Being English/ British/ European and the Politics of Difference

By: Henry Redwood

To say that it has been a bad couple of weeks to be English (or is it British, or European? I’m not sure anymore…) is an understatement. Violent and racist football supporters in France; racist abuse at home; intolerant and divisive politics in all political parties; “Brexit”; and lastly, losing a football match to a team with more volcanoes than professional footballers. Each of these events has left in its wake a series of finger-pointing and questions over who’s to blame: Roy Hodgson? The working class? The Tories? The press? A complacent left? (Im)migrants and/or refugees? This need for someone, or a collective, to be blamed within society seems to run deep. It was certainly key in the angry protest vote that saw Britain leave the EU. The primary concern within each of these allegations seems to be to find the ‘Other’, upon whom we can unburden our own responsibilities and troubles – the immigrant; the elite; the European bureaucrat; the English -and draw, perhaps, clear lines that strongly delineate what “we are” – and more often what we are not.

However, the ‘blame game’ rests on an unsustainable model, which assumes that clear lines can be drawn which delineate what “we” are – and more often what we are not. The most obvious example here is the notion of “Great Britain”, which has been variously deployed in, often contradicting, ways by different parts of the argument. Underneath each, though, is a conception of a nation – a collective – that remains unchanging; of a set of morals, values, culture etcetera, that is transcendental, frequently constructed by relational difference (we are not European; we are not fascist).

The arbitrariness of this (of course, being arbitrary makes it no less violent) is seen with the difficulty we have in deciding at which point a particular “Great Britain” began. The pretence of unity and solidity of these categories, which was pumped out throughout the referendum ‘debate’, and the confidence that we could ever know what it means to be English, British or European (or all three at once), meant that the debate was conducted from a perspective where we could decide what it meant to be ‘British’ (or even democratic). This decision was made through exclusionary identity politics, rather than considerations on how we might reconfigure these understandings of difference to try to remove the harm caused by arbitrarily signifying Self against the ‘Other’.[1] This is not only directed at those who voted in favour of Brexit; this issue has come up repeatedly in the anti-Brexist arguments since, where Brexiters are labelled as racists, ignorant, idiots, and are consequently de-politicised in the process as their voices are considered irrelevant. This ignores both our (here meaning Remain voters) responsibility, and in these cases our dependency on this ‘Other’ to define us (I am not a Brexiter, I am not racist or fascist), which was perhaps most clearly seen in the celebratory pro-European protest in London on Saturday.[2] This protest summed up this forms of identity politics, and worryingly seemed to recreate the boundaries that de-politicised the voices of Brexiters, reproducing the same political relationships that led to the ostracisation of large sections of the population in the first place; hardly a basis upon which to rebuild the shattered community.

The accusatory, and often angry, politics of the blame game seems to have occupied us elsewhere over the past decades, and perhaps it marks a trend in the new-millennium’s political landscape. At University, and elsewhere, the response to the impact of austerity has frequently been about blame and the fragmenting of larger political ideologies and structures and issues into “bite size” issues. Students are angry at the staff for not providing more contact times; the academic staff resent students for wanting a corporate-inspired ‘transferable skills’ format of education that the University was not designed to deliver, and that they are not trained to deliver.[3] It feels as though something similar has happened in the political realm, where there seems to have been a turn to (possibly thanks to, or as a result of, the digital age) a politics based on fragmented and seemingly isolated issues. A trend most evident in the rise of pressure group politics and organisations like 38 degrees.

Underlying both of these points is a sense that we can distil responsibility – and perhaps importantly with this, a sense of belonging and being – to different individuals and collectives, without considering our shared responsibility and co-dependence. As such, we are failing to explore the culpability of much larger systems that produce these harms and us as recognisable subjects we are not looking at the shared responsibility that we consequently have for the reproduction of that system and the violence that relates to it. Without this understanding, the “immigrant” remains an external entity that we have no obligation to; a burden, rather than an always-already member of our community that we are responsible for.[4] Without this understanding, the Brexit voter remains an ignorant racist, rather than someone who has been subjectivised through the same system that produces others’ (my) privilege; someone silenced for decades whilst a politics was practised that was blind to its violence, and complicit in aggravating inequality.  In both, it is the gap and relation between the Self and the ‘Other’ that needs to be addressed. Not by blaming the ‘Other’, but by reconfiguring the system as a whole. The same system that currently produces the Self and ‘Other’ as different, and as opposing polarities. In a time of rising extremism – islamophobic; homophobic; transphobic; take your pick – such reframing is more important than ever.

 

 

Henry Redwood is a third year PhD student in the War Studies department and senior editor at strife. His work engages with critical theory to explore how international courts construct truths and the normative underpinnings these project. Alongside his research Henry has previously worked at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and a number of (I)NGOs working in Rwanda. Twitter: @hred44

 

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] See Martha Minow, Making all the difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American law (Cornell University Press, 1991)

[2] For an excellent insight into Brexiters see here

[3] http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/transferable-people/

[4] For an wonderful article on migrant identities and borders see, Francis Saunders, ‘Where on Earth Are You?’, 38:5 (2016), pages 7-12

 

Book review: 'Making Sense of Proxy Wars: States, Surrogates & the Use of Force' by Michael Innis

Reviewed by: Lauren Dickey

Michael A. Innes (ed.), Making Sense of Proxy Wars: States, Surrogates & the Use of Force (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012).

A Futile Attempt to Make Sense of Proxy Wars

At the end of the Cold War, and especially in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the study of war gradually shifted from a realist-dominated, state-centric discourse to emphasise instead the role of non-state actors and asymmetric dynamics in conflict. The ‘old wars’ were increasingly being replaced with arguments in favour of a new sort of warfare, with explanations pointing to ‘new’ or different motivating factors, support (state versus non-state), and/or forms of violence.[1] Despite this shift, a crucial gap in the literature on war persists: proxy warfare.

Michael A. Innes edited a volume which boldly sets out to ‘make sense’ of proxy wars, poising the text to make an important and timely contribution to the history of conflict itself. Once seen as superpower-induced wars fought on the soil of a third party, proxy wars have since appeared to be shaped instead by regional powers and the cross-border dispersion of armed groups. The growth of proxy warfare is a direct threat to state sovereignty, and a challenge made even more real through the growth of robotics and cyber technologies that enable an inclusion of non-state actors on the battlefield. Proxy warfare is thus a highly fluid concept; it is undefined insofar as there is much about it that remains unknown.

The most significant shortcoming of Innes’ edited volume rings clear within its attempt to lay the groundwork for the contributions of other scholars. Nowhere in the text is ‘proxy war’ explicitly defined. Each successive chapter evades the very concept this book endeavours to parse apart. A brief preface is offered in place of a literature review, as it seems in Innes’ attempt to address the complexities of proxy war, he opted for a brief analysis of the text’s central concept. However, in choosing to omit this critical component, the volume skirts around explanations of why the text should be taken as more than a disjointed compilation of case studies.

Each of the case studies offered by the eight contributing authors is informative when examined on their own. The first chapter, places the concept of proxy warfare at the beginning and end of the analysis with a stated intention of explaining why terrorism creates space and opportunity for proxy wars. Yet the chapter never details how a proxy relationship can come into being; nor does it devote any space to explaining the structure of a proxy conflict, the benefactor, proxy agent, and target agent.

The following chapters offer rich case studies, but little conceptual clarity on the role of non-state actors in proxy warfare. The second chapter on the IRA’s proxy bomb campaign of 1990 challenges basic assumptions about suicide bombing, arguing that scholars and analysts alike should question the intent of the action, rather than assuming such attacks are always acts of martyrdom. The authors believe that the IRA’s main purpose in shifting to proxy bomb operations was to shift tactics and ‘teach British security forces a lesson they would not soon forget.’[2] But public opinion ultimately checked the growth of the IRA’s proxy tactics, angering the community and ultimately weakening the overall legitimacy of the IRA’s struggle.

Chapters three and four offer respective interpretations of proxies in historical context, each drawing comparisons to US counterinsurgencies in Iraq or Afghanistan. Both argue, in one form or another, that the mistakes of the past can be lessons for the US and its coalition partners in the present; yet, both simultaneously fail to recognize the unpredictability of current events and the often subjective interpretations of history. The only true lesson to be garnered from history is that no two wars – not to mention proxy conflicts – are cloned images.

Chapter five makes the closest attempt to anything that has ‘made sense’ of proxy warfare in the volume. Proxyization is traced briefly from classical times when rulers preferred to hire trusted foreigners as mercenaries through to present-day use of private military and security companies (PMSCs). A case is made to assess the activities and services of PMSCs to ascertain what policy and governance mechanisms should be implemented, but does not move its policy recommendations any further. The final chapter is adopted from a RAND report on Shell’s activities as a ‘proxy’ in the oil-rich Nigerian Delta, tactics of both hard and soft security that enable it to maintain its profit margins, but still do not ‘sway the operating environment in the Delta.’[3] The singular study of Shell as a multi-national corporation (MNC) proxy highlights the role of non-state actors stepping in to provide public goods in areas where the government is largely absent, thereby removing some of the sovereign authority of the state.

The case studies within this edited volume unfortunately equivocate proxy strategy with proxy tactics, failing to acknowledge important differences therein.[4] It further neglects an acknowledgement that proxy warfare describes a specific mannerism involving the interaction between benefactor, proxy agent, and target agent. The manuscript was framed by the need to more actively and accurately account for non-state proxies in counterinsurgency and war alike. But in failing to paint a clear picture of what proxy warfare actually entails, there is little meat on the bones of the book. The in-depth case studies make for a compelling read, but its approach to the phenomenon of proxy warfare is lacklustre at best; and, ultimately, the Innes volume falls far short of its attempts to ‘make sense’ of this contemporary facet of warfare.

 

 

Lauren Dickey is a PhD student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and the Political Science Department at the National University of Singapore. Her research focuses on Chinese strategy toward Taiwan in the Xi Jinping era. She is a member of the Pacific Forum Young Leaders program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] See the notable work of Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 3^rd ed. (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2013).

[2] Bloom and Horgan, ‘Missing Their Mark: The IRA’s Proxy Bomb Campaign,’ in Innes (ed.), pp. 49.

[3] Rosenau and Chalk, ‘Multinational Corporations: Potential Proxies for Counterinsurgency?,’ in Innes (ed.), pp. 149.

[4] Akin to the mistake of employing strategy as a synonym for strategy. On this point, see, e.g., Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013), pp. 11-14.

Are Hamas rockets terrorism? Hollywood weighs in

By: Lauren Mellinger

Source: Wikimedia

On June 20, 2016, NBC Universal (Universal Cable Productions) filed a lawsuit in a California federal court against its insurer, Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company. At first glance the case appears to be a typical dispute over a contract – a Hollywood production company is suing its insurer for failure to pay the expenses incurred due to last minute decisions made by the production company in response to the last round of fighting between Hamas and Israel during the summer of 2014. Yet, at the centre of the case lies the question: Whether Hamas’s rocket attacks during that conflict should be classified as a war between sovereign nations, or as the militant acts of a terrorist group.

Summer 2014: A Brief Overview of Operation Protective Edge

On June 12, 2014, three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped and murdered in the West Bank. Hamas would later claim responsibility for the attack but in the ensuing weeks, Israel cracked down on Hamas operatives in the West Bank, and Hamas in Gaza responded with a barrage of rocket fire. On July 7, over 85 rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel, for which Hamas claimed responsibility. The next day, the Israel Defense Forces launched Operation Protective Edge. Neither Israel nor Hamas wanted the conflict to escalate – becoming the third in a series of rounds in a war of attrition that has existed between the two sides since Hamas took control of Gaza in June 2007. The operation lasted seven weeks, ending in a cease-fire on August 26.

Now for the obvious question – Why is the operation suddenly being featured in The Hollywood Reporter?

Enter Hollywood

In the summer of 2015, USA network aired the miniseries Dig, the television show at the centre of this lawsuit. When production began the previous summer, the plan was for the mystery-conspiracy-thriller which is set in Jerusalem to film on location in Israel – the location shoot being integral to the creative process. Indeed at a panel at that summer’s annual Comic-Con, Dig’s creators boasted that “[s]hooting there [in Jerusalem] is paramount to the story in capturing the vividness and emphasizing the characters of the show.”

But when the violence broke out that June, only the pilot episode had been filmed. Following a week-long unplanned hiatus (an expensive undertaking for a production company, especially on an overseas location shoot), Universal opted to relocate filming to New Mexico and Croatia for the duration of production for that season. Due to the unanticipated relocation, Universal incurred $6.9 million in unforeseen costs. When Universal submitted a claim to its insurer, Atlantic, for reimbursement, the company denied the claim.

So far – a typical contractual dispute. But now for the added twist:

According to Universal Cable Productions, of which USA Network is a subsidiary, after the violence broke out, the U.S. State Department attributed the rocket attacks to Hamas. At that point, Universal argues, it submitted a claim to Atlantic, which then denied coverage.

In their complaint, Universal maintains that Atlantic’s rationale for failing to reimburse the production company contravenes the official policy of the U.S. government, which to date has not recognised Hamas as a sovereign government. Indeed according to the documents filed with the court, Universal argues that:

“[t]he United States government has officially designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Nevertheless, Atlantic has ignored the United States government position and applicable law. It claims Hamas is a sovereign or quasi-sovereign government over the Gaza Strip (even though Atlantic admits the Gaza Strip is not a recognized sovereign nation), in a self-serving attempt to invoke the war exclusion and avoid its coverage obligations.”

Atlantic maintains that the company denied Universal’s claim on the grounds that, per the terms of the contract, coverage is excluded for war or warlike actions. According to documents filed with the court, Atlantic stated that the company informed Universal in a letter dated July 28, 2014 that at the time “the terrorism coverage should not apply” to the events of July 2014, as Hamas’s actions did not target either the United States or its policies, and that “the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury has not certified the [Hamas/Israel] events as acts of terrorism.”

Barring any issue of justiciability per U.S. law, should the case proceed, the California federal court will be forced to confront an issue that has seemingly confounded policymakers and international jurists since January 2006: How to define Hamas.

The Challenge of Defining Hamas

While it is too early in the proceedings to state with certainty, the likelihood is that Atlantic is not taking a stand on political grounds. Rather, it is more likely that they saw the amount incurred by Universal when production was moved at the eleventh hour, and looked for a loophole that would allow them to avoid payment. The fact that Atlantic can even ask the court to entertain its argument is due to what has amounted over the past decade, if not longer, to an “accepted ambiguity” in international law and policymaking regarding Hamas.

This “accepted ambiguity” with respect to accurately classifying Hamas is primarily the result of two factors: first, the fact that the organisation’s victory in the 2006 elections caught Israel and the international community off guard, and many government officials, academics and foreign policy experts found it difficult to explain how an entity, regarded by many as a terrorist organisation, could ascend to power through a democratic process without first having relinquished its armed strategy. (This element of surprise certainly applied to the Bush administration, which had invested in the Palestinian Authority as part of a larger effort to promote democratic governance in the region, and at the time, had encouraged the Palestinians to proceed with the elections.) The second factor has been the subsequent intellectual inertia of policymakers who have failed to adequately respond to the threat posed by the Hamas’s transformation from a terrorist organisation, to a democratically elected terrorist organisation, now with actual governing responsibilities and access to state budgets and other resources.

On January 25, 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, when its Change and Reform party list won 74 out of 132 seats. In the wake of the results, some counterterrorism analysts and Middle East specialists argued that participating in democratic elections, and subsequently serving in a government, would result in the group’s eventual moderation. Yet, notwithstanding the periodic moderate statements made by some members of their leadership, Hamas’s actions since the election wholly contradict the assertion that participation in politics will ultimately tame them. Hamas, since coming to power and becoming the de facto government in Gaza, has implemented a system of government that largely adheres to the movement’s core principles – espoused in a founding document the organisation has yet to officially renounce. This includes adhering to the use of violence, and refusing to recognise Israel. Hence, serving in the capacity of a democratically elected government has not impeded Hamas’s efforts to further its militant ideological goals.

In short:

Is Hamas a terrorist organisation? Yes.

Is Hamas a government? Yes.

Is Hamas currently in de facto control of the Gaza Strip? Yes, for the time being, in light of their takeover of the coastal enclave in June 2007, and until such time as the Palestinians hold new legislative elections (or the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority manages to reclaim control over Gaza.)

The challenge for policymakers is to understand the nature of the adversary they are confronting and formulate policies to mitigate the threat posed. It is long overdue for policymakers (and academics) to embrace a new paradigm with respect to Hamas – that of the hybrid terrorist organisation.[1]

In his latest book Global Alert, Israeli counterterrorism scholar Boaz Ganor has proposed a definition for hybrid terrorist organisations. Ganor’s model consists of a single organisation comprised of three interrelated wings: first, the terrorist or guerrilla wing, per the classic definitions. To this a second wing is added – a political wing, that enables the organisation to participate in institutional politics, where it can gain legitimacy, albeit gradually. Lastly, such groups often maintain a robust social-welfare network, the purpose of which is to ensure a steady stream of new recruits to the organisation over time.[2]

That an organisation can exist as a “hybrid” challenges the theory, widely accepted in both academia and among policymakers, that an armed group’s decision to participate in electoral politics is an automatic indication of its eventual transition into a “legitimate” political actor (i.e., a political party that has abandoned its armed strategy.)[3]  Yet, groups like Hamas are challenging the conventional wisdom. In her study of Islamist terrorist and guerrilla groups in transition in the Middle East, scholar Krista Wiegand found that an organisation’s existence as a hybrid or a “dual-status” group does not presuppose the group’s eventual transition to a non-violent political party. Rather, it reflects a rational choice. According to Wiegand, for armed groups that embody a hybrid status, “the use of political violence is a strategic rational choice under certain conditions, while under other conditions, non-violent political participation is more rational . . . violence and non-violence are not mutually exclusive choices.”[4]

In other words, a hybrid group has the best of both worlds – the opportunity to slowly gain international legitimacy while obtaining access to state resources, without ever having to forsake the use of violence.

What Happens Next?

Given the international community’s glacially slow response to understanding the threat posed by hybrid organisations, it is likely that the immediate effect of Universal’s lawsuit will be on Israel’s relationship with Hollywood. In 2014, Dig was not the only Hollywood production filming in Israel that opted to relocate due to the ongoing violence in Gaza. Indeed, one day before USA pulled production from Israel, the FX series Tyrant also decided to move production for season one to Turkey due to the hostilities. Production on The Dovekeepers, a new biblical miniseries that CBS originally intended to film on location in Israel, was relocated to Malta. That decisions such as defining Hamas may be subject to the ad hoc rulings of lower courts may hamper Israel’s efforts to entice foreign production companies to consider Israel when looking for suitable foreign locales for film and television projects.

Still, the growing challenge that hybrid organisations such as Hamas pose to Israel is by no means exclusively a challenge for Israel. Modern history is replete with examples of armed groups that have eventually transitioned to non-violent political parties. At present, what sets Hamas (and for that matter, groups such as the Lebanese Hizballah) apart from other armed organisations that have undergone some form of transition is an issue that lies at the heart of this lawsuit – are these organisations in fact in the process of transitioning? Or rather, do they embody a new type of security challenge for democratic states?

The latter is more likely in the case of Hamas. Therefore, those states that opt to designate only the militant wing of an organisation such as Hamas as a terrorist organisation, excluding the political arm of the organisation, are doing little more than creating an artificial distinction. By effectively enshrining a false dichotomy into law – that an organisation can either be a “terrorist organisation” or “the political wing of an armed group” – the state fails to account for the organisational and operational reality of hybrid groups, namely, that existence as a hybrid is a rational choice, not to be misconstrued with the initial phase in an eventual transition a legitimate political party. Only with an appropriate understanding of such groups can states begin to devise adequate policies to mitigate the threat such groups pose to their security.

 

 

Lauren Mellinger is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and a senior editor of Strife’s blog and journal. Her research specializes in Israeli counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national security decision-making, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. You can follow her on Twitter @Lauren_M04

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] For a more in depth understanding of the emerging concept of the “hybrid” organisation see: Boaz Ganor, Global Alert: The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism and the Challenge to the Liberal Democratic World (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 73-83; Amichai Magen, “Hybrid War and the ‘Gulliverization’ of Israel,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 5(1) (2011): 59-72; Benedetta Berti, Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins  University Press, 2013); Jeroen de Zeeuw, “Understanding the Political Transformation of Rebel Movements,” in ed. Jeroen de Zeeuw, From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2008); Krista E. Wiegand, Bombs Over Ballots: Governance by Islamist Terrorist and Guerrilla Groups (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2010).

[2] Ganor, Global Alert, p. 74.

[3] See Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Arie Perliger, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups (London: Routledge, 2003); Marina Ottoway, “Islamists and Democracy: Keep the Faith,” The New Republic, June 6 and 13, 2005.

[4] Wiegand, Bombs Over Ballots, p. 75-76.

Perim: the strategic island that never was

By: James A. Fargher

Source: Wikimedia

Despite lying in the middle of one of the world’s most critical choke points, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait between Djibouti and Yemen, the island of Perim is a remote and often forgotten outpost. Perim is located in the midst of the waterway which separates the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden – the connection between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean and one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Throughout history, Perim has been fought over as a prize by great and regional powers alike in the belief that the island can be used as a gateway to the vital Suez shipping lane. Nevertheless, due in part to the island’s small size and its harsh climate, Perim has proven to be only marginally useful to the regional maritime powers. This article reviews Perim’s modern history, exploring the series of occasions in which powers have attempted unsuccessfully to turn the island into a ‘Gibraltar of the East.’

Perim is a fragment of an ancient volcano, part of a chain of long-dormant volcanos stretching across Africa and Arabia.[1] It lies in the middle of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, three kilometres from Arabia and twenty kilometres from Africa.[2]  Perim has no source of fresh water, aside from occasional rainfalls, and it is located in one of the hottest and driest regions in the world.[3]

Perim was first scouted as a possible site for a castle by the Portuguese explorer and admiral Afonso de Albuquerque.[4]  The Portuguese had launched a fleet into the Indian Ocean in an attempt to seize control of the lucrative Indian spice trade and in 1513 Afonso led his ships through Bab-el-Mandeb into the Red Sea. Failing to discover sources of fresh water on the island, the Portuguese abandoned their plans for building a fortress on Perim. By the end of the 16^th century the Red Sea had fallen under the control of the Ottoman Turks.[5]

The possibility of establishing a naval base on Perim was next explored by the British East India Company in 1799.[6] Lieutenant-Colonel John Murray, commander of the 84^th Regiment, was despatched by the Company from India to Perim with a force of three hundred men.[7] Following Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt, the Company was anxious to control the line of communication between the Red Sea and India, and to forestall any French assault on the subcontinent. Like the Portuguese, Murray discovered that there were no sources of water to supply his troops.[8] Moreover, the artillery pieces at that time did not have the range needed to hit ships sailing through the western side of the Strait, so Perim could not be used to prevent a fleet exiting the Red Sea.[9] Six months after landing on Perim, Murray withdrew his force from the island to Aden.[10]

Following Murray’s failed expedition Perim was left unclaimed for nearly sixty years. Interest in the island was only revived when in 1854 the French engineer Fernand de Lesseps announced his plan to build a canal connecting the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, a revolutionary project which when it was eventually completed in 1869 transformed the Red Sea into one of the world’s great oceanic highways. In response to rumoured French interest in the island and driven by the urgent need to construct a lighthouse, the British government despatched a warship to formally lay claim to Perim in 1857.[11] The legend goes that Perim was seized hours before the arrival of a French expedition, the morning after the British consul in Aden had deliberately gotten them drunk, an episode which one Victorian statesman described as a ‘bright ornament in the history of British naval enterprize [sic]’.[12] Indeed, Perim would remain a British possession for over a century until it was ceded to the People’s Republic of South Yemen in 1967.

Despite its timely capture and notwithstanding its location on the most important shipping and communication line in the British Empire, Perim did not prove to be a strategic asset for the British. Although a small detachment of Indian troops was garrisoned on the island and a lighthouse constructed, no fortifications were ever built on Perim. As the War Office concluded in a report in 1882, ‘no advantage would be gained by fortifying the island, although it is doubtless necessary to hold in order to prevent any other power taking it and converting it into a fortress.’[13] Moreover, even the latest artillery was unlikely to have the range necessary to stop ships from slipping through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.[14] For Britain, Perim was only valuable in so far as that owning the island ensured that it was denied to other rivals; only once was it assaulted when in 1916 a small Ottoman force unsuccessfully attempted to storm it.[15] Whilst a small coaling station did operate on the island between 1883 and the mid-1930s, this was purely a commercial enterprise and Royal Navy ships continued to refuel at the nearby imperial fortress of Aden.[16]

The only time in modern history that Perim has been used to blockade the southern entrance of the Red Sea came shortly after it was granted to South Yemen in the 1960s. After failing to secure a UN resolution guaranteeing free passage of Bab-el-Mandeb, Britain had left Perim in the hands of South Yemen, then under the control of the National Liberation Front (NLF).[17] A radical faction of the NLF occupied Perim in December 1967, and attempted to impose a blockade on Israeli tankers passing through the Strait.[18] Armed with only short-range artillery, however, NLF militants were unable to interdict Israeli shipping,[19] and an effective blockade was only implemented once Egypt joined in hostilities against Israeli during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. In October that year, Egyptian troops armed with Soviet artillery pieces were deployed to the island, backed up with naval units.[20] These forces were able to briefly secure the Strait and block Israeli tankers from reaching Eilat, but the blockade was lifted shortly afterwards following a ceasefire.[21]

Since the October War, Perim has not been used as a strategic base. Despite its location in the middle of one of the world’s busiest shipping lines through which 3.4 million barrels of oil pass per day,[22] no state has truly been able to utilise the island’s supposed strategic potential. The lack of water and harsh climate has hampered efforts to establish large garrisons on Perim, as does the island’s small size. Moreover, only modern artillery has sufficient range to engage ships passing through the western strait, and attempting to sever such a vital artery of world trade would likely result in significant political repercussions. With Yemen currently embroiled in a bitter civil war and lacking in naval hardware, it also remains unlikely that Perim will be used as a base for power projection in the short to medium-term.

James A. Fargher is a Doctoral candidate in the Laughton Naval History Unit in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, specialising in British naval and Imperial history.

 

Notes:

[1] DIJ Mallick et. al., ‘Perim Island, a volcanic remnant in the southern entrance to the Red Sea,’ Geological Magazine 127:4 (1990): 309-318.

[2] Ibid.

[3] ftp://ftp.atdd.noaa.gov/pub/GCOS/WMO-Normals/TABLES/REG__I/D1/63125.TXT.

[4] RS Whiteway, The Rise of Portguese Power in India, 1497-1550 (London: Archibald Constable, 1899), 153-157.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Kenneth Panton, Historical Dictionary of the British Empire (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 406.

[7] H. M. Chichester, ‘Murray, Sir John, eighth baronet (1768?–1827)’, rev. Roger T. Stearn, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19633, accessed 19 June 2016].

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, Speech to the House of Commons, 10 March 1884, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol. 285 (1884).

[13] Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of State for India to the Governor-General of India, 18 March 1886, Letter. In Anita Burdett, The Persian Gulf & Red Sea Naval Reports, vol. 6 (Chippenham: Archive Editions, 1993), 55.

[14] Sir E. Hertslet, ‘Memorandum on French and Italian Designs in the Red Sea and its immediate Neighbourhood,’ Foreign Office, 6 March 1882. In Steven Smith, ed., The Red Sea Region: Sovereignty, Boundaries & Conflict, 1839-1967, vol. 1. Arabian Geopolitics 6 Regional Documentary Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 99.

[15] MD Fontenoy, ‘British Control of Red Sea is Due to Coup by Governor,’ The Washington Post, 22 July 1916.

[16] Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, ‘Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to the Senior Naval Officer in the Red Sea, 1894, Orders.’ In Anita Burdett, The Persian Gulf & Red Sea Naval Reports, vol. 6 (Chippenham: Archive Editions, 1993), 586.

[17] Robert Aliboni, The Red Sea Region: Local Actors and the Superpowers (Routledge Library Editions: Politics of the Middle East).

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Michael Binyon, ‘Egyptians say that Suez is cut off from Cairo and Observers are Blocked,’ Times, 26 October 1973.

[21] Drew Middleton, ‘Israel Sees Peril in Arab Decisions,’ The New York Times, 1 November 1974.

[22] Mohammed Mukhashaf, ‘Gulf Arabs wrest strategic Yemen island from Iran-allied group,’ Reuters, 5 October 2015.

 

 

Poetry and reconciliation: The poet's quest for peace

By: Alex Reid with Sasha Dugdale

Sasha Dugdale, Poet and Translator. Source: Academica Rossica.

Poetry, especially in traditional oral form, has the power to connect boundaries and disciplines. Literary critic Paul Fussell makes a powerful case that by forcing the reader to confront ‘actual and terrible moral challenges’ the genre earns itself a special reputation for timelessness and emotional reverence. [1] War poetry is often a staple ingredient in history and English curriculums for schools across the world, and many who claim not to enjoy poetry make an exception for war poetry. As a deeply personal experience, poetry captures people across time and space. These exceptional qualities may allow for poetry to become a potent tool in conflict resolution.

Poetry offers an insight into the emotional experience of violence and conflict potentially beyond that found in academia. As Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov notes, academically identifying the drivers of conflict amidst political elites does not necessarily promote a stable or long lasting peace. [3] Missing from the equation is the importance of community reconciliation as a process and an outcome of durable peacemaking. ‘Reconciliation’, Bar-Tal and Bennick note, ‘involves modifying motivations, beliefs, and attitudes of the majority, and such activities promote establishing or renewing relations within a group.’ [2] Poetry offers itself as a way of building confidence and understanding between groups at a grassroots level.

It is possible to envisage that the vocabulary and social discussion poetry stimulates might become an important element of the reconciliation process between communities. This idea is not novel. Long ago, Walt Whitman’s American Civil War poem entitled ‘Reconciliation’ exposed the self-serving myth that the enemy is ‘the evil other’, and not in fact ‘a man divine as myself’:

Word over all, beautiful as the sky!

Beautiful that war, and all its deeds of carnage, must in time

be utterly lost;

That the hands of the sisters Death and Night, incessantly

softly

wash again, and ever again, this soil’d world:

… For my enemy is dead — a man divine as myself is dead;

I look where he lies, white-faced and still, in the coffin — I

draw near;

I bend down, and touch lightly with my lips the white face in

the coffin.

Walt Whitman, 1867 [4]

Employing the theme of reconciliation, and seeking a way to incorporate poetry into contemporary discussions about conflict, last weekend, internationally renowned poets gathered in London for an interfaith discussion and series of readings on the theme of ‘The Poet’s Quest for Peace’. The event saw Kurdish poet and refugee Choman Hardi, Israeli poet Agi Mishol, and T.S. Eliot prize-winning poet George Szirtes asking the important question: How might poetry contribute to peace processes?

Strife spoke briefly with Sasha Dugdale, editor of Modern Poetry in Translation, on some of these themes. Sasha was short-listed earlier this month for the Forward Prize for Best Single Poem of 2016 with her poem Joy:

Alex Reid: Who are the audiences for your poetry? Does your poetry about conflict ever reach the victims, or the stakeholders in these conflicts? 

Sasha Dugdale: I write in response to friends’ experiences of conflicts (mostly Russians and Ukrainians) and my own experience of translating their conflict-related work, so my experience of conflict is second-hand. I wouldn’t dream of presuming to show the victims or stakeholders, as I am mostly at one removed and it would feel presumptuous. Also it is usually at an oblique angle to the events it describes.

AR: One of the panels on the day asked the question ‘How might poetry contribute to peace processes?’ Could you tell Strife your thoughts on this:

SD: I can’t honestly see how poetry contributes to peace processes, which are usually careful minute calculations of diplomacy with all emotion carefully stripped out. But poetry can remind us of the pity of war as no other genre can, so perhaps its useful role is played out before the tanks roll in.

AR: What are some of the challenges of writing about violence and conflict through poetry as a medium?

SD: I don’t seek to write about conflict and violence, I write about what is moving and agitating me. But there are distinct risks: when some poets are living through war, genocide and desperate times, to write about their experience from the position of someone who lives in safety and stability can seem presumptuous to the point of immorality. I wouldn’t say I wrote poetry of witness, because I wouldn’t claim to have felt or witnessed their experiences ‘on my pulse’ however I can write what naturally and properly arises from my own meditations on war and conflict and my own experiences of working with the scarred.

 

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The Poet’s Quest for Peace was an LJS event, curated by Naomi Jaffa [former Director of The Poetry Trust/Aldeburgh Poetry Festival] and organised by Harriett Goldenberg and Sue Bolsom.

Sasha Dugdale is a Sussex-born poet, playwright and translator specialising in both classic and contemporary Russian drama and poetry. She has worked for the British Council in Russia and set up the Russian New Writing Project with the Royal Court Theatre in London. Since 2012 she has been editor of Modern Poetry in Translation (co-founded in 1965 by Ted Hughes and Daniel Weissbort) and to date she has published three poetry collections – most recently Red House (2011). Twitter: @SashaDugdale.

Alex Reid is a recent graduate of War Studies at King’s College London and recipient of the Sir Michael Howard Excellence Award and Best Undergraduate Award. Alex currently works for Strife as a Social Media Coordinator, and as a research assistant for Dr. John Bew. In September she will begin her Master’s education as a Conflict, Security and Development student at KCL. Twitter: @AlexHREID.

 

Notes:

[1] Fussell in Featherstone, Simon (1995), ‘War Poetry: An Introductory Reader’ (Routledge), p.1

[2] Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov (2004), From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation (Oxford University Press)

[3] Bar-Tal, Daniel, Bennink, Gemma (2004), ‘The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process’, in Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov, From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation (Oxford University Press), pp.11-39

[4] Whitman, Walt (1867), ‘Reconciliation’, Bartleby Bibliographic Record, accessed 24/06/2016, http://www.bartleby.com/142/137.html

What Brexit means for UK-China ties

By: Lauren Dickey

The people of the United Kingdom have voted to leave the European Union, and it is a bitter pill for many of its friends, partners, and allies to swallow. This is particularly true for China, one of the rising global powers that has invested no shortage of time and energy in nurturing its bilateral relationship with the United Kingdom. For the United Kingdom and China, the ‘golden relationship’ and ‘golden decade’, as Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne trumpeted last year, are equally under threat.^[1] Chinese President Xi Jinping’s aspirations for a ‘united EU’ and constructive British role in ‘promoting the deepening development of China-EU ties’ now look to be fading memories.^[2] A Britain outside of the EU stands a chance at saving its valuable linkages to Beijing, but the work ahead will not be easy.

Historically, the UK-China relationship faced a fair share of challenges. China fought and lost two Opium Wars with Britain in the 19th century, resulting in the UK forcing the Chinese to open their borders to trade, including in the narcotic derived from the Asian variety of the poppy flower. The Qing dynasty staunchly opposed the opium trade networks, going so far as to confiscate and destroy much of the drug. One of Britain’s first acts of war in response was to occupy Hong Kong; and, just a few years later in 1841, Hong Kong was formally ceded to the British and the first Opium War was formally ended through the Treaty of Nanking. It was only in 1997 that Hong Kong returned to Chinese control, a transition with continued ripple effects nearly twenty years later.

More recently, the UK-China relationship suggested that such historical troubles had been shelved in order to pursue mutually beneficial ties. China has invested more than US$40 billion in the UK, creating more than 6,000 jobs; a further $60 billion in trade deals were signed during Xi’s state visit last fall.^[3] When China kicked off its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in early 2015, the United Kingdom broke ranks with the United States in stepping up as a founding member of the institution.^[4] At a societal level, people-to-people exchanges also continue to flourish, with academic and cultural exchanges as well as tourism on the rise.

But the referendum is a game changer. Brexit threatens what lies at the core of the UK-China relationship: Britain’s promise to serve as an ‘essential partner for an opening China, for the benefit of [both] peoples.’^[5] The question ahead for British policymakers — and, importantly the captain that steers the ‘leave’ ship after Prime Minister David Cameron — is whether the United Kingdom can still be the western country ‘most open’ to China’s rise.^[6] It is a question that has serious reverberations for China’s economic standing at a time when its economy is slowing and it continues to search for global partners.

Assuming the two-year process to leave the EU proceeds without hiccup or member state opposition, once the UK is fully divorced from the EU, China will lose its access to the European market via Britain.^[7] The United Kingdom is no longer an attractive extension of the ‘one belt, one road’ initiative to link markets from Europe to China by land and sea.^[8] For existing plans to develop the ‘northern powerhouse,’ boosting economies in Manchester, Leeds, and Liverpool, Britain cannot expect the deep pockets of Chinese investors to save the day.^[9] Additionally, with London as host to more than 40 percent of the global market for currency trading — and the second largest offshore centre of renminbi — it will be difficult for the City to retain its lustre and gateway banking position in Europe.^[10] While offshore yuan trading centres are largely dictums of Chinese policy, the Brexit will, at a minimum, yield a significant re-think of Beijing’s fiscal posture in the UK.

After the referendum, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Hua Chunying noted that China respects the decision of the British people, and that China will continue to examine and develop UK-China and China-EU ties with a strategic, long-term outlook in mind. She further commented that China wishes to continue cooperation and progress in the relationship between the two countries.^[11] Elsewhere, however, signs of Chinese concern started to appear. An op-ed in the Chinese-language Global Times claimed the United Kingdom is back to where it started 300 years ago and that Europe is in decline. Most strikingly, the author opined ‘all that will be left is the little piece that is England.’^[12]

The European Union has, somewhat ironically, already begun to assemble new pieces of its strategy toward China for the decade ahead.^[13] But for Britain, no such contingency plan appears to exist. The task ahead, for British policymakers navigating the tumultuous waters of leaving the EU must thus also entail prioritising and defining what and how the UK-China relationship will evolve in the post-Brexit era. A new UK-China trade agreement, according to a China Daily estimate, will take 500 British officials ten years to negotiate. Instead, both sides will need to turn to interim steps to preserve politico-economic ties and domestic interests.^[14] Furthermore, for Beijing, its largest advocate vis-à-vis the European Union trading bloc will soon recede to a cheerleader on the sidelines. Now, Beijing will likely face tougher restrictions from the EU without sufficient economic liberalisation.

None of the aforementioned challenges that lie ahead for the UK and China as the Brexit moves forward are insurmountable, but much is still unknown. To mitigate the negative consequences for the UK-China economic relationship, policymakers in both London and Beijing must begin immediately to navigate the new terms and conditions of their relationship. The Brexit may indeed be a bitter pill to swallow, but the sooner China is able to stomach this seismic geopolitical moment, the more readily it can look to adapt its ties with both the United Kingdom and the European Union.

Lauren is a first year PhD researcher in War Studies at King’s College London and the National University of Singapore. Her research explores Chinese President Xi Jinping’s strategy toward Taiwan. She is a fluent Mandarin speaker and a member of the Pacific Forum Young Leaders program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Prior to King’s, she was a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. You can follow her on Twitter @lfdickey.

 

^[1] Simon Denyer, ‘Britain is bending over backward to prove its friendship to China,’ Washington Post (14 October 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/10/14/britain-is-bending-over-backward-to-prove-its-friendship-to-china/.

^[2] Andrew Bounds, ‘China’s Xi Jinping urges UK to stay in EU,’ FT (23 October 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/df78cae4-797e-11e5-933d-efcdc3c11c89.html#axzz4CWfAzGhZ.

^[3] ‘The Brexit result will have China worried,’ Time (24 June 2016), http://time.com/4381309/china-brexit-eu-trade-uk-economy/; ‘China and Britain head into golden era of relations,’ The Telegraph (20 October 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/china-watch/politics/11936897/china-britain-relations-new-era.html.

^[4] ‘UK announces plans to join Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,’ HM Treasury (12 March 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-plans-to-join-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank.

^[5] David Cameron, ‘My visit can begin a relationship to benefit China, Britain and the world,’ The Guardian (1 December 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/02/david-cameron-my-visit-to-china.

^[6] Ibid.

^[7] The European Union is currently China’s largest trade partner, sending US$389 billion worth of imports into the trading bloc in 2015.

^[8] Andrew Browne, ‘A wrench in the U.K.-China relationship,’ Wall Street Journal (24 June 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-wrench-in-the-u-k-china-relationship-1466768571.

^[9] Sarah Gordon, ‘Northern Powerhouse takes the lion’s share of FDI,’ FT (24 May 2016), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/63d695da-20e8-11e6-aa98-db1e01fabc0c.html#axzz4CWfAzGhZ.

^[10] Enoch Yiu, ‘Brexit could dull London’s sheen as offshore yuan centre,’ South China Morning Post (19 June 2016), http://www.scmp.com/business/markets/article/1976870/brexit-could-dull-londons-sheen-offshore-yuan-centre; Mark Gilbert, ‘London Could Lose Its Euro Trading If U.K. Leaves EU,’ Bloomberg View (16 March 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-03-16/london-could-lose-its-euro-trading-if-u-k-leaves-eu.

^[11] ‘2016年6月24日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会 [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on June 24, 2016],’ PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1375085.shtml.

^[12] ‘英国回300年前原点，欧洲加速衰落 [England back to starting poitn of 300 years ago, Europe increasingly in decline]’, 环球网 [Global Times] (24 June 2016), http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2016-06/9080633.html.

^[13] ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for a new EU strategy on China,’ European Commission High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 22 June 2016.

^[14] ‘UK vote to leave the EU blows the whole European plan wide open,’ China Daily (24 June 2016), http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-06/24/content_25841499.htm.

Untied Kingdom? Contested British identity, why we suffer economic woes, and the soul of the EU

By: Pablo de Orellana and Claire Yorke They used to call us ‘perfidious white Albion’

 

Britons will wake up on Friday morning to discover whether their future lies within Europe, or without. Over the past few months the debate between the ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’ camps has dominated the news. For many the end of this week will bring relief that, finally, one way or another, a decision has been made. The referendum campaigns have not painted a flattering portrait of British politics. The tone and rhetoric have been characterised by alarming levels of populism and xenophobia on one side, and a distinct lack of vision on the other. On both sides there has been a problematic absence of facts; with both sides having relied on fear of immigrants or economic breakdown to convince the electorate.

Regardless of the outcome on Friday, the past few months have revealed the alarming growth and extent of nationalism and xenophobia in this country. These dynamics have been fermenting for some time, the result of successive governments failing to address fast increasing inequality, a sense of disconnect and disenfranchisement among the public, a political establishment that panders to a right-wing media, which deploys mild to extreme nationalism to garner votes in a political climate where key institutions are losing credibility. These worrying trends within British politics will not disperse with this Thursday’s vote and will require urgent attention once the dust settles.

This special referendum editorial critically analyses the campaigns and their respective discursive positions, particularly the zero-sum campaigns of fear being waged – the fear of the foreign, and the fear of economic catastrophe. We find that the RemaIN campaign has failed to make a sufficiently positive case for the European Union and in so doing has failed to identify key advances and progress brought about by European cooperation while ignoring the key causes for social and political malaise in the UK that have driven the popularity of Brexit. We then analyse what this debate reveals about the dynamics of identity politics in this country, highlighting that what has been achieved is a narrow and ultimately false reconceptualization of British identity, one that will continue to corrode British politics and values for years unless it is addressed.

 

The campaigns, the debate

Immigration, Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson, and other members of the Leave campaign tell us, is why the NHS is in crisis, why housing is ever more scarce, why there are insufficient jobs for hard-working Brits, and why the cost of living is so high. In the more extreme cases, it is used to explain a perceived corrosion of the very ethos and identity of the country. Their divisive discourses of ‘us’ and ‘them’ have shown the uglier sides of nationalist politics, portrayed most starkly in the ‘Breaking Point’ poster unveiled by UKIP Leader Nigel Farage last week.

The solution, they argue, is a ‘return’ to our own identity and a regaining of control over British destiny. To have less of them and more of us they offer various iterations on migration control, usually using Australia’s own flawed and controversial system as a guide. Brexiters tell us our sovereignty has been stolen, destroyed, and that our Parliament can no longer act independently. For them, we have been cheated out of our right to decide our fate, we are hostages to the European Union and its drive to create a superstate of Europe. The solution? Cast away the anchor, sail from the shore out to the wider world. How welcoming such figures would actually be to an influx of people from elsewhere is questionable, despite their claims to the contrary.

This trend, however, is not unique to Britain. Donald Trump in America, the Front National in France, Lega Nord in Italy, Golden Dawn in Greece, Alternative fur Deutschland in Germany, and many others have all experienced a surge in support in recent years. The march of xenophobia and ever more extreme nationalism is matched across the West by the similar rise of populist or radical left-wing politics, sometimes recycled from the 1980s, that gain traction with promises to reclaim control from unaccountable economic elites: Sanders in the US, Podemos in Spain, Cinque Stelle in Italy, Corbyn in the UK, and many more.

It reflects a malaise that is far from exclusively British and is common across the West. The core of the problem can be identified within the claims as to what immigrants are accused of stealing and destroying: access to healthcare, housing, education, decent pay, job stability. Yet these are not problems of immigration. The excessive burden and pressure overwhelming those key social institutions speak more widely to economic and societal problems as well as failures in governance. It is in part a result of governments being unable or unwilling to address inequality at a time when the gap between the richest and poorest has grown to levels unknown since the end of WWII, and the lack of investment to ensure access to vital services. While concerns about immigrants make headlines and are freely used as electoral ammunition, little is said about the role of wealthy foreigners who invest in property in the capital and push up house prices, while doing little to contribute to the tax system. The selectiveness of this anti-immigration discourse is but an example of what the West does have in common, and which affects crucial social institutions: the economic theories that have dominated the West for the last three decades. Their most recent reincarnation is the economics of austerity that have dominated economic thinking and particularly governance and social investment since 2008.

Conversely, the RemaIN campaign has failed to provide a positive vision of why Europe matters. It has instead resorted to highlighting the economic catastrophe that awaits a post-EU world and the insecurity that Brexit will bring to this country. Figures have been rustled up, stretched, and recalculated to prove how the average working household, businesses and the entire country would lose untold sums of money. Helpfully, the stats are announced in terms of monthly and yearly household losses. Even house prices are at threat from Brexit. Despite some RemaIN voices defending progressive aspects of EU policies, the gist of the campaign to remain in is that untying the UK from the EU would irremediably impoverish the UK. In other words, there are no reasons to remain as much as terrifying reasons not to leave, and the facts marshalled for the arguments relate therefore only to the wallets of individual ‘working people’. It is unwise to rest so much on a negative vision, especially when promoted by leaders increasingly discredited by the economic orthodoxy they have been pursuing for years. Pulling on pursestrings rather than heartstrings does little to arouse political passions when faced with emotional pleas for independence and a reassertion of Britain as a great country. In this debate, fear of destitution has been pitted against fear of the foreigner. Neither plays to our country’s strengths or vast potential.

For Britain, Europe holds far more than economic stability and security. The European project has brought not only peace since the end of two world wars –one of the longest periods of peace since the fall of the Western Roman Empire- but also growing exchange and interaction among disparate people who have far more uniting them than dividing them. The ability to travel without border checks and visas has opened up the continent, making Genoa as easy to reach as Newcastle, and Madrid as easy as Bath. Leaving the European Union would make the ease of movement, whether for business in Brussels, holiday homes in the Algarve, retirement, or parties on the beaches of Ibiza far harder.

For students and young people, the investment of the European Union in education has meant opportunities have flourished for students to develop international networks and learn more about people from across the region who have similar approaches to life, irrespective of their background or language. Many students in the UK have been able to participate in invaluable exchanges such as the Erasmus scheme, where learning a language is coupled with life experience in a foreign environment both of which serve to make the language, the people, and the culture far more accessible and familiar. If anything, Britain would do well to embrace these more for future generations.

London is a financial capital of the world, this case has been amply made. Yet small and medium industries also benefit from the connectivity with Europe and the access it brings to a larger market and new consumers. For young people, greater opportunities can be found in employment opportunities through Paris, Berlin and Rome. Given the difficulty of the current job market the country should be seeking out these opportunities and reducing the barriers of entry to the next generation.

A European identity is not something we should be shy of embracing. Europe has brought, and continues to enable, the exchange and sharing of art, culture, ideas, and scientific development. It is through such exchange that our own culture thrives and develops, feeding off new and different ideas. The European Capital of Culture initiative has revived and energised cities in the United Kingdom like Liverpool, showcasing local talents, investing in cultural establishments and bringing new people from beyond the region to enjoy and experience it.

Some in Britain may feel the country can go it alone, but to turn our back on the diversity, richness, and opportunity of Europe, is to deprive ourselves of a historical, cultural, intellectual and educational opportunity to really be the thriving, cosmopolitan and outward looking country that Britain should be.

 

A Flawed Union contra Britain’s identity

The European Union has many flaws, not least accountability, transparency, and the visible disconnect from domestic populations that this referendum has highlighted. In spite of this, it would be foolish to cut and run. British interests and the future of Europe are better served by Britain being an active member of the Union and leading and reforming it from within. An optimist might hope that the strength of feeling the Brexit debate has demonstrated, and the nature of the concerns raised by both sides, might spark a wider European discussion about how to reform the institutions and processes of the EU. If Prime Minister Cameron survives the election, this may be one way he can seek to mend the large cracks that have revealed themselves in his party and British society as a whole.

Britain, for its part, has fallen short of its leadership potential within the EU. This is not just a fault of the current government, which expended precious European political capital to defend tax havens and slow down tax reform affecting multinational corporations, but of every British government since we joined. Britain has appeared as an apathetic participant. We are convinced that many European countries, exhausted of the austerity orthodoxy uncompromisingly advocated by Merkel’s German government since 2008, would welcome alternatives. In the EU, any alternative and reform must be supported by big power, and as a big power, Britain can do far more to press for reform from within. The Franco-German duopoly, lately more of a German monopoly, is not a given in the EU. We can and should balance it: firstly so that we have a stronger and more coherent leading voice in Europe in defence of our own, and mutual, interests, but secondly so as to improve this deeply flawed Union from within.

The idea that Britain can and should go it alone is based on a misguided sense of ‘Britishness’. Britain has never really been an island beyond the literal sense and Europe informs British identity far more than either Leave or Remain acknowledge. Modern day Brits are part of a family tree whose branches extend throughout Europe and beyond. Modern Britain, and its structure, politics, and culture, are built on the legacies of successive waves of immigration and change originating on the continent. Celts, Romans, Gaels and Scotii, the Angles, Saxons, Jutes, Vikings, Normans and French, and more recently Europeans and the peoples of the Commonwealth and the world have over three millennia contributed to the extremely particular, mixed and vibrant cultural and social constitution of this country. Through this history, both positive and negative, Britain is the product of trade, travel, the movement of goods and people, the exchange of ideas, and the ongoing incorporation of different cultures.

The English language is a wonderful amalgamation of languages: French, German, Scandinavian, Hindi, Greek, Arabic among many others. The idea of British greatness as independent of anything or anyone else is not only an unjust falsehood, but also arrogantly denies the influence of its multicultural past. We are better for such exchange and should be embracing our international roots. Our identity is informed, even subtly, by these European and international influences. Europe is inescapable, hardwired into British culture.

Immigrants do not pose a danger to this identity. Although there are practical concerns about immigration to debate and resolve, not least linguistic, economic and social integration, education, and healthcare, claims of the dangers posed by immigrants to the country are tinged with the notion that their negative traits are a congenital result of having roots in a certain country: this is the definition of xenophobia. We see this in Farage’s exclamations of immigrant danger, which operates on the basis that there is some satisfactory threshold of potential immigrants and any more dilutes the nation’s sense of Britishness, a similar theme is in the Conservative obsession with quantitative quotas. Both reveal the core assumption in this discourse that any immigrant is bad, whence the debate surrounding quotas, and thus to various degrees all immigrants stand accused of stealing opportunities and social care, as well as being more predisposed to crimes, , as he has at times asserted. There may be undesirable elements among those who come to this country, just as there are among Brits, yet research has conclusively proven that immigration into the UK is largely composed of young people that are active members of society, who require less healthcare, housing and ‘have a higher labour force participation rate, pay proportionately more in indirect taxes and make much less use of benefits and public services’ and overall also raise wages.^[1] It could be argued, conversely, that much of the UK’s emigration into Europe is less helpful, often composed of over-60s and pensioners that require healthcare and social services from their host countries, mostly Spain, Italy and France, and rely on the EU treaties to not have to pay for them. It is telling of the power of identity politics that it is seldom questioned why they deserve those rights while Europeans in the UK do not.

Mainstream parties are deeply implicated in the growth of the nationalism we are witnessing and its anti-immigration policy consequences. Nigel Farage and UKIP alone cannot be credited with this shift. It is only when established politicians deploy such politics, as we saw in the last London and general elections, that the idea that immigrants are to blame for everything can finally go mainstream. When long-established centre-right conservative and centre-left social democrat parties seek to steal votes from either extremes by aping their discourses, they not only fail to take those votes, but they legitimise their discourses. We are witnessing an auction, the value of nationalist ideas gaining currency and being amplified as politicians bid for votes. Nationalism is a dragon that has its own internal dynamics, it will not stay long with the rider that seeks to utilise it, and will constantly seek expressions that further simplify, radicalise and actualise the conflict of Us versus the Other.

In other words, the ever more frequent exploitation of identity for electoral gain makes those ideas ever more mainstream, bigger, and the fringes of those ideas more violent and extreme than hitherto. Ultimately, the normalisation of these ideas at the centre and their further radicalisation at the fringes is making us less tolerant, less compassionate, and less able to understand the manifold experiences of people who make up and contribute to this society.

 

Conclusion

Following the referendum there are a number of potential outcomes. If Britain chooses to leave the EU there will be a difficult divide to rebuild, not only within Britain, but also with our European neighbours. If Leave succeed, it will commence a long and protracted period of new negotiations, of renegotiations and of re-establishing Britain’s place in the world as an island nation. It may well be able to create new deals with non-EU states, but it will be a lengthy and costly process. There will undoubtedly be a period of economic uncertainty, if not a crash as investors remove their money and seek the safer and more stable opportunities of mainland Europe.

Politically, there will be a reckoning for the Prime Minister and his party and for those who staked their careers on Remain as leaders such as Nigel Farage claim a victory and Tory grandees in the Brexit camp seek access to the leadership position. The dragon of nationalism that this campaign has stirred will not lie content with Brexit. If the country’s ills are not resolved by this ‘declaration of independence’, nationalism will thrive, further disintegrating the social compact of the country, seeking new foreigners and internal enemies to blame and stigmatise for the ills of society, the state and the country. The oft-cited preference of Leave campaigners for Australia’s deeply problematic and frequently dehumanising immigration policy and methods might spell the end of British values and respect for human life, as nationality increasingly determines the quality and rights of individuals.

If Remain win there will be a collective sigh of relief, but also a genuine need for introspection and regrouping. If Remain are successful it will have been through close margins, too close for comfort. Those in the Remain camp will need to rebuild the trust and sense of solidarity with the European partners who have watched the divisive debate unfold. Political and societal leaders will need to rebuild relations with those within Britain who feel less certain about how welcome they really are in this country. The Remain side would be wise to use the need for reform to reengage with the EU on a more proactive basis, leading and contributing to the vision of how Europe can and should be better, more transparent, more accountable and more in touch with populations.

The government has overlooked vital issues during this process, including the NHS, education, welfare, housing, and reform, all of which are latent frustrations underlying the divisions that have emerged. These cannot be blamed on immigrants forever, nor is it a valid or justifiable short-term excuse. These sentiments and the strength of feeling aroused through the campaigns point to more worrying and long-term concerns within society that will not dissipate on Friday. Addressing the toxic nature of the debate, and the evident distrust not only of the political class, but also of the expert establishment, will be critical challenges for Britain whatever the outcome.

It is precisely because our island cannot be untied from the continent, because we are only thirteen miles from our European neighbours, that we have a stake in one another’s political health. This means Britain should keep a seat at the table; and take a more energetic leadership position in the EU, which much of Europe would welcome to balance the dominance of France and Germany. Finally, it should be part of a concerted fight against the detrimental effects of populist nationalism. If we were to invoke Churchill more sensitively than the Leave campaign has, we would point to his struggle against populist Fascism, highlighting that as Europe was almost destroyed by the last tide of incendiary populist identity politics in the 1930s, we should know better.

Dr Pablo de Orellana is a Spanish-born, Italian-raised anglophile that became British by choice, time, and friendships.  He is a Teaching Fellow at King’s College London specialising in identity politics, diplomacy, and critical theory and he occasionally indulges in the arts.

 Claire Yorke is a British-born Europhile that through love of languages, literature, travel, and culture became European. She is a PhD Researcher at King’s College London, Department of War Studies researching discourses of empathy in diplomacy.

 

[1] Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini, “The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK,” The Economic Journal 124, no. 580 (November 1, 2014): 593–643; Christian Dustmann, Tommaso Frattini, and Caroline Halls, “Assessing the Fiscal Costs and Benefits of A8 Migration to the UK,” Fiscal Studies 31, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 1–41; Christian Dustmann, Tommaso Frattini, and Ian P. Preston, “The Effect of Immigration along the Distribution of Wages,” The Review of Economic Studies 80, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 145–73.

Muhammad Ali: anti-war, anti-hate. A tribute.

By: Austin Luce

A seldom remembered achievement in the life of Muhammad Ali took place ten years after his retirement from professional boxing. In August of 1990, just before the U.S. led coalition entered the First Gulf War in what would be called Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein had taken thousands of foreign civilians hostage, including fifteen Americans living and working in Kuwait. While many of the women and children were allowed to return home, fifteen men were kept as insurance against an American intervention. Ali, already suffering from advanced Parkinson’s disease travelled to Iraq independently to negotiate the Americans’ release. Indeed, in November of 1990 he was still one of the most recognizable people in the world. Using his celebrity as a bargaining chip, and his Muslim faith as a commonality, Ali was granted an audience with Hussein. Impressed with Ali’s stature, and fearing greater embarrassment on the world stage, Hussein released all 15 of the hostages unharmed, after less than four months of captivity.

Although Muhammad Ali, born Cassius Clay, was known as a fierce warrior inside the boxing ring, it was his exploits outside of it as a messenger of peace that set him apart. Ali passed away June 3 at the age of 74, during a time when his adopted faith of Islam has been corrupted by some groups calling for violent Jihad. Yet, this author is reminded of how Ali was willing to surrender his life in the name of peace, and urged others to do the same; a major reason America’s war in Vietnam eventually came to a conclusion.

After a three year reign as heavyweight champion of the world (1964-67), Cassius Marcellus Clay, who had converted to Islam and changed his name to Muhammad Ali, was drafted into the United States armed forces. Being a devout Muslim, Ali’s religious beliefs precluded him from participating in any war, and he applied for exemption as a conscientious objector. As his request was denied, Ali was convicted for refusing induction, fined $10,000 (a significant sum for 1967) and sentenced to five years in prison. As a result, he was stripped of his heavyweight title, and banned from boxing, tentative upon official appeal.

At a time when America was so culturally divided, Ali became a symbol for racial equality and the anti-war movement. Famously taking the unpopular stance of asking why he should go overseas to fight when the American people and government would not fight for his liberty at home; he declared “I ain’t got no quarrel with them Vietcong… no Vietcong ever lynched me, put dogs on me, or called me a ni**er.” Instead, he said his real fight was against injustice in a country that continued to fail him and his people regarding their human rights. Moreover, why he or anyone else should go fight against people who had not done them any harm, or were not any threat to their country in the first place, was not clear. Ali’s conviction was eventually overturned, and he regained his heavyweight title.

Ali’s message was that of peace, acceptance and understanding; he eventually became the first major American figure to travel to Vietnam (in the 1990s) as part of a goodwill mission, years before U.S.-Vietnamese relations were normalized. It is no wonder then that Ali, a Muslim, nonetheless kept in his inner circle of trainers Angelo Dundee and Bundini Brown (A Catholic and a Jew, respectively). His memorial service on June 10^th in Ali’s hometown of Louisville, Kentucky will be an interfaith service, attended by imams, priests, and rabbis, with foreign leaders such as Recep Erdogan and King Abdullah of Jordan in attendance.

After the September 11th attacks, a frail Ali spoke out against violence and terror. He declared that those who kill in the name of Islam are wrong; and that if he was able (healthy enough) he would do something to stop it. Recently, he responded to Donald Trump’s threats and proposal to ban Muslims from the United States:

“I am a Muslim and there is nothing Islamic about killing innocent people in Paris, San Bernardino, or anywhere else in the world. True Muslims know that the ruthless violence of so called Islamic Jihadists goes against the very tenets of our religion. I believe that our political leaders should use their position to bring understanding about the religion of Islam and clarify that these misguided murderers have perverted people’s views on what Islam really is.”

When this author was born, the most famous and beloved basketball player in the world was Kareem Abdul Jabbar; who, like Ali, a Muslim convert known for his outspokenness and activism. The number one children’s film was Aladdin, a film about a young Muslim man living in the Middle East. Unfortunately, the media’s coverage of terrorist attacks—both in the U.S. and overseas—and of Muslims in general, which is often relegated to stories involving violence and radicalisation, has led many living in the West to associate Islam with terrorism; leading to xenophobia, insecurity, and division. This is precisely what groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda hope for: it helps to validate their message and expand their support base.

However, if there were ten Muhammad Ali’s, this author very much doubts that terror groups’ propaganda would find enough oxygen to survive, as Ali stole every scene he was a part of. More importantly, leaders like Osama Bin Laden and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi never do their own fighting; proselytizing hate and ignorance, they send others to do it for them. A healthy and outspoken Ali would have dwarfed them. Terror groups cheapen human life by asking young men and women to inflict harm on themselves and others. Ali once stopped a total stranger from doing just that: in 1981, a man about to commit suicide by jumping off a window ledge, was approached by Ali, who refused to stop talking to him, until he came down from the ledge.

Ali was, and still is, beloved around the globe; more so than any terror group espousing violence as its central tenet. Killing innocent people is not brave. Going to prison for refusing to do so most definitely is. Muhammad Ali referred to himself as ‘The Greatest’. Through his actions, he proved that he was.

Austin Luce is a graduate student in the MSc War & Psychiatry program at King’s College London.

Extremism, environment, and the new security dynamics of the 21st century: Strife in conversation with RUSI Director, Dr. Karin von Hippel

Interviewed by: Harris Kuemmerle

Yazidi refugees in Northern Syria. Source: Wikimedia

Harris Kuemmerle – Where do you see climate change fitting within the wider European security dynamic moving forward? Do you feel that European policy makers adequately appreciate the security risks of climate change? Or is it still seen as somewhat of a secondary security issue?

Karin von Hippel – I think we all need to focus much more on the longer term security impacts of climate change. For example, many scientists have argued that the drought in Syria, which began in 2006, contributed to the civil war as it forced many people (notably farmers) to move to urban areas. We need to prepare for similar challenges in the future, especially in parts of the Middle East and Africa, where scarce resources will cause more people to compete, which in turn, will lead to more conflict.

I cannot say for certain if the Europeans appreciate this more or less than others. While it is common to discuss the threat posed by climate change, I’m not sure we are all doing as much as we can today to prepare for different scenarios tomorrow. That really is the crux of the issue. At RUSI, we are establishing a Futures Programme, looking at issues such as migration, robotics, space, climate change, conflict, etc and where and how they may intersect over the next 15 to 20 years, and what this will mean for our common security. Governments, multilateral institutions, academia and the private sector need new tools to anticipate and plan for such uncertainty.

HK – Is it fair to say then that environmental issues haven’t quite internalised themselves within the primary security paradigms and agendas?

KvH – That’s an interesting question. In the United States the military and intelligence communities are very forward leaning in this space. By contrast, the rest of the U.S. government may be lagging, primarily because so many officials end up being consumed by the crises of the moment and have very little spare time to focus on future threats

HK – The integration of coal markets was one of the founding elements of the European project. With that being said, do you feel that increased energy interdependence among member states has the potential to again be a key driver of European integration moving forward? Or could energy instead serve as a driver of disintegration?

KvH – I think that energy issues in Europe have indeed led to some challenges. For example, some countries have a closer relationship with Moscow, and need to rely on Russian oil; and that has made it very difficult within Europe to have unity over issues such as the Ukraine crisis. Honestly, I don’t see energy interdependence operating as an integrating factor within Europe in the near future. Indeed, energy may be more likely to lead to fracturing because of the reliance of some countries on Russian oil supplies.

HK – How would you define the term radicalisation with regards to people joining terrorist or other extremist groups?

KvH – That’s a good question, and it’s similar with the term “fundamentalist”. The way we [at RUSI], and researchers like myself look at it is by asking whether or not such extreme views lead to violence. You could be radical and fundamental in your beliefs, but if you are not going to channel your radical beliefs into violence (especially violence against civilians) then it’s not a security issue. If you are going to use violence as a tool to try to impose your belief system, then radicalism or fundamentalism is a problem.

Ultimately (provided such groups are not violent) people have a right to their beliefs. We may not agree but freedom of expression is a fundamental tenet of any democracy. This doesn’t mean we should be ignoring extremist, non-violent groups – and in fact – we should be thinking of ways of keeping communication channels open with such groups as they may have individuals who decide to leave precisely because such groups are not violent. Hence communication could help security and other officials identify potential terrorists-in-the-making. The challenge is that these relationships are hard to establish because many extremist groups (on the left or right) often do not trust the authorities or outsiders.

HK – What would you suggest have been the greatest strengths and weakness of current US policy with regards to counter terrorism and counter extremism? Why?

KvH – I think everyone is struggling with understanding what radicalises people, especially with ISIL, which is very different from previous terrorist groups. The numbers of people joining ISIL are much higher than those joining groups like al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. In the past few years, between 1,500 and 2,000 people a month have travelled to join ISIL. In recent months, these numbers have been reduced significantly, to around 200 a month; though that is still way higher than those joining al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. There is definitely something else going on with ISIL, be it the so-called Caliphate or the extreme violence they employ – we don’t really understand the appeal of ISIL as well as we should. As a result we are making too many untested assumptions, and throwing a whole lot of money on those assumptions. I’m afraid we still need to do more research to understand this issue better.

Ultimately radicalisation is very location-specific, each recruit will have a very specific set of reasons to join, based on local grievances. Recruits from Iraq, Minneapolis, or Birmingham will all have distinct motivations. So you really need to understand what is happening in these particular areas, in addition to understanding the global appeal of these organisations.

HK – Are there other cases of past or present radicalisation that we can draw upon to help tackle groups like ISIS? For example, the case of gang membership in urban areas?

KvH – Yes, these issues are definitely comparable. I was recently at a conference speaking with Gary Slutkin, the founder of Cure Violence, an organisation that has done some great work in reducing gang violence all over the world (it was launched in Chicago, but has since spread globally because their methodology works). They employ interruptors and former gang members to play a role in preventing violence. They borrow a methodology used by health workers to stop the spread of pandemics. So there are definitely successes out there, and techniques which one can borrow from adjacent fields, provided you are able to tweak it to make it work for your purposes.

HK – Given the importance of an enabling environment in facilitating radicalisation, in your opinion, what would be the best way to prevent such an enabling environment in Syria or other such parts of the world?

KvH –ISIL emerged from the civil war in Syria, I think a more robust U.S. approach to Syria would have helped prevent the country deteriorating as much as it has. I understand why President Obama did not want to do more than he was doing, as he was worried about the unintended consequences, as we saw in Libya. On the other hand, I think the U.S. government by 2014 knew many more Syrians than it did Libyans, and it had lots of relationships with people on the ground, through training programmes and other non-lethal support to opposition activists. Had the US bombed around the time the red lines were crossed, I think it would have made a big difference and ISIL would not have been able to capitalise on the space as they did. Though this is of course all conjecture and impossible to prove, it’s just my personal belief.

ISIL has been able to thrive in Syria primarily because they are experts at filling power vacuums and taking advantage of chaotic situations. ISIL’s territorial holdings have changed frequently since 2014 and they have been in sporadic conflict with a range of militias, including opposition fighters, the Kurds, aL-Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Syrian regime, and recently the Russians. Unfortunately, the longer Western powers essentially watch from the sidelines, with minimal assistance, the worse it’s going to get.

HK – In your experience, do you think gender is a concept that is understood and engaged enough in counterterrorism policy and practice? Can you offer an example to highlight this?

KvH – Women play a role in preventing family members from being radicalised. They also can play a negative role and contribute to radicalisation of friends and family members. The interesting thing about ISIL is that more women are joining ISIL than have joined other groups in the past, and we are doing research to try to understand this issue and ultimately understand the way women perceive the phenomenon.

HK – Finally, in your calculations, would a British exit from the EU have a net positive or negative impact on British and European Security?

KvH – We have been looking at the security implications of Brexit at RUSI, and from this perspective, it makes more sense for Britain to remain (e.g., to enhance/build on the common arrest warrant, sharing of intelligence, etc), but at RUSI we do not take a corporate position on Brexit.

 

 

Dr Karin von Hippel became Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on 30 November 2015. Karin von Hippel joined RUSI after recently serving as Chief of Staff to General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter-ISIL. Karin has also worked as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and as a Senior Adviser in the Bureau of Counterterrorism at the US Department of State. Prior to that, she worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC and at the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London. She has also worked for the United Nations and the European Union in Somalia and Kosovo.

Harris Kuemmerle is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies and the Department of Geography at King’s College London. His research focuses on the intra and inter-state hydropolitics of the Indus River. Twitter: @HarrisKuemmerle

Why we should worry (proactively) about Taiwan

By: Lauren Dickey

Tsai Ing-wen, President of Taiwan. Source: Wikimedia

At her May 20^th inauguration, President Tsai Ing-wen tiptoed around two words of utmost importance to Beijing: 1992 Consensus. This consensus is what Beijing has, in recent years, deemed to be the political foundation for cross-Strait engagement and rapprochement. Neither accepting nor repudiating the 1992 Consensus was a risky move for the new Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration, and one with potential repercussions for the next four years.

China maintains that it has a clear and consistent policy toward Taiwan, and one that is grounded in the 1992 Consensus.[1] Tsai’s delicate treatment of the Consensus was a move shaped by Taiwanese domestic politics, but one that is likely to send cross-Strait relations into a cool peace, at least for now. It is in the interest of the United States and other countries with ties to Taiwan to ensure that the Tsai administration is able to lead the island nation free from external pressures and coercion. And it is further in the interest of the international community to ensure Taiwan feels safe and secure in doing so. Rather than a full-blown normalisation of relations, policymakers should advocate for Taiwan’s inclusion at the international level and further support Taiwan’s indigenous defence push in ways that align with the ‘rebalance’. Additionally, the United States and its partners and allies should look to engage economically with Taiwan through the Trans-Pacific Partnership and other similar initiatives.

Any worrying on the issue of cross-Strait relations must begin with the 1992 Consensus. It is a term former Kuomintang (KMT) Mainland Affairs Council minister Su Chi admitted he made up in order to shelve stumbling blocks and in pursuit of more meaningful discussions.[2] Nearly twenty-five years later, what does this Consensus offer to ties across the Strait? It is still an agreement to disagree; both Beijing and Taipei – and subsequently the KMT and DPP – hold different definitions of the purported consensus. Under former President Ma Ying-jeou, it was his explicit acceptance of the 1992 Consensus as the irreplaceable political basis for cross-Strait interaction that created momentum for last year’s historic Ma-Xi meeting.[3] But, at the end of it all, surveys show that Ma became the most disliked politician in Taiwan.[4] His administration’s read of the 1992 Consensus clearly did not win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese population.

Tsai is taking a markedly different tactic to the 1992 Consensus, but still has yet to appease Beijing’s demands. Long before her inauguration, she extended an olive branch: a recognition of the historic meeting between the two sides in 1992.[5] In her inaugural speech, Tsai again recognised the ‘historical fact’ of a meeting in 1992, even as she outlined her administration’s intention to conduct relations with Beijing in accordance with Taiwan’s constitution and the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.[6] Tsai has made a case to conduct cross-Strait ties in accordance with the island’s democratic will, a bitter pill for Beijing to swallow. Indeed, the PRC State Council Office for Taiwan Affairs acknowledged the comments of Taiwan’s ‘new leader’ but criticised her vague approach as an ‘incomplete test answer’ given the absence of a clear acknowledgment of the 1992 Consensus.[7]

As if to add more fuel to the fire, Tsai’s inaugural speech was laced with other terms far less palatable to Beijing. She referred to Taiwan as ‘this country’ (where her predecessor, Ma, referred to ‘Taiwan’ or the ‘Republic of China’); and, particularly important, in sketching out plans for how she seeks to spearhead the island’s economic rejuvenation, she stated that Taiwan could no longer be dependent on a singular market.[8] No names need to be mentioned, nor fingers pointed, given the reality of Taiwan’s economic dependence upon mainland China’s market.[9]

The months leading up to Tsai’s inauguration saw attempts from Beijing to put the squeeze on Taipei in various forms. From Gambia finally shifting recognition to Beijing (after cutting its Taiwan ties in 2013), to the extradition of Taiwanese criminals in both Kenya and Malaysia, to an invitation for Taipei to observe this year’s World Health Assembly, Beijing’s ‘one China’ narrative at the global level seems to be alive and well. In the cross-Strait relationship, tourism numbers have continued to decline, and farming exports have come under closer scrutiny – or, in the case of a recent pineapple shipment, outright rejection due to ‘excessive pesticide residues.’[10] The People’s Liberation Army also held exercises in Fujian province on the opposite side of the Strait in the days leading up Tsai’s inauguration.[11] Chinese intimidation tactics and pressure on Taiwan’s international space and economy is but likely to continue; a strategic action presumably aimed at bullying the DPP to a point where it falls out of power in the 2020 presidential elections.

To be certain, there is plenty to worry about in terms of what the next four years hold for Taiwan. A Taiwanese government that cannot pull its economy out of current doldrums or sufficiently promote the welfare of its people has ripple effects for the world, least of which is the global supply chain; and in terms of cross-Strait ties, Tsai’s dodging of the 1992 Consensus may backfire. Even if a full-blown conflict (and Chinese occupation) remains out of reach for now, we should still worry, albeit proactively, about Taiwan. The next four years will not see the United States abandon its time-honoured, strategically ambiguous approach to ‘one China’ in favour of normalising ties with Taiwan. But this is not to say that steps to strengthen ties with Taiwan in the face of any future menacing behaviour from China should not be taken. Rather than ignoring Beijing’s treatment of Taiwan, the United States and others are poised to encourage a strategic ‘rethink’ of the common narrative framing Taiwan as a provocateur under a pro-Taiwan administration. Western policymakers should also quietly advocate for Beijing and Taipei to find a new norm on which to deepen cross-Strait engagement. Taiwan is both a strategic asset and an opportunity for the West – policymakers must be willing to treat it as such.

 

 

Lauren Dickey is a PhD candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and the National University of Singapore where her research focuses on Chinese strategy toward Taiwan under Xi Jinping. She is also a member of the Young Leaders program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] ‘Full Text of mainland’s Taiwan affairs authorities’ statement on cross-Straits relations,’ Xinhua (20 May 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/20/c_135375950.htm.

[2] ‘Su Chi admits the “1992 consensus” was made up,’ Taipei Times (22 February 2006), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/22/2003294106.

[3] Transcript of President Ma Ying-jeou address to Mainland Affairs Council (29 April 2015), http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&rmid=2355&itemid=34609.

[4] Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey data (13 May 2016), http://www.tisr.com.tw/?p=6745#more-6745.

[5] ‘DPP recognizes 1992 meeting, not “1992 consensus”: Frank Hsieh,’ Focus Taiwan News (4 May 2016), http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201605040017.aspx.

[6] Full text of President Tsai’s inaugural address (20 May 2016), http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201605200008.aspx.

[7] ‘中央台办、国台办就“蔡英文未承认92共识”表态,’ Phoenix News (20 May 2016), http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160520/48812135_0.shtml; ‘Mainland says Tsai’s speech on cross-Straits ties “an incomplete test answer,”’ Xinhua (21 May 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/21/c_129002689.htm.

[8] See full text of President Ma’s inaugural address (21 May 2008), http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2008/05/21/157332/p1/Full-text.htm.

[9] Krejsa, ‘Seeing Strait: The Future of the U.S.-Taiwan Strategic Relationship,’ Center for a New American Security (May 2016), http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNASReport-Taiwan-FINAL.pdf.

[10] ‘Gambia resumes ties with China,’ China Daily (17 March 2016), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-03/17/content_23926410.htm; ‘Taiwanese telecoms fraud case heading to trial on mainland China as Taipei delegation returns home,’ South China Morning Post (22 April 2016), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1937710/taiwanese-telecoms-fraud-case-heading-trial-mainland; ‘WHA invitation cites “one China,”’ Taipei Times (8 May 2016), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/05/08/2003645759; ‘Beijing, Taiwan’s latest tiff is over who’s to blame for island’s decline in mainland Chinese tourists,’ South China Morning Post (12 May 2016), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1944056/beijing-taiwans-latest-tiff-over-whos-blame-islands; ‘Uncertainty in cross-strait ties takes toll on Taiwan’s farm exports,’ Focus Taiwan News (19 May 2016), http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201605190011.aspx.

[11] ‘PLA steps up drills in southeast “targeted at Taiwan and US,”’ South China Morning Post (18 May 2016), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1946719/pla-steps-drills-southeast-targeted-taiwan-and-us.