh beyond just fuelling destabilisation and providing the environment for a large pool of willing recruits to join their state-building project.

Water as a weapon of war

The brutality and savagery of Daesh tactics are well documented, with their latest attack in Brussels sending shock waves around the world. However, probably their least well known (and arguably most effective) strategies have been their attempts to control the dams and waters of the Tigris and Euphrates; rivers which constitute the vast majority of habitable and arable land in Iraq and Syria. Since their inception Daesh have at one time or another taken control of five dams along the Tigris and Euphrates; the Samarra, Nuaimiyah, Haditha, Mosul, and Tishrin.[5] This has given them the capabilities to drown entire cities such as Baghdad or shutoff the water or electricity to whole communities as a means of instilling psychological terror or controlling populations. Capabilities which have been turned into actions on numerous occasions. For example, in April 2014 Daesh closed the gates of the Nuaymiyah Dam and the resulting flooding successfully unseated government forces in the area and caused water shortages for millions, and thousands to lose their homes.[6] Furthermore, in August 2014 Daesh successfully captured Mosul Dam, the control of which put Baghdad and almost half a million Iraqis in direct danger of flooding and electricity blackout. The danger was deemed to be so great that the Iraqi government committed considerable resources (including US assistance) to its successful recapture.[7]

However, Daesh is still in control of a number of other dams in Syria and Iraq and their control has given Daesh not only an effective means of combating government forces, it has also given them a powerful and coercive tool for both instilling dread and loyalty among populations.[8] In the words of Michael Stephen at RUSI, ‘the control of water supplies gives strategic control over both cities and countryside. We are seeing a battle for control of water. Water is now the major strategic objective of all groups in Iraq. It’s life or death. If you control water in Iraq you have a grip on Baghdad, and you can cause major problems. Water is essential in this conflict.’[9] Indeed, in a 2014 issue of Dabiq (Daeshs’ official magazine) the group claimed that ‘it’s either Islamic State or the flood’, making clear their willingness to use water as a weapon of war.[10]

Water as a tool of peace

However, when the guns fall quiet and the warriors go home the prevailing state must be able to provide for the basic services of its people, including its vanquished. That ability to provide basic services is one of the most common tests of a state, and Daesh is not exempt from this. Adding to that, in the case of arid Syria and Iraq, the supply of water is of particular importance and according to one intelligence official, ‘if ISIS has any hope of establishing itself on territory, it has to control some water.’[11] However, this control also comes with responsibilities; and crucially, costs.

If Daesh intends to survive as a state in the traditional sense then it must invest heavily in the building, upgrading, and management of new and current water works infrastructure and delivery projects while also ensuring that the supply is sustainable. This investment will likely require substantial financial and political costs in their newly conquered regions as their inherited infrastructure becomes unfit for purpose. While at the same time Daesh will also need to be able to evolve its institutional structure in order to have the organisational bodies necessary to oversee these developments and manage the system while also making sure they are well staffed with trained personnel.

Going hand in hand with this management and governance will be dealing with issues pertaining to the equal use of the waters and Daesh will have to have systems put in place to mediate disputes over fresh water use domestically in order to prevent tensions. While also having the diplomatic presence necessary to fight for the fresh water interests of their new state among their neighbours in one of the driest regions on earth. These realities will necessitate cooperation (particularly internationally), and while there are some limited examples of this occuring, it remains unclear if Daesh will be pragmatic enough to be able to put aside ideology and cooperate long-term with those they may deem their enemy in order to keep the taps flowing.

This is a daunting list of tasks for any state, especially a new one. So how well is the new so-called Islamic State getting on with functioning as a state? While it is hard to say for sure, all indications suggest that things are not going as well as hoped. A 2014 report suggested that Daesh seemed to be unable to provide even basic services, with water only available for 3-4 hours a day in Raqqa.[12] Likewise, a later report from August 2015 suggested that services had improved in some areas, however, that the conflict was also taking a heavy toll on the infrastructure and the medium to long-term sustainability of those services was in doubt.[13]

In response the group have taken steps to ensure they meet water and electricity demands, including paying for Syrian and Iraqi government water infrastructure staff to remain at their jobs in Daesh controlled territory, taxing water, and bringing in outside assistance.[14] However, these are short-term solutions and will likely not by itself be enough to provide for the basic needs of the people in the longer term and much more investment in infrastructure and cultivation of domestic talent will be required to provide an adequate supply moving forward.

Indeed, the fact that Daesh appear to be relying so heavily on short-term water management solutions seems to suggest that the group still lacks both expertise in this area, and a dedicated governing body for managing the system and developing long-term policies. While also underlying all of this, is what appears to be a fundamentally unstable cultural dichotomy. With Daeshs’ primary ideological drive seemingly to expand the state through war, at the expense of their civic ambitions to establish a civil Caliphate becoming more secondary.

Concluding remarks

Ultimately, with waters importance in war, also comes its inseparability from peace. And in order for Daesh to survive as a state they must have in place robust and effective agricultural, hydrological, and infrastructure policies to keep the waters flowing and the people alive. While also working to mediate fresh water inequalities within and without their borders. This responsibility (on top of their other duties as a de facto state) will place great strain on Daesh leadership and it seems that they still lack the expertise and stability necessary to effectively deliver on key public services and move beyond short-term solutions.

This matters because while water politics and the use of water as a weapon seem to have been a key asset of Daesh in their early years. As time moves on they will likely find water issues to be much more of a problem than an asset. Indeed, while the inability to provide basic services is not always in in of itself enough to topple governments, and the Daesh regime may indeed be popular with some. Daesh must also know all too well that fresh water shortages can still be a significant contributing factor to instability in a once prosperous region. Despite that, the situation in their territory seems to indicate that Daesh are largely failing both at providing those services in the short-term and in building a system which can ensure stable supplies of water and other services in the long-term, making their future as a state seem as uncertain as the waters of the rivers that support them.

 

 

Harris Kuemmerle is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies and the Department of Geography at King’s College London. His research focuses on the role of provincial engagement in the formulation and implementation of national security and management policies along the Indus River. Twitter: @HarrisKuemmerle

 

 

 

[1] 2016, The United Nations World Water Development Report 2016: Water and Jobs

[2] 2013, Impact of the conflict on Syrian economy and livelihoods, Syria Needs Analysis Project, ACAPS

[3] Aron Lund, 2014, Drought, Corruption, and War: Syria’s Agricultural Crisis, Carnegie Endowment

[4] Ian Sample, 2015, Global warming contributed to Syria’s 2011 uprising, scientists claim, The Guardian, 2 March, 2015

[5] John Vidal, “Water supply key to outcome of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, experts warn,” The Guardian, 2 July, 2014

[6] Ibid.

[7] Saira Khan, 2016, The Islamic State and Water Infrastructure, Tel Aviv Notes, Volume 10, Number 3

[8] 2014, Iraq insurgents use water as weapon after seizing dam, Reuters

[9] John Vidal, “Water supply key to outcome of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, experts warn,” The Guardian, July 2, 2014

[10] The Islamic State, “The Flood,” Dabiq, Issue 2, 1435 Ramadan

[1] John Vidal, “Water supply key to outcome of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, experts warn,” The Guardian, July 2, 2014

[12] Liz Sly, The Islamic State is failing at being a state, The Washington Post, December 25, 2014

[13] Laith Alkhouri and Alex Kassirer, 2015, Governing the Caliphate: The Islamic State Picture, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point Military Academy

[14] Saira Khan, 2016, The Islamic State and Water Infrastructure, Tel Aviv Notes, Volume 10, Number 3

Organised crime and terrorism Part IV: Setting examples: Violence as communication in Mexico’s Cartel War

This is the fourth, and final, piece in Strife’s four-part series exploring the relationship between organised crime and terrorism in a 21st century security environment. The first, second, and third parts can be found here, here, and here, respectively.

By: Joe Atkins

Fire engulfs a casino in Monterrey, killing 52 people. Source: BBC News.

Too often, some conflicts attract attention only when something abnormally brutal happens. This occurred in Nigeria, when the terrorist group Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls on 14 April 2014, shocking international audiences. This happened also, some months later, in Mexico. There, in the state of Guerrero, 43 students were kidnapped on 20 September 2014. Two weeks later, local police forces found a mass grave, with the charred and tortured bodies of 28 of them. Mexico’s Attorney General claimed that the former mayor of the town of Iguala ordered the massacre, in cooperation with the local cartel, Guerreros Unidos. A year after the fact, however, an international committee, appointed by the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, expressed serious concerns regarding the Attorney General’s account of the event[1]. This sparked doubts about the reliability of this version, which affirms that members of the Guerreros Unidos killed the students, took them to a dump, and burned their bodies. Reports about the federal police’s monitoring activity of the students casted a shadow on this episode of brutality[2].

The massacre of the 43 students of Guerrero was a particularly notorious case, even for crime-ridden Mexico. It attracted international attention, constituting a major embarrassment for President Enrique Peña Nieto’s government. Outside observers, however, face a daunting task when they try to make sense of Mexico’s highly intense violence, made even more difficult given the complexity of the conflict itself. It is no surprise that some commentators simply dismiss violence as devoid of any rational meaning. Actually, the intricate character of the conflict is a problem also for cartels and state authorities themselves. Blurred allegiances and conflicting attributions of blame make communication very difficult. In this context, violence has become a tool to convey information and propaganda.

The Mexico drug war has been going on since 2006 and has caused among 30 and 60 per cent of the 120.000 homicides that occurred in the country between 2006 and 2013[3]. During the last ten years, eight cartels have been competing with each other for the control of the trade routes for cocaine, marijuana and methamphetamine. Simultaneously, they have confronted the Mexican state, by corrupting or intimidating police and judiciary officials, by scaring local mayors, and by influencing elections. To add confusion to this already complex situation, allegiances and power relations have been very fluid. Local gangs, in fact, often switch loyalty, while some cartels have been effectively defeated, only to have rivals and offshoots rising in their place. Moreover, several anti-crime forces have been operating, including the Mexican Army and Navy, with various degrees of effectiveness and collusion. Local citizens, finally, have conjured up their own vigilante forces, which have often demonstrated as much brutality as the drug trafficking organisations[4].

In this complicated context, it is often difficult to know who is ruling in a particular area. Thus, cartels and gangs have often decided to make their presence felt by way of cruelty and terror. This already happened during the outburst of drug-related violence in the 1990s, when beheadings became a frequent method to send messages to rival cartels. The new era of “high-intensity crime”, however, has renewed and expanded this function of violence.

Now, messages conveyed by violence reach multiple audiences. Politicians are the recipients, as well as police officers, journalists, the armed forces, and the public at large[5]. Violence has become a major communication tool, and its effect is different depending on the receiver. Cartels target members of particular categories to push them to cooperate or to make them neutral; violence, however, hits common citizens as well, sowing confusion among them and paralysing any attempt to revert the drug traffickers’ grip on society. Moreover, violence has become so widespread that it is actually possible to identify different types of violence, each of which conveys a particular message from drug trafficking organisations.

Mass killings are one of these types. If we look deeper into Mexico’s most dangerous states we can find other massacres like the one in Iguala. In most of them, survivor reports, CCTV videos, or victims’ reports pointed out at the Los Zetas cartel, formed by ex-members of Mexico’s Special Forces. In 2010, in San Fernando, Tamaulipas state, Los Zetas affiliates killed 72 immigrants from Central and South America, after their refusal to join the cartel or pay extra fees to enter the United States[6]. In 2011, in the same area, Zetas hijacked several passenger buses, raping the women and forcing the able-bodied men to fight among themselves, awarding the survivors with cartel membership[7]; in total, 193 people died. Only some months later, in Monterrey, Nuevo Léon state, a Los Zetas commando fired indiscriminately on customers in a casino, and then started a fire that destroyed the building, killing 52 people in total [8]. In the same area, the year later, 49 bodies were found dumped by a roadside on the Mexican Federal Highway 40[9]. The Los Zetas cartel seems to be responsible for all the mass killings above. The heightened rivalry between Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel over cocaine routes in North-Eastern Mexico is the most likely explanation of this series of indiscriminate violence. Massacres, however, are also a means to maintain the Zetas’ reputation as cold-blooded murderers with a taste for bloodshed[10]. It is a tool of psychological warfare. In an environment where violence is everywhere, the need to make its effect felt is even more pressing.

Violence as a communication tool, then, is the by-product of the rivalry among several cartels. This rivalry engenders a “competitive escalation of increasingly extreme and creatively violent acts”[11]. Most of this escalation, for now, resulted in the murder of single persons or of little groups. At its core, the murder in itself is always a message, as its perpetrators usually present it as a punishment, an act of justice. Since the beginning of the conflict, however, it has lost its symbolic strength, simply because there are too many of them[12]. Beheadings were an early method to convey a more forceful message and stun the audience, by showing that cartel members were capable of anything[13]. Even decapitations, however, have become increasingly commonplace, since a group of members of La Familia Michoacana threw five severed heads on a nightclub dance floor to publicise their “divine justice”[14]. With time, then, a whole set of forms of drug-related killing and treatment of corpses has formed, with its own lexicon. These words are quite common among different Mexican cartels and in the media coverage of the drug war.  For example, enteipados are bodies wrapped in duct tape; descuartizados are bodies that have been quartered (as the victims of the 2012 Nuevo Leon massacre); encajuelados are bodies left in the trunk of a car; entambados are bodies crammed in barrels; encobijados are bodies wrapped in blankets. In addition, cutting off fingers means that the dead person was a snitch; cutting hands means that the dead was a thief; cutting the tongue means the dead was a police or rival cartel informer, while cutting the foot means the dead was a defector[15]. Finally, bodies are generally left on roadsides, usually half or wholly naked. This happens most often for women, as a means to deprive them of their honour, but also for men, in an attempt to demote their manhood[16]. In Mexico, drug-related murders are seldom a hidden act. On the contrary, narcos leave the bodies in public places, where everyone can see and read the messages on the corpse.

Actual violence, then, has evolved from simple murder, by differentiating into different types, according to quantity, treatment of the body, and ritualized display of it. Another dimension, however, is particularly important in the current inter-cartel war: the broadcasting of violence. Brutal acts committed by cartel members, in fact, are not only important as a local display of strength. With the diffusion of Internet, in fact, their reproduction has become as much a tool of psychological warfare as an integral part of the narcocultura. In the past, cartels had also profited from traditional channels, by devoting attention to timing to guarantee that specific time slots of local television news cover the murders.[17] The online presence of drug trafficking organisations, however, is increasingly important. The Internet has become a major battlefield in the information war, with its own offensives and counter-offensives[18], and cartels and vigilante groups have become its major actors, with the Mexican state present in a lesser degree[19].

Cartels, however, still do not have a vertically organised propaganda strategy, with a coherent graphic style, formalised structures and technical sophistication[20]. Most of the output consists in self-proclaimed cartel members and, in large part, in young men attracted by drug trafficking myths. Cartel online presence, then, is scattered, grassroots, and spontaneous. It is, thus, also more difficult to tackle. This is particularly true for social networks, with reports of cartel activity on Myspace, Youtube[21] and Facebook[22]. Cartel members have used all these online channels to convey threats of violence or pictures and videos of murders and massacres. Apart from mainstream social networks and media sites, moreover, cartel-specific news sites have sprung up, to avoid the self-imposed censorship of local newspapers and to capitalise on narcocultura’s increasing success. The foremost example is blogdelnarco.com, which, since its inception in 2010, has become one of Mexico’s most visited sites. Blog del Narco broadcasts gruesome pictures of murders and, most famously, videos of interrogations, usually featuring the torture and homicide of the hostage[23]. In this way, cartel members humiliate the victim, as well as the rival cartels; they spread fear among their affiliates and show how the government is weak, if the victim is a police officer.

Outside commentators often define violence in the Mexican cartel war as “meaningless”. This assertion, as we have seen, is hardly true. Violence, first, serves as a way of settling disputes and punishing. This is not its only function, though. From the cartel’s perspective, violence is most effective when rival cartels, government forces, and the local population get to know that cartel justice has stricken. The communication of violence, thus, is an essential part of the act of kidnapping, torturing, or killing. As drug trafficking organisations lack the communication strategy and hierarchy that terrorist groups retain, every affiliate or group of affiliates participates in the larger information war, by acting, by leaving messages, and by broadcasting them via television or the Internet. The combined effect of this phenomenon is to sow confusion among those who fight the cartels and to establish a climate of constant, ever-lasting fear among a paralysed population.

 

Joe Atkins is an MA student in Latin American Studies. His interest in the Mexican drug war stems from an older fascination for Mexican culture and literature. He is also studying welfare and politics in the Central American countries.

 

Notes:

[1] Paulina Villegas, Experts Reject Official Account of How 43 Mexican Students Were Killed, New York Times, Sep. 6, 2015. Available on http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/world/experts-reject-official-account-of-how-43-mexican-students-vanished.html, accessed on February 4, 2016.

[2] Ed Vulliamy, One year ago, 43 Mexican students were killed. Still, there are no answers for their family, The Guardian, Sep. 20, 2015. Available on http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/20/mexico-43-killed-students-, accessed on February 4, 2016.

[3] Brianna Lee, Mexico’s Drug War, Council for Foreign Relations, March 5, 2014. Available on http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689, accessed on February 4, 2016.

[4] George W. Grayson, Threat Posed by Mounting Vigilantism in Mexico, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute, Sep. 2011.

[5] Howard Campbell, Narco-Propaganda in the Mexican “Drug War”. An Anthropological Perspective, Latin American Perspectives, Issue 195, Vol. 41 No. 2, March 2014, p. 64.

[6] Randal C. Archibold, Victims of Massacre in Mexico Said to Be Migrants, New York Times, Aug. 25, 2010. Available on http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/world/americas/26mexico.html, accessed on February 4, 2016.

[7] Adam C. Estes, Mexico’s Tales of Bus Passengers Forced to Fight to Death, The Wire, Jun. 14, 2011. Available on http://www.thewire.com/global/2011/06/gladiator-death-fights-mexico-drug-war/38812/#disqus_thread, accessed on February 4, 2016.

[8] Simon Rogers, Mexico’s drug war visualized, The Guardian, Jan 31, 2012. Available on http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/graphic/2012/jan/31/mexico-drug-war-visualised, accessed on February 5, 2016.

[9] BBC News, Mexico violence: Monterrey police find 49 bodies, 13 May 2012. Available on http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-18052540, accessed on February 5, 2016.

[10] Ioan Grillo, Special Report – Mexico’s Zetas rewrite drug war in blood, May 23, 2012. Available on http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mexico-drugs-zetas-idUKBRE84M0MF20120523, accessed on February 5, 2016.

[11] Campbell, p. 64.

[12] A facilitating condition of the increase in cartel-related deaths has been the diminishing costs of killers-to-hire. Estimates of a killer’s pay for a single murder in 2001 were in the range of $12.000; in 2011, cartels paid from $500 to $650 per month for indeterminate killings and other acts of violence. Paul Rextor Kan, Cartels at War, Washington, D.C., Potomac Books, 2012, p. 26.

[13] Kan, p. 29.

[14] BBC News, Human heads dumped in Mexico bar, 7 September 2006. Available on http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/5322160.stm, accessed on February 5, 2016.

[15] America Y. Guevara, Propaganda in Mexico’s Drug War, Journal of Strategic Security, 6, no. 3, 2013, p. 138.

[16] Campbell, pp. 65-66.

[17] Campbell, p. 65.

[18] Robert J. Bunker, The Growing Mexican Cartel and Vigilante War in Cyberspace, Small Wars Journal, Nov. 2011, pp. 1-4.

[19] Guevara, p. 150.

[20] Sarah Womer, Robert J. Bunker, Sureños gangs and Mexican cartel use of social networking sites, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 21:1, 2010, pp. 91-92.

[21] Womer, Bunker, pp. 86-89.

[22] Juan-Camilo Castilo, The Mexican Cartels’ employment of Inform and Influence Activities (IIA) as tools of Asymmetrical Warfare, University of Kwazulu-Natal, 2014, p. 4.

[23] Campbell, pp. 68-70.

Organised crime and terrorism Part III: Letters from Dubai: D-Company’ and the ‘93 Mumbai terror attacks

This is the third piece in Strife’s four-part series exploring the relationship between organised crime and terrorism in a 21st century security environment. The first and second parts can be found here and here, respectively.

By: Andrea Varsori

The aftermath of the bomb near the headquarters of the Shiv Sena. Source: India Times

Rags-to-riches criminal overlords do not normally lack ambition; yet, most of them do not aim to claim the title of ‘Protectors of the Faith’. Their daily worries are mostly concerned with assuring that their network of businesses runs smoothly, that officials are sufficiently bribed or intimidated, and that all their underlings actually remain loyal. However, even the most business-minded criminal bosses can develop a sense of allegiance to their own community, be it ethnic or religious. In times of sectarian violence, these overlords may decide to act to defend their people. This decision may be completely at odds with the logic of the criminal enterprise: it entails a potential backlash from the authorities and the larger public. During sectarian conflicts, however, their reputation is at stake: inaction may spark doubts about a boss’ ability to project his own power, thus encouraging rivals to try to take over his networks. The boss’ community may also feel betrayed, and may begin to sabotage the boss’ illicit trade and favour someone else. There is no simple way to solve this problem.

Dawood Ibrahim probably never had this kind of thoughts before December 1992. At that time, Ibrahim was one of the most powerful citizens of Mumbai, although he was no longer a resident. He was born in the southern part of the city in 1955, the eldest son in a low-income family of ten. After dropping out of school, he gradually resorted to extortions and robbing, eventually ending up smuggling goods in local markets. The major boost to his career arrived while in jail: there, in fact, he managed to earn the trust of Haji Mastan and Yusuf Patel, two of the most important smugglers of the city.[1] Having understood Dawood’s ambition, they entrusted him with their business before retiring. By the time Dawood was free again, he had thus gained access to Mastan’s and Patel’s resources. Starting from there, he used both ruthless violence and cunning to profit from the weaknesses of the most important gang in Mumbai, led by Pathans from Afghanistan. By 1982, he had managed to kill the new leader of this gang; however, the Mumbai police was often able to prove his complicity in most of his gang’s crimes, and he was visiting prison quite often. On 4 May 1984, he jumped bail and fled to Dubai.[2]

In Dubai, then a major haven for smugglers, he managed to build a massive network of illegal and legal businesses. This network included both Muslims and Hindus, as it had often been the case in earlier criminal gangs of Mumbai. What became known as ‘D-Company’ — from the first letter of Dawood — smuggled in gold, silver, electronic goods, and textiles; it extorted protection from businessmen and occasionally solved disputes between them.[3] In Dubai, Ibrahim built for himself a luxurious mansion, where he organised lavish parties, inviting Mumbai’s most famous celebrities, cricketers, and politicians. His story was that of a boy from Dongri who had successfully taken control of entire criminal enterprises and who had silenced rival Hindu dons: in Mumbai, Muslims in the slums started to see him as an empowering model, as a vindicator of the Islamic minority. He could not return to his own city, however, as he knew that the police was waiting for him. This constraint became a problem for him and his associates when the Mumbai riots began in December 1992.

It all started in Ayodhya, 1,460km northeast of Mumbai. In this region, Hindu mythology claimed that Ram, one of the avatars of Vishnu, was born; a temple stood on the exact place of Ram’s birth. In 1523, Mahmud of Ghazni, commander of an army of Muslim invaders from Central Asia, conquered the area and destroyed the temple of Ram. In its place, he built the Babri Masjid, or Babur’s Mosque, in honour of the first Moghul Emperor. The memory of these events contributed to embittered relations between Hindus and Muslims in the area. In the 1980s, the Hindu Sangh Parivar (HSP), an umbrella organisation including several Hindu nationalist groups, aimed to revive the dispute. The members of its various branches claimed that the mosque had to be closed and destroyed, in order to build a new, bigger temple to Ram. The victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), itself a part of HSP, at the local state elections in 1991 decided the fate of the mosque. One year later, the government transferred the property of the land on which the Masjid stood to a Hindu organisation charged with constructing a new temple; volunteers destroyed all buildings surrounding the mosque.[4] On 6 December 1992, a crowd of 150,000 Hindu nationalist militants summoned by the main leaders managed to overcome a weak police presence and razed to the ground the Babri Masjid.[5]

This was an insult for many Indian Muslims. The destruction of the mosque in Ayodhya was followed by six days of intense riots. In Mumbai, Muslim mobs started targeting temples; the police, in a desperate attempt to control the violence, fired on looters, while Hindus retaliated on mosques.[6] This cycle of riots in Mumbai left 227 dead: around two-thirds of the victims were Muslims, while only 15% of the whole city population at that time was Islamic.[7] In January 1993, a new sequence of riots occurred: this time, the troubles lasted for ten days, and caused 557 dead and more than 2.000 injured[8]. As in the December riots, the Islamic population had been disproportionally hit by the violence.

As the riots went on, Dawood Ibrahim kept receiving discomforting news. Furious rioters were explicitly targeting Muslim men and women; after days of communal violence, angry mobs began to protest against him, shouting “Dawood to death.”[9] They felt betrayed: he seemed distant, powerless, and unable to protect them. This belief could become rapidly damaging to Dawood’s reputation and business. As the riots abated, sectarian tension did not decrease: by the end of January 1993, Dawood had finally decided to exact revenge for the riots.

He ultimately did not need to do much. He helped to hold meetings in Dubai with powerful Mumbai Muslim criminals, along with representatives of the “concerned Muslims” from the Arab world. He permitted weapons and explosives to be smuggled in India through the routes he controlled. Last, but not least, he provided the connection with the Pakistani secret services, the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI).

The plan to hit Mumbai proceeded. On the afternoon of Friday, 12 March 1993, a group of affiliates of Dawood’s smuggling networks struck the city with the widest and most complex set of bombing ever seen in a single city and on a single day. Ten explosions rocked the city between 1.28pm and 3.35pm. The bombs targeted different core points, from the Mumbai Stock Exchange, to the Katha Bazaar, the city’s largest wholesale market for grain and spice, and then to the Plaza Cinema, one of the symbols of the city’s burgeoning movie industry. At the end of the day, 257 persons were dead and 713 more were injured.[10]

Naturally, one of the targets was also the headquarters of the Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena party, a part of the HSP. The Shiv Sena had a prominent role in advocating the destruction of the Babri Masjid and in fostering anti-Muslim propaganda. A bomb exploded near an oil pump, on the side of the main building: four people died, no members of the Shiv Sena were among them. Nonetheless, the location of the bomb made very clear what was the target and the sectarian allegiance of those who had placed it. Communal riots could have been the first logical consequence.

Fortunately, police forces managed to avert this potential outcome. Moreover, the brutality and breadth of the attacks had shocked most Mumbai citizens into terror, rather than rage. As soon as the smoke from the explosions had settled, however, the police started connecting the dots. It was apparent from the beginning that this act of terrorism required a complex organization and uncommon skills. On 15 March, the Times of India claimed that “hi-tech terrorism” had arrived in India.[11] At that time, this type of terrorism had several harbingers; apart from the LTTE (the Tamil Tigers), most of them were Islamic fundamentalist organizations.

Right from the beginning, however, Dawood’s fame turned against him: his name was the first to appear in the theories that tried to explain the attacks.[12] The lack of training and discipline on the part of the terrorists also helped the police tremendously. During the bombings, in fact, some of them were reaching by van the buildings that hosted the city and the Maharashtra state administration, with the intent of murdering every BJP member they could find. As they passed near one of the target locations, however, a bomb exploded, and they abruptly decided to abort the mission.[13] Therefore, they left their van behind, filled with weapons and explosives. When the police found the vehicle, it became a decisive lead for the investigators, as the van’s owner was a relative of Tiger Memon.

As the Mumbai police officers soon discovered, Memon was the centrepiece of the bombing plot. The son of a part-time worker, second among six, he grew up in a decaying, crowded building in Pydhonie – a mostly Muslim zone of South Mumbai. After a failed attempt as a bank cashier, he started his criminal career as a chauffeur for local smugglers. He was quickly noticed for his recklessness and his knowledge of the city; this earned him an invitation to Dubai, where he became a gold carrier. In a few years, he took charge of all smuggling operations from Mumbai; a sumptuous wedding in 1985 and the opening of an office in the city’s financial quarters definitively confirmed his rise.[14]

Tiger Memon had been the true organiser and motivator behind the attacks. He supported from the beginning Dawood’s decision to retaliate for the anti-Muslim riots. He was in charge of smuggling the weapons and he knew exactly how they could best reach Mumbai: by arriving on the coast, 250km south of the city.[15] He profited from the same techniques, connections, and intelligence that he used when transporting gold and electronic goods. He also selected the people that could deliver the bombs: they were all members of his network. After choosing his affiliates, he organised their military training in Pakistan; he visited the training camp for some days, according to one of the participants.[16] Most importantly, after giving his men a final rousing speech, the evening before the attacks, he left on a 4am flight to Dubai to join his large family.[17]

Later judiciary proceedings confirmed Tiger Memon’s role. The final judgement on the bombings arrived on 21 March 2013, with a sentence by the Supreme Court of India, which upheld prison sentences for most of the accused. Dawood Ibrahim and Tiger Memon, however, have not yet faced trial: they have gone into hiding, possibly in Pakistan; Dawood’s new house has been traced to Karachi as late as 2006.[18] Still, their departure from Dubai and the greater attention on the part of the authorities have taken their toll on Ibrahim’s and Memon’s criminal network. The decision to help to stage the attacks has divided the ‘D-Company’ along religious lines: in 1996, Chhota Rajan, one of Dawood’s main subordinates, formed his own gang in retaliation for the 1993 bombings. Rajan was Hindu, as most of his own affiliates: the schism caused a flare-up of gang-related homicides in Mumbai, with more than a hundred people dead.[19]

Dawood’s decision to act, then, caused permanent damages to his criminal syndicate. Sectarian division has certainly harmed ‘D-Company’s’ activity after infighting broke out in the late 1990s. The public nature of the 1993 terrorist attack, moreover, provided too much unwanted attention for a criminal organisation. Dawood’s choice can be explained by paying attention to the dual nature of his role as a ‘Don’: he had been both the man in charge for a criminal firm’s success and the potential avenger of the Muslim minorities of Mumbai. He decided to act to fulfil the latter role, instead of the former. The fact that he is not serving a prison sentence in India shows that he had some guarantees on his own personal safety. In this perspective, a crisis of his own criminal network may have seemed as a reasonable price to pay.

 

 

Andrea is an MPhil candidate at the Department of War Studies. His research project focuses on security issues in mega-cities: in particular, he is interested in the role of the urban environment in shaping organized criminal and political violence. He tweets at @Andrea_Varsori

 

Notes:

[1] Zaidi, S. H., Black Friday. The True Story of the Bombay Bomb Blasts, New Delhi, Penguin Books, 2002, pp. 21-23.

[2] Zaidi, p. 25.

[3] Zaidi, p. 26-27.

[4]McLeod, J., The History of India, Santa Barbara, CA, Greenwood Publishing, 2015, p. 194.

[5] Stein, B., D. Arnold, A History of India, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 2010, pp. 411-412.

[6] Padgaonkar, D. (ed.), When Bombay Burned, New Delhi, UBS Publishers, 1993, pp. IX-XI.

[7] Padgaonkar, p. XVI.

[8] Padgaonkar, pp. 42-100.

[9]  Zaidi, p. 21.

[10] Zaidi, pp. 1-17.

[11] High-tech Terrorism, The Times of India, March 15, 1993.

[12] Hypotheses about his involvement started to appear on that same Friday and right afterwards. Zaidi, p. 104; Padgaonkar, p. 169.

[13] Zaidi, p. 94.

[14] Zaidi, pp. 31-36.

[15] Zaidi, pp. 40-52.

[16] Zaidi, pp. 61-62.

[17] Zaidi, p. 82.

[18] Khan, A., Tiger Memon wanted to bomb plane at Sahar Airport to avenge Mumbai riots, says 1993 bomb blasts accused, India Today, August 1, 2015. Available on http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/tiger-memon-wanted-to-bomb-plane-at-sahar-airport-to-avenge-mumbai-riots/1/455519.html .

[19] Swami, P., Mumbai’s Mafia Wars, Frontline, Vol. 16, March-April 1999. Available on http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1607/16070420.htm .

Organised crime and terrorism Part II: Negotiating with bombs – The Sicilian mafia’s attempts at intimidating the Italian state

This is the second piece in Strife’s four-part series exploring the relationship between organised crime and terrorism in a 21st century security environment. The First part can be found here.

By: Martin Stein

The devastating effects of the Milan car bomb, 28 July 1993. Source: Wikimedia.

In the night between 26 and 27 May 1993, a wide deflagration stuck Florence, seemingly from its medieval centre. A car bomb, loaded with 277kg of explosives, had detonated in via dei Georgofili, a narrow road behind the world-known Uffizi art gallery. The bomb destroyed the Torre dei Pulci, a tower built during the Renaissance. There were five victims: in the Torre, in fact, Angela Fiume (36 years old), the warden, lived with his husband, Fabrizio Nencioni (39), and their two daughters, Nadia (9) and Caterina (2 months). The bomb also, in addition, caused a fire that killed Dario Capolicchio (22), a college student. There were 48 injured alongside heavy damages to the nearby Uffizi building. Around 25% of the paintings in the area were damaged, some of them beyond any possibility of repair[1].

Three other bombings occurred exactly two months after the Florence attack. Two car bombs detonated in Rome, in front of two different churches (San Giorgio al Velabro and San Giovanni in Laterano), injuring 22 people but with no casualties. A third car bomb was placed in Milan, Italy’s financial centre. The blast damaged the Contemporary Art Pavillion and killed a traffic inspector, three firefighters and a Moroccan migrant. In Italy, the shock from the incidents was immediate. Most of the population were unprepared, as Italians believed that terrorism had ended in the “Seventies” otherwise known as the “Lead Years”[2].

Bloodshed, however, was not uncommon in those years. In 1992, three events stood out for importance: this time, they all happened in Sicily. On 12 March, the passenger of a passing motorbike shot the Christian Democrat politician Salvo Lima in Palermo. On 23 May, a bomb exploded under the official car of Judge Giovanni Falcone, one of the recent protagonists of the struggle against the Sicilian Mafia. The explosive device killed Falcone, his wife and his three police-officer escort. Finally, on 19 July, a car bomb placed under the house of Judge Paolo Borsellino, the other protagonist of the recent Mafia prosecutions. The blast killed the Judge and five police servicemen.

These assassinations could have been the ultimate setback for the struggle against the Mafia. It had taken decades, for Italy at large and for the Sicilian society in particular, to acknowledge openly even the existence of this criminal organisation[3]. Its workings and its activities were, for most of the Cold War period, secret and unnoticeable. Mafiosi composed local disputes, imposed their protection racket, and collected their own taxation (the pizzo)[4]. Most importantly, local Families controlled a sizeable portion of votes. This meant that they were able to strike a deal with local politicians, mostly from the Christian Democrat party, to exchange electoral success for state inaction and distribution of public money[5]. Thus, Mafiosi and their political allies were often in charge of providing key public services, including hospitals and transportation. Then, even if Mafia violence sometimes exploded in savage wars for internal predominance, until the 1980s, its overarching infiltration of the local authority went largely unnoticed.

This began to change in the 1970s. The Mafia Families had suffered a backlash from the State in the previous decade, due to a massacre occurred during the first Mafia war. The “Lead Years”, instead, brought a new opportunity: the heroin trade. Some Mafiosi had already been engaged in smuggling[6], but, after the start of the “War on Drugs”, prominent bosses turned their organisation to trafficking on a larger scale, also by exploiting their connections with the American Cosa Nostra. Important leaders like Stefano Bontate and Tano Badalamenti started making estimated millions of dollars. In the meantime, however, they ignored a dangerous menace to their domination. From the town of Corleone, near Palermo, a group of prominent killers rose up. Their first leader was Luciano Leggio, who then transmitted his power to two main associates, Totò Riina and Bernardo Provenzano. The Corleonesi, as they were known, started encroaching on the whole organisation, by investing money in making allies and acquiring loyalties, instead of buying luxury goods. Even if Bontate and Badalamenti were much richer, the Corleonesi rapidly became militarily more powerful. By 1977, they managed to expel Badalamenti from the Commission, the general ruling organ of the Mafia. In 1981, they started the second Mafia war, by directly killing Badalamenti and Bontate[7].

In the following three years, the Corleonesi successfully achieved the Mafia equivalent of a coup d’état. They showed that military power and support from the Families was more important than wealth and drug trade connections. They stepped up the number of killings, eventually murdering more than 200 affiliates to the rival families. They effectively turned a war into a slaughter, as their enemies were too astonished by the series of attacks to react in any manner. The Corleonesi also showed a never before seen eagerness to inflict harm and with that guiding mentality they irredeemably damaged the old Mafia tenets. Mafiosi from Corleone spared no relative, when they carried out their assassinations. In one case, a “man of honour” managed to escape from an assassination attempt, and they retaliated by killing 35 of his relatives.

By the end of 1983, Totò Riina, then the leader of the Corleone group, had taken over the whole organisation. The Mafia came under the dominion of this aggressive and harsh élite, which spelled its subsequent crisis. Riina, in fact, did not stop with the utter defeat of the rival Families. Soon, he started ordering killings based on suspects only, and he quickly ended up eliminating his own allies and associates. By those years, however, a new group of judges had united in Palermo, including judges Falcone and Borsellino[8]. The climate of fear established by the Corleonesi ultimately convinced some of the most desperate Mafiosi to surrender to the State, exchanging insider information for a reduced sentence. These figures were the pentiti, “repented ones”. In September 1984, Tommaso Buscetta decided to turn into one of them. This decision was critical, as he became the highest-ranked Mafioso collaborating with justice[9].

Buscetta’s witnessing, along with the contribution from other pentiti, helped the team of Judges to set a “maxi-trial” against 474 Mafiosi in February 1986. This trial ended on 31 January 1992 with a judgement by the Court of Cassation. The Court upheld the sentences and, for the first time, declared the Mafia to be a single organisation, with the Commission responsible for its murders. Riina used to scorn the Italian state, as it did not support those who tried to fight organised crime[10]. With the maxi-trial final sentence, however, the authorities had inflicted a significant blow on his affiliates. He answered in the way that he knew best: by murder.

Riina and some of his followers believed that the Italian State would ultimately back down. They felt betrayed by the Christian Democrat party, their old partner for embezzlement and corruption operations. They even felt betrayed by the Catholic Church, which had begun to denounce in earnest the Mafia’s violence. They were convinced that they could coerce the Christian Democrats and the Church into submission and force them to ignore the Mafia, as it happened before. This, however, was not possible anymore. The Corleonesi succeeded in killing Falcone and Borsellino and in enacting the bombings in Florence, Milan, and Rome. However, the very political system that had protected them was tumbling down. The collapse of the Soviet Union spelled the end of the Communist Party; a wave of corruption scandals effectively dissolved the Christian Democracy and the Socialists. In this atmosphere of unforeseen political transformation, the tide turned against the Mafia. The years of the car bombs were the years when fundamental legal measures were approved. Among them, pentiti started to enjoy a witness protection scheme, a new anti-Mafia authority was established, the police were given the option to infiltrate the organisation, and tougher prison conditions were made available for high-ranking Mafiosi[11].

By the mid-1990s, the bombing campaign had largely receded. Far from intimidating the Italian state, terrorist tactics had backfired tremendously. As the Italian political system changed, the Sicilian Mafia had decided to act violently in the moment when their erstwhile protectors were disappearing. The whole organisation seemed hijacked by its Corleonesi core. This exercised an immense pressure on the Mafia, and many of its affiliates turned to cooperating with the state. The syndicate had lost its ancient rules and most importantly, its lost focus of its main reason to exist, – making money. After the arrest of Riina, in 1994, Bernardo Provenzano became the new “boss of bosses” and, as he was a more cautious man, he patiently tried to regain control of the Sicilian territory. After its imprisonment, in 2006, Matteo Messina Denaro, a relatively young leader, has probably decided that preserving the protection racket and getting a share of the drug trade was more than enough. Without car bombs and targeted killings, the Mafia transformed into a wider, untraceable organisation, whose laundered money has reached all of Italy and the wealthiest parts of the European continent.

Martin Stein is an LLM (Master in Laws) student from University College London. His research interests include transnational organised crime, international illicit trade, and international police cooperation.

 

Notes:

[1] F. D’Emilio, Car Bomb Blast Damages Florence’s Uffizi Gallery; Explosion Kills 5; Glass Shields Save Most Paintings, Washington Post, May 28, 1993, p. A31.

[2] Longrigg, C., Boss of Bosses. A Journey into the Heart of the Sicilian Mafia, New York, NY, Thomas Dunne Books, pp. 120-121.

[3] Stille, A., Their Thing, The American Scholar, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Spring, 1995), p. 292.

[4] Gambetta, D., The Sicilian Mafia: the business of private protection, Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 1993.

[5] Shelley, L. I., Mafia and the Italian State: The Historical Roots of the Current Crisis, Sociological Forum, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 668-669.

[6] Antonino Calderone, a “repented” member of the Mafia, writes in his memoirs of the transformation from smuggling cigarettes to dealing heroin. In P. Arlacchi, Men of dishonor: Inside the Sicilian Mafia, New York, NY, Morrow Pub., 1995.

[7] Dickie, J., Cosa Nostra. A History of the Sicilian Mafia, NY, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 284-289.

[8] Dickie, pp. 298-9.

[9] He, in fact, was one of the founders of the Commission, back in 1957. Dickie, p. 236.

[10] Dickie, p. 297.

[11] Dickie, p. 315.

Organised crime and terrorism Part I: Godfathers and bombs – organised crime and terrorist tactics

This introductory piece is the first in a four-part series exploring the relationship between organised crime and terrorism in a 21st century security environment. 

By: Andrea Varsori

Source: Interpol

The general understanding of how criminal organisations work implies that the leaders of those groups are mostly discreet, business-minded folks[1]. After all, criminal organisations have one, big task that influences their entire agenda: they want to make money. They are criminal because they use illicit means, like coercion or bribes, or because they deal in illegal goods, or both. According to this view, most of the time profit is their major objective. Rivalries and fights may start when there are misgivings on who gains the most from a deal, or when rivals start to use coercive means to gain control of greater shares of the market. Still, according to this view, the most reasonable Dons know that indiscriminate violence is a tool to be used only in very peculiar occasions. Normally, it is at best useless, or at worst outright dangerous.

Nonetheless, violence is fundamental for mafias and gangs in most cases. Criminal organisations use it to extort money from legitimate firms; to safeguard the secrecy of important information; to punish those who do not fall in line. They can also sell violence, to create ‘protection rings’[2] or to assert monopolies. Most importantly, they can play a leading role in limiting potential violence: that is, they structure a widespread, individual, anomic violence into something more organised, more ready to exploit economies of scale, and definitely more dangerous. At their best, mafias can mimic the state or rule where the latter does not arrive, establishing their own practices and rituals. Thus, an efficient criminal group learns to administer violence to impose a set of rules: it sets itself as judge, jury, and executioner; it masters violence, so that only the threat of action is enough to quell any opposition.

To the wise godfather, then, terrorism is arguably the nemesis. In its most brutal, spectacular form, which nowadays has taken the form of the threat of Daesh, it is a double-edged knife for a criminal organisation. This knife, however, has the sharper edge facing its own user. A criminal group stands to lose from the use of terrorist tactics: terrorism forces the state to focus all attention on the authors, as it constitutes the ultimate danger to a state’s authority and legitimacy. Also, indiscriminate violence often generates a huge backlash from the civil society: thus, criminal organisations, which thrive and prosper in an underworld of secrecy and corruption, may be crushed by the reaction to a terrorist event.

This does not mean that terror and crime can never be partners. More often than not, terrorist organisations adopt ways and techniques from the criminal world. The most obvious application is for financing[3]: terrorist groups have long been dealing in extortion and blackmail (as for the IRA in Northern Ireland[4]), or in illicit trade (as for the FARC in Colombia[5], or the Taliban in Afghanistan[6]), in order to get the money to further their political activities. Seeing it happen the other way around, however, is quite rarer.

This series will focus on this latter type of the crime/terror nexus. Why should a criminal organisation use dangerous terrorist tactics? Which kind of objective is it pursuing? Is this an entirely new phenomenon? We will deal with these questions all along the three parts of our Series. First, Martin Stein will explore the bombings of 1992-93 in Italy and their role in the struggle between the Sicilian Mafia and the Italian State; then, the Bombay bombings of March 1993 will be covered, and how one of the most famous Indian dons, Dawood Ibrahim, was part of the plot to hit India; finally, Joe Atkins will review the cases of mass killings and ‘disappearances’ in Mexico, exploring how terror is widely used as a tool to assert control on a frightened population. The varied scope of these articles will highlight different aspects of the link between criminal organisations and the use of terror. In Italy, bombings were part of a precise strategy to intimidate the Italian state; in India, the attacks were motivated by religious reasons and by Ibrahim’s intent to appear still as the protector of Bombay Muslims; in Mexico, terror seems to constitute a ‘normal’ part of ‘cartel justice’, thus delivering worrying parallels between ‘narco-warriors’ and fundamentalists.

 

Andrea is an MPhil candidate at the Department of War Studies. His research project focuses on security issues in mega-cities: in particular, he is interested in the role of the urban environment in shaping organized criminal and political violence. He tweets at @Andrea_Varsori

 

 

 

Notes:

 

[1] The outmost example of this perspective is the economic analysis of organized crime, whereas the criminal organisation is analysed as a particular type of firm. See Fiorentini, G., S. Peltzman (eds.), The economics of organized crime, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 87-108. A view of criminal organisations as risk-averse groups that prefer to hide or corrupt rather than fight is also used in political science. See B. Lessing, Logics of Violence in Criminal War, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 59(8), 2015, p. 1497.

[2] D. Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: the business of private protection, Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 1993.

[3] For the broader issue of the financing of terrorist organization, see the Winter 2015 Strife Series: https://strifeblog.org/2015/01/07/financing-terror-a-strife-4-part-series/ .

[4] J. Burns, Dealing in the business of fear, Financial Times, 7 January 1992.

[5] P. Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Santa Monica, CA., Rand Corp., 2011, pp. 15-18.

[6] A. Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban. Insights from the Afghan Field, London, Hurst Publishers, 2009, pp. 7-22, 150.

A war on humanitarianism?

By: Mélanie Thienard

Source: Wikimedia

 

Is the United States waging a war on humanitarianism?

On 26 October 2015, a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital in Northern Yemen was struck by airstrikes, allegedly conducted by the US-supported, Saudi-led coalition, who have denied any implication in the destruction of the hospital. Earlier that month, on the 3^rd of October, another MSF hospital was destroyed by the sustained fire of a US Air Force AC-130U gunship in Kunduz, Afghanistan.

In a series of press articles, French academic Gilles Dorronsoro claimed that these attacks in fact reflect a criminalisation of humanitarianism. According to him, former US Secretary of state Colin Powell tried to use humanitarian organisations in the War on Terror. It is the refusal of MSF to become ’essential contributors to the United States’ “combat team”’ which, according to Dorronsoro, led the organisation to become a legitimate target for the US army in what he described as a ‘war on humanitarianism.’ Whilst this remains speculative, other matters arose from the Kunduz bombing and the US justifications: a lack of verification of targets and/or a disregard for the core International Humanitarian Law (IHL) principle of proportionality.

International humanitarian law, hospitals, and the principle of caution

The body of law governing the conduct of hostilities is clear on the status of hospitals:

’Directing an attack against a zone established to shelter the wounded, the sick and civilians from the effects of hostilities is prohibited[1].’

The UN General Assembly reaffirmed this principle with a resolution: ‘places or areas designated for the sole protection of civilians, such as hospital zones or similar refuges, should not be the object of military operations’.[2]

To uphold their protected status, hospitals set up by humanitarian organisations, such as MSF, must communicate their geographical position to all fighting parties on a regular basis. MSF is well aware that it is crucial to ensure the relative safety of both staff and patients. In fact, the GPS coordinates of the Kunduz hospital were last communicated to the coalition forces only days before its destruction.

Military necessity and proportionality

Only a few hours after the first US statements attributing the attack to a ‘mistake’, US commander in Afghanistan General John Campbell hinted that the attack on the Kunduz Trauma Hospital was justified by military necessity after Afghan forces allegedly came under Taliban fire. In this approach, the hospital was engaged deliberately rather than ‘mistakenly struck.’ Is that legal? In certain circumstances, yes.

‘The “principle of military necessity” permits measures which are actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose and are not otherwise prohibited by international humanitarian law. In the case of an armed conflict the only legitimate military purpose is to weaken the military capacity of the other parties to the conflict.[3]’

The surviving MSF staff in Kunduz however strongly denied the presence of active combatants in their facilities at the time of the attacks.

Military necessity is, however, not unlimited. It is in fact bound by another essential component of IHL:  proportionality. In terms of IHL, proportionality ‘seeks to limit damage [to civilians and civilian objects] caused by military operations by requiring that the effects of the means and methods of warfare used must not be disproportionate to the military advantage sought’.[4]

Considering the above IHL principles, let’s imagine that Taliban combatants were indeed using the hospital to target coalition forces.

Two questions remain unanswered. On a tactical level, was Taliban fire sustained enough to justify the call of an air strike on a civilian building? Strategically, would razing a perfectly functional hospital to the ground – killing 30 staff and patients and depriving thousands of civilians from accessing medical treatment – be critical to regain control of the city of Kunduz after it had been seized by Taliban fighters? If the answer to both is yes, the strike could be legally justified. If, however, the answers are uncertain, so is the legality of the attack.

An intelligence failure and the role of the Afghan forces

A final question, potentially the most important one, remains. Did the Afghan forces deliberately provided flawed intelligence to the US forces to justify the call of the airstrike?

As mentioned previously, the Afghan forces have claimed the presence of Taliban fighters in the hospital’s main compound, which prompted a muted, even sympathetic Afghan response to the attack.

A military coalition must be based on a certain degree of trust. It is doubtful that the US forces in Afghanistan possess the capability of double-checking every action of their Afghan allies. Such a policy could furthermore create a hierarchy between US and Afghan forces, which could undermine the coalition as a whole. If it turns out that the Afghan forces indeed provided flawed intelligence, drastic measures need to be taken to ensure the verification of targets by US operatives before a strike.

However, let’s not forget that, in the end, US forces pulled the trigger. Communication transcripts show that the gunship’s crew questioned the legality of the airstrike, but were nevertheless ordered to engage the hospital. General Campbell also admitted that ‘the decision to provide aerial fires was a US decision, made within the US chain of command.’ No one forced the US forces to take Afghan intelligence at face value. To the General director of MSF, it is clear that the attack constitutes a war crime as well an attack on the Geneva conventions.

Claiming that a ‘war against humanitarianism’ is being waged is in this case far-fetched and misleading. Such claims however show that, when it comes to foreign military intervention, the US is walking on eggshells and faces grave accusations of disregard of IHL and civilian lives.

The destruction of the Kunduz hospital shows two worrying trends at the operational level: a flawed chain of command, and the dissemination of flawed intelligence by Afghan forces. Whilst the advancements in targeting technology led some to argue that only the US army was capable of conducting warfare in accordance with the principles set forth by IHL, incidents such as the Kunduz bombing show a critical lack of communication between units with regard to the selection of targets. This makes the US army vulnerable to embarrassing ‘mistakes’ and war crime accusations as well as putting humanitarian NGOs working in active combat zones even more at risk.

The only way to address these issues in a constructive manner is for President Obama to answer the calls of MSF and consent to an independent and impartial investigation of the Kunduz attack.

Even war has rules.

 

 

Notes:

[1] Article 15, Fourth Geneva Convention, § 3, available at https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter11_rule35

[2] UN General Assembly, Res. 2675 (XXV), §6 available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/25/ares25.htm

[3] https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/glossary/military-necessity-glossary.htm

[4] https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/glossary/proportionality-glossary.htm

 

 

Mélanie is a 3rd year IR student specializing in the Middle East, human rights and humanitarian law, president of the Amnesty International Society at King’s and has worked at Amnesty International UK since 2014 as a national student representative. Prior to coming to King’s she studied law and economics in Marseille, France. 

The Paris terror attacks and their geopolitical implications

By: Deborah Asseraf

US Marines and French Gendarmie inspect weapons as part of a training exercise. Source: Wikimedia.

Six coordinated terror attacks, involving seven terrorists took place in East Paris and near the Stade de France at Saint Denis on the evening of Friday, November 13. In Saint Denis, three terrorists blew themselves up near the stadium, while supporters inside attended a friendly France – Germany football match. Among the five attacks in East Paris, one was a suicide bombing, at the Boulevard Voltaire, and four others were shootings. This included the Bataclan concert hall hostage crisis, during which as soon as police launched the assault the four attackers detonated the bombs they were carrying. At least 132 people were killed and 350 wounded.

Islamic State responsibility

Islamic State claimed responsibility soon after in a statement that defined the attacks as the ‘first of the storm’. Indeed, France is likely to be a primary target for the terrorist group. For example, a video released in September 2014 attributed to Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, known as an ISIS spokesperson, instructed followers around the world to kill citizens of the countries involved in the coalition: ‘If you can kill a disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and filthy French – or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may be.’

Using the same rhetoric in another video released in October 2014, a French ISIS militant warned France that ‘as many bombs you dropped in Iraq and Sham [Syria], you will have as many murders, as many killings, like our brother Mohammed Merah did. You are afraid of one brother, there will be thousands and thousands in the future’. The call for attacks in France has become a key element of ISIS propaganda directed towards French potential recruits.

France is a main pool of recruitment for Islamic State. Among the 30,000 ISIS ‘soldiers’ in Syria and Iraq, most are foreign fighters, and in 2014 about 1,200 were said to be French. According to a 2015 report by a French Senate investigation committee dedicated to countering jihadist networks in France and Europe, 1500 French citizens who fled to Syria have been identified by the intelligence services. Accurate policy responses to handle the cases of those who return to France are yet to be found. The antiterrorism bill passed on November 13, 2014 modifies statutory law regulating the entry of foreigners but does not tackle the issue of French fighters coming back from Syria. The first article of the bill only allows authorities to prevent a suspected ‘jihadi candidate’ from going abroad.

At present, the intelligence administration has registered 4,000 people in ‘fiches S’, administrative memos compiling information about persons who are known for their ‘Islamic radicalization’ on French territory. One of the Bataclan terrorists, Omar Ismaïl Mostefaï was registered in a ‘fiche S’ for ‘radicalization’.

Internal responses to the crisis: a national emergency plan

President François Hollande, who was rushed out of the Saint Denis stadium as soon as the explosions were heard, immediately addressed the Nation that night. He called for an emergency ministerial meeting and announced two measures. President Hollande first declared a state of emergency, and second announced the closing of French borders. If these domestic responses to the crisis are mainly consensual in France, the issue of external action in Syria remains the subject of fierce debate.

The state of emergency is an exceptional legal situation in which French State authorities are allowed to take special action outside of the framework of ordinary law. Prefects (state representatives in regions) are allowed to impose bans on traffic, curfews, large gatherings, and allow searches and raids without warrants. The state of emergency is based on a 1955 law, passed in response Algerian National Liberation Front terror attacks in 1954. It was first used three times during the Algerian War of Independence. A state of emergency was last declared in 2005 on the occasion of the large-scale riots in the Parisian suburbs. In 2015, the state of emergency is not only applied at the local level, but to the entire national territory. It allows for the cancellation of cultural events, gatherings, the closure of public monuments and museums, and increased levels of security and surveillance. Accordingly, 1,500 soldiers were deployed in the capital and nearly as many police officers. In order to implement efficient border controls, customs staff were reinforced.

As part of the state of emergency, 168 antiterrorist raids took place on Sunday, November 15 and overnight into Monday, November 16, in the homes of potential terrorists registered in a ‘fiche S’ and 23 people were arrested. The raids were conducted in Bobigny (Northern Paris), Toulouse, Grenoble, Strasbourg, Lille-Roubaix, Marseille and Lyon, where a rocket launcher was discovered. In Villefranche-sur-Saône, close to Lyon, heavy weaponry was found, including a Kalashnikov assault riffle, a rocket launcher, pistols, and bullets. Aside from the current investigation that led to identify French and Belgian terrorist cells, raids current searches aim to dismantling other networks. Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve stated: ‘It is just the beginning’.

External response: is France at war?

In an official address on November 14, President Hollande stated that: ‘What happened yesterday in Paris and in Saint Denis close to the Stade de France was an act of war. Faced with war, the country has to take appropriate decisions. An act of war that was committed by a terrorist army, Daesh, a jihadist army against France, against the values we defend throughout the world, against who we are, a free country that speaks to the whole world’. The use of the expression ‘act of war’ is a crucial step for France. It suggests the terrorist attacks carried out on French territory have external belligerent outcomes. Designating ISIS as an ‘army’ seems very delicate considering the situation on the ground. Islamic State may have its own institutions, control territory, and a population, but it is not recognized as a state on the international scene. Hence, ISIS is not in control of a regular army but rather comprises a various range of actors from former Saddam Hussein officials to jihadist terror groups including the former Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

Declaring war against ‘the Caliphate’ is no less than declaring a war against terror. If the very term resembles G. W. Bush’s rhetoric, it can also be feared that such a war is already lost. Regarding the fact that terrorists carrying out such so-called ‘acts of war’ are French citizens, it seems impossible to consider ISIS as a defined enemy in the form of an army.

It is not clear whether President Hollande is really declaring war based on a use of international law. At the moment the French and US-led coalition against ISIS launched in 2014 includes Western countries (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands) as well as Arab and Middle-Eastern countries (Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Turkey, United Arab Emirates). Nevertheless, the coalition intervention, consisting of airstrikes as well as arming and training support to the Kurds is completely informal. Western action could hardly be an UN-backed intervention, as a unanimity vote at the Security Council, would be likely impossible considering Russia’s pro-Assad agenda.

Nonetheless, the use of the term ‘act of war’ by President Hollande could be a way to legitimize an intervention under NATO provisions. Indeed, the 1949 Washington Treaty (article 5) states: ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.’

Moreover, in 1999 NATO members recognized acts of terror as armed attacks that possibly bound allies to collective defence: ‘Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism’.

As an act of war opens the legal possibility for a use of force under international law, France could call for its NATO allies to support and retaliate against ISIS and escalate the conflict. However, legitimizing war against ISIS through international law might also lead the nations involved to acknowledge that the earlier coalition was illegal. On the night of November 15, ten French fighter jets dropped twenty bombs in their biggest raid in Syria so far. They targeted Islamic State’s strongholds in Raqqa in coordination with US forces.

A strong response

While French intentions regarding the coalition against ISIS are not completely clear, it seems very unlikely that troops would ever be dispatched to the ground. However, the latest attacks will no doubt affect French foreign policy, and an escalation in airstrikes with support of the coalition may be occurring, as President Hollande vowed a ‘merciless response’ to ISIS. In order to strengthen French air force in Irak and Syria, the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier will leave Toulon for the Persian Gulf on November 18. It will carry eighteen Rafale and eight Super Étendard aircrafts, and join the six Rafale and six Mirage already based in Jordan.

Yet, relevant internal solutions must be found within France. The primary threat to French security is domestic. The country’s immediate enemies are to be fought on French territory. Internal policies dedicated to tackling, preventing, and understanding radicalisation are now essential in averting future attacks.

Deborah Asseraf is a graduate student at Sciences Po, Paris, specializing in the field of public policy and law. A research student in History at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS Paris) she is interested in international relations and politics.