Yazidi refugees in Northern Syria. Source: Wikimedia
Harris Kuemmerle – Where do you see climate change fitting within the wider European security dynamic moving forward? Do you feel that European policy makers adequately appreciate the security risks of climate change? Or is it still seen as somewhat of a secondary security issue?
Karin von Hippel – I think we all need to focus much more on the longer term security impacts of climate change. For example, many scientists have argued that the drought in Syria, which began in 2006, contributed to the civil war as it forced many people (notably farmers) to move to urban areas. We need to prepare for similar challenges in the future, especially in parts of the Middle East and Africa, where scarce resources will cause more people to compete, which in turn, will lead to more conflict.
I cannot say for certain if the Europeans appreciate this more or less than others. While it is common to discuss the threat posed by climate change, I’m not sure we are all doing as much as we can today to prepare for different scenarios tomorrow. That really is the crux of the issue. At RUSI, we are establishing a Futures Programme, looking at issues such as migration, robotics, space, climate change, conflict, etc and where and how they may intersect over the next 15 to 20 years, and what this will mean for our common security. Governments, multilateral institutions, academia and the private sector need new tools to anticipate and plan for such uncertainty.
HK – Is it fair to say then that environmental issues haven’t quite internalised themselves within the primary security paradigms and agendas?
KvH – That’s an interesting question. In the United States the military and intelligence communities are very forward leaning in this space. By contrast, the rest of the U.S. government may be lagging, primarily because so many officials end up being consumed by the crises of the moment and have very little spare time to focus on future threats
HK – The integration of coal markets was one of the founding elements of the European project. With that being said, do you feel that increased energy interdependence among member states has the potential to again be a key driver of European integration moving forward? Or could energy instead serve as a driver of disintegration?
KvH – I think that energy issues in Europe have indeed led to some challenges. For example, some countries have a closer relationship with Moscow, and need to rely on Russian oil; and that has made it very difficult within Europe to have unity over issues such as the Ukraine crisis. Honestly, I don’t see energy interdependence operating as an integrating factor within Europe in the near future. Indeed, energy may be more likely to lead to fracturing because of the reliance of some countries on Russian oil supplies.
HK – How would you define the term radicalisation with regards to people joining terrorist or other extremist groups?
KvH – That’s a good question, and it’s similar with the term “fundamentalist”. The way we [at RUSI], and researchers like myself look at it is by asking whether or not such extreme views lead to violence. You could be radical and fundamental in your beliefs, but if you are not going to channel your radical beliefs into violence (especially violence against civilians) then it’s not a security issue. If you are going to use violence as a tool to try to impose your belief system, then radicalism or fundamentalism is a problem.
Ultimately (provided such groups are not violent) people have a right to their beliefs. We may not agree but freedom of expression is a fundamental tenet of any democracy. This doesn’t mean we should be ignoring extremist, non-violent groups – and in fact – we should be thinking of ways of keeping communication channels open with such groups as they may have individuals who decide to leave precisely because such groups are not violent. Hence communication could help security and other officials identify potential terrorists-in-the-making. The challenge is that these relationships are hard to establish because many extremist groups (on the left or right) often do not trust the authorities or outsiders.
HK – What would you suggest have been the greatest strengths and weakness of current US policy with regards to counter terrorism and counter extremism? Why?
KvH – I think everyone is struggling with understanding what radicalises people, especially with ISIL, which is very different from previous terrorist groups. The numbers of people joining ISIL are much higher than those joining groups like al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. In the past few years, between 1,500 and 2,000 people a month have travelled to join ISIL. In recent months, these numbers have been reduced significantly, to around 200 a month; though that is still way higher than those joining al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. There is definitely something else going on with ISIL, be it the so-called Caliphate or the extreme violence they employ – we don’t really understand the appeal of ISIL as well as we should. As a result we are making too many untested assumptions, and throwing a whole lot of money on those assumptions. I’m afraid we still need to do more research to understand this issue better.
Ultimately radicalisation is very location-specific, each recruit will have a very specific set of reasons to join, based on local grievances. Recruits from Iraq, Minneapolis, or Birmingham will all have distinct motivations. So you really need to understand what is happening in these particular areas, in addition to understanding the global appeal of these organisations.
HK – Are there other cases of past or present radicalisation that we can draw upon to help tackle groups like ISIS? For example, the case of gang membership in urban areas?
KvH – Yes, these issues are definitely comparable. I was recently at a conference speaking with Gary Slutkin, the founder of Cure Violence, an organisation that has done some great work in reducing gang violence all over the world (it was launched in Chicago, but has since spread globally because their methodology works). They employ interruptors and former gang members to play a role in preventing violence. They borrow a methodology used by health workers to stop the spread of pandemics. So there are definitely successes out there, and techniques which one can borrow from adjacent fields, provided you are able to tweak it to make it work for your purposes.
HK – Given the importance of an enabling environment in facilitating radicalisation, in your opinion, what would be the best way to prevent such an enabling environment in Syria or other such parts of the world?
KvH –ISIL emerged from the civil war in Syria, I think a more robust U.S. approach to Syria would have helped prevent the country deteriorating as much as it has. I understand why President Obama did not want to do more than he was doing, as he was worried about the unintended consequences, as we saw in Libya. On the other hand, I think the U.S. government by 2014 knew many more Syrians than it did Libyans, and it had lots of relationships with people on the ground, through training programmes and other non-lethal support to opposition activists. Had the US bombed around the time the red lines were crossed, I think it would have made a big difference and ISIL would not have been able to capitalise on the space as they did. Though this is of course all conjecture and impossible to prove, it’s just my personal belief.
ISIL has been able to thrive in Syria primarily because they are experts at filling power vacuums and taking advantage of chaotic situations. ISIL’s territorial holdings have changed frequently since 2014 and they have been in sporadic conflict with a range of militias, including opposition fighters, the Kurds, aL-Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Syrian regime, and recently the Russians. Unfortunately, the longer Western powers essentially watch from the sidelines, with minimal assistance, the worse it’s going to get.
HK – In your experience, do you think gender is a concept that is understood and engaged enough in counterterrorism policy and practice? Can you offer an example to highlight this?
KvH – Women play a role in preventing family members from being radicalised. They also can play a negative role and contribute to radicalisation of friends and family members. The interesting thing about ISIL is that more women are joining ISIL than have joined other groups in the past, and we are doing research to try to understand this issue and ultimately understand the way women perceive the phenomenon.
HK – Finally, in your calculations, would a British exit from the EU have a net positive or negative impact on British and European Security?
KvH – We have been looking at the security implications of Brexit at RUSI, and from this perspective, it makes more sense for Britain to remain (e.g., to enhance/build on the common arrest warrant, sharing of intelligence, etc), but at RUSI we do not take a corporate position on Brexit.
Dr Karin von Hippel became Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on 30 November 2015. Karin von Hippel joined RUSI after recently serving as Chief of Staff to General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter-ISIL. Karin has also worked as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and as a Senior Adviser in the Bureau of Counterterrorism at the US Department of State. Prior to that, she worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC and at the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London. She has also worked for the United Nations and the European Union in Somalia and Kosovo.
Harris Kuemmerle is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies and the Department of Geography at King’s College London. His research focuses on the intra and inter-state hydropolitics of the Indus River. Twitter: @HarrisKuemmerle
The idea of removing Turkey from the ranks of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would send shockwaves through the international community. Never before has the alliance ousted a member, as the need for unity, especially in the days where a war with the Soviet Union seemed like a real possibility, always superseded in importance the conduct and dissention among individual states. However, with the USSR relegated to the dust bin of history, and even though Russia is no longer the threat to the West it once was, the gross misconduct of Turkey has continued to go overlooked. However, last year’s incident in which Turkey shot down a Russian aircraft unprovoked underscores the point that apologizing and diluting Turkey’s actions are not only no longer necessary, but dangerous.[1] This author is pro-NATO, and in favour of its continued existence, and while the nations that constitute the treaty are not perfect either, and have much to apologize for themselves, the idea of a Western alliance cannot survive compromise of its principles, which Turkey threatens to do. This author is also not the first to suggest or propose expulsion.[2] Also, Turkey’s shooting down of Russian aircraft is hardly the first transgression, but rather part of a long history of incidents typical of a rogue state that threaten the security and stability of both Europe and the Middle East.
The pattern of Turkey’s offenses can be traced back over 100 years. It seems unfathomable that the Armenian genocide during the First World War has continued to be ignored; 1.5 million deaths is not an insignificant number, even when compared to the hundreds of millions of victims of other 20th century conflicts. However, as history cannot be undone, the concern is no longer whether Turkey committed this atrocity, but that it continues to officially deny that the Armenian genocide ever even took place![3] Germany and Japan make no such efforts to dissemble and prevaricate regarding their actions or atrocities committed during World War II.[4] Why isn’t the same expected of Turkey? When it comes to expectations of decency, Turkey continues to remain exempt; an exemption that must end, if NATO is to have and retain any meaning.
Adding insult to injury, the much forgotten Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus in the 1970’s behoves condemnation, even if it comes four decades later. Russia, (and not your father’s Russia in terms of strength, but) having lost none of its belligerence, annexes Eastern Ukraine and earns international censure. When Turkey behaves similarly, NATO has seen fit to sweep it under the rug, despite thousands dead.[5]
The very nature of the alliance is summed up in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: “An attack against one ally is considered as an attack against all allies.”[6] By flexing its political and military muscles, Turkey is playing a game of provocation intended to lead the rest of the alliance into war. World War I began in a similar way: One nation, the Kingdom of Serbia, was able to drag the entire world into the abyss of armed conflict, responsible for the loss of an entire generation of men. Thus, if Turkey, with its posturing, were able to precipitate a similar situations with Russia today, NATO would have no choice but to rush to Turkey’s aid, or risk the alliance disintegrating. This must not be allowed to happen.
In the new century, President Recep Erdogan, Turkey’s supreme leader has taken his country back several decades in terms of progress. The new regime is known for arresting journalists, academics, and activists who speak out against the regime; none the more typified then by the recent government takeover of Zaman, the nation’s #1 circulating daily newspaper.[7] There have been aspersions of corruption (millions of lira going missing, likely embezzled by Erdogan and beneficiaries,) as well as fraudulent elections.[8] When westerners think of these things, they usually associate them with Russia, or failed states in the third world; not a Western ‘democracy.’
Finally, there is the issue of the fight against Daesh, otherwise known as ISIS, ISIL, or just IS. It has been widely reported that Turkey is one of the main sources of income for IS, buying the oil that Daesh produces, as well as greatly inhibiting the Kurdish resistance in the region; of which there are many Kurds in Syria, Iraq, as well as Turkey. [9][10] One cannot be an ally of both NATO AND IS. They are mutually exclusive! It grows more complicated still, as Erdogan is a Sunni Muslim, the same sect of Islam as both ISIS and our “friend” Saudi Arabia. As for the Kurds, who want their own homeland, independent of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, Turkey has no desire to allow its Kurdish minority to establish their own democratic state (and a secular one to boot!) and will continue to block their efforts. Thus, seeing his main rival Syria become so fragmented is something Erdogan must relish; and so continues to pour fuel on the fire.[11]
Some propose that ousting Turkey from NATO would weaken the alliance. However, this author would argue that discharging the Turks would in fact be a show of strength, not weakness. NATO failed to display a collective determination when Russia annexed Eastern Ukraine, and before that Georgia (Russia failed in that attempt.)[12] Not to mention the decade long quagmire of Iraq and Afghanistan; so if there was ever a time where the alliance appeared weakened, it is now. As it stands, NATO has a chance to send the world a message that it doesn’t need Turkey for its defense; that the alliance can stand on its own without the support of a morally corrupt regime.
It is doubtful whether Turkey would be as gung-ho in shooting down Russian jets without the backing of NATO; and should that support disappear, as this author suggests, and Turkey finds itself without friends, Premier Erdogan would think twice about provoking a potential war. The alliance could consider establishing a framework for allowing Turkey to re-enter NATO at a later point in time; if it redresses the injuries it has engendered, and assuage the arrayed concerns of the other members. It could then be thought of as a suspension of membership, like being on probation. However, actions, as it is said, speak louder than words. Even Germany, one of NATO’s largest constituents, has been ambivalent towards Turkey’s membership in the European Union and not, it would seem, without justification (a majority of Germans surveyed are against Turkey’s inclusion).[13] Turkey’s membership in that institution also rests on it accountability, especially in regards to the Syrian refugee crisis, in which Erdogan is expected to help. However, his recent track record does not bespeak the qualities one would expect from a peace-maker, like compassion and understanding, but rather a belligerent (callousness and moral compromise). Put simply, if Turkey wants to be a member of the international community, it must act like one.
Austin Luce is a graduate student in the MSc War & Psychiatry program at King’s College London.
Leaders gather for a photo at the February 2016 meeting of the European Council. Source: Wikimedia
Annabelle Vuille: What would you say are the most pressing security challenges faced by Europe today?
Daniel Keohane: Let me answer this question slightly differently, as there are numerous security challenges to be listed – from Russia to ISIS, failing states in the Middle East, the refugee challenge, and terrorism etc. What is more interesting, is to think about which challenge is a priority for whom. I have been struck on recent travels by the level of diversity; in Berlin at the moment, the priority is the refugee crisis; in Paris, the priority is terrorism; in Warsaw, the priority is Russia; and in the UK, the government is consumed with the Brexit referendum debate. Added to this is the fact that everybody is still recovering and, indeed, still suffering from the economic crisis, which is also a security challenge in a way as a healthy, growing economy is requisite to deal with other pressing security challenges. No doubt, there is an incredibly complex confluence of crises at the moment. So, rather than prioritizing, I prefer to understand which challenge is a priority and for whom.
In the 2016 Strategic Trends Report published by CSS, you argued that European defense cooperation is no longer primarily driven by the EU and NATO, but rather by the interests of national governments. To what extent does this dilute the strength of Europe’s collective security environment?
Well, this is a good question and I should start by explaining the reasoning behind my argument. Of course, there are some people that would say that my argument is not very new and that defense policy in Europe has always been driven by national governments. The point I am trying to make is that during the 2000s, even if you just look at operations, governments cooperated and acted mainly through the EU and NATO. The difference today is that they are doing it in a whole host of ways, be it bilaterally, regionally or ad hoc like the coalition against ISIS. Of course, governments still act through the EU and NATO, but these two institutions are no longer the central option and this is a major change from five to ten years ago. Let’s take France as an example: in Congo 2003 and Chad 2008 France acted through the EU, but since the 2011 Libya intervention, the government has mainly acted alone or as part of an international coalition, i.e. anti-ISIS. This is a change that I find quite interesting because it is not the renationalisation of policies, it is a renationalisation of cooperation; making it more complex, more messy, more widely driven by the national governments and hence, all the more interesting.
With the ‘Big 3’ (France, UK and Germany) making up the bulk of European defense expenditure, how can we expect their national interests to shape the operational priorities of NATO?
First off, it is important to note the difference between the three states. Traditionally, France and Britain have an interventionist culture with a global outlook. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and as nuclear-armed powers, both have a certain sense of responsibility for global security and, as such, are more willing to carry out external military interventions unilaterally or as part of a coalition. This is quite different from Germany. Whilst comfortable pursuing ad hoc, bilateral or mini-lateral cooperation on capability projects, as with the Dutch, Germany is much more hesitant when it comes to operations and the use of robust military force. In such instances, Germany prefers to act in conjunction with the United States, NATO, or the EU, even as it has come to take on a more active, and central role in European politics and foreign policy. Not only has Angela Merkel led the European response to the Ukraine Crisis but also, in a surprising response to the Paris attacks, Germany sent a relatively robust support team, including frigates and reconnaissance aircraft to the anti-ISIS coalition. Whilst no full-blown combat role, I think that Germany has come a long way since its abstention on the Libya intervention in 2011 and that, in contrast to the assessment by some German experts, it may slowly assume a more advanced leadership role. Additionally, Britain and France cannot do it alone; with their resources reduced, they need Germany’s help diplomatically and militarily even if only in a beefed-up role. Consequently, these three states have come to cooperate closely and this has provided some potential for convergence: All three are supporting NATO to deter Russia in Eastern Europe. All three have deployed forces to fight ISIS and other Islamists, whether in Syria, Iraq or Mali. And all three are keeping a close eye on what is going on in Libya. However, the potential for divergence still exists, particularly concerning the EU referendum in the UK. At the end of the day it is about politics and if the UK votes to leave the EU it could cause a major rift that could negatively impact defense cooperation. Another possible divergence exists over operations in the Middle East and North Africa. If in the future Britain and France are required to step up their anti-ISIS campaigns and Germany is unwilling to contribute, there could be a rift on burden sharing over who is doing what against Islamists in southern neighborhoods. Elements of both convergence and divergence are in play.
What role will Poland play in shaping NATO’s future priorities?
Poland’s main concern is Russia and territorial defense. It has long wanted a beefed-up NATO, and particularly American presence on Polish soil and things are moving in that direction. I think where Poland could come to play an interesting role is in NATO’s southern strategy, which will be discussed at the NATO summit in Warsaw in June this year. Whilst it is relatively clear on what measures need to be taken to deter Russia, it is much less clear what role NATO has in fighting ISIS, stabilizing Libya etc. If Poland demonstrates its willingness to contribute to these efforts, it would suggest a mood of, and desire for coherence among the NATO allies. If, on the other hand, Poland proves unwilling then I fear that there will be some divergence; some southern countries, such as Italy, will expect more engagement from Poland in return for supporting the deterrence efforts against Russia.
A 2016 RAND wargaming study showed that Russia could reach the capitals of Estonia or Latvia on NATO’s eastern flank within 60 hours. How well equipped is the Alliance in responding to possible Russian aggression?
That’s a good question because in strictly military terms, so far, the NATO efforts would not be enough in terms of conventional deterrence. The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) is relatively small, compared to the Russian forces on the other side. Additionally, whilst the United States is quadrupling its Reassurance budget and investing more resources into deterring Russia and beefing-up NATO’s defense, it’s still a relatively small amount; less than 1% of the Pentagon’s entire budget, which is nothing compared to the money that Russia has been investing into its military structure over the past few years. However, whilst there is more that NATO could, and even should do, that would be to miss the political and strategic point. The reason why NATO is not doing more is mainly because the United States does not want to push too hard. It is highly unlikely that Putin would attack a NATO member state and it would be unwise on his part to try and test NATO’s and U.S. resolve. Thus, I think the feeling in Washington is to strengthen deterrence and signal an alertness of a possible military threat from Russia, but at the same time, to avoid provocation or any move that would provide Russia with an excuse to attack; essentially, it is about striking a delicate balance between deterrence and détente. So, in strictly military terms NATO’s efforts are not so impressive, but in strategic terms it might be the wiser course.
In the 2016 Strategic Trends Report you also discussed the UK security and defense review of November 2015, and mentioned that its ‘main political message’ was that ‘Britain is back as a serious military power’. Additionally, Britain is NATO’s strongest European military power. Therefore, if the referendum on EU membership did result in a ‘Brexit’, what impact would this have on European defense and, more specifically, on the internal cohesion among NATO member states?
My own view is that, in theory, from a military standpoint a Brexit should not change that much for European defense cooperation as Britain will remain a member of both NATO and the UN Security Council, and it will remain a major military and nuclear-armed power. In practice, however, it might all be a little bit different. Certainly, it will make political alignments with France and Germany more difficult, which will directly impact defense policy. It has been a longstanding dream of many in Paris and Berlin to have separate EU military structures – by that I mean operational headquarters – and until this point, the UK has always been able to block such efforts. However, if Brexit were to take place, there would be nothing to stop France and Germany from doing so and would, at the very least, throw the gauntlet to them. There is another aspect to the Brexit business that has not been widely covered: the damage that it could have on the UK’s military ambitions. I think that Brexit could have the same impact on the UK defence budget as the economic crisis of 2008; diminishing government revenue and hence, taking a toll on defense expenditure. If you look at the forecasts, such as the one provided in last week’s issue of The Economist, none of them are particularly positive on the outlook for the UK’s economy if there was a Brexit. Consequently, if the UK economy suffers badly then the government’s budget will suffer badly, and this will have a negative effect on defense spending. Even if Britain sticks to 2% nominally, in real terms, it could really hurt their military ambitions as the cost of advanced equipment rises by 5% a year. The other impact of Brexit is that Britain would be diminished as a diplomatic player because it would lose its voice in guiding EU foreign and defense policy. Britain would simply matter less, particularly to the United States. Essentially, Brexit could potentially damage relations with the United States, make Britain less valuable at the UN and NATO, and it could hurt the UK’s own defense ambitions. I think the consequences are quite serious.
Could it make Europe more vulnerable?
It would – at least psychologically. Primarily because there is already a perception that Europe is frail and struggling to cope with the various crises ranging from terrorism, Russia, and ISIS to the refugee crisis. If Britain did indeed vote to leave the EU, it would create a whole host of questions: Will other countries, particularly non-Eurozone countries hold their own referendums? Will they subsequently want their own special relationship with the EU? Will the original founding members – or some of them at least – come to pursue a strategy of selective integration? In other words, you could end up having a very introverted debate about the future of European governance at the very moment when everything is falling apart around us; potentially akin to shifting the deckchairs while the Titanic is sinking. So from a psychological standpoint I think it would have a dreadful impact. Yet, it is difficult to make any definitive assessment. Some people believe that Brexit could drive France and Germany toward more integration. It might, but it might not because it could legitimise the arguments of populists and nationalists including Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. Ultimately, although there is much uncertainty as to what will happen, I am pretty sure that the effects will not be positive.
Is there any other aspect of European defence and security you would like to touch upon?
This isn’t directly a question for European security, but rather for global security. I think that the military aspects of the U.S.-China relationship will constitute the big question for the 21st century and for the international system as a whole. Europe, I believe, is only just starting to wake up to this reality because, understandably, we have been focused on the immediate crises at our doorstep. The other issue will concern what happens next in Libya and Syria. The Syrian war, we hope, will not go on forever and we will have to ask ourselves how we will remedy the situation and rebuild the Syrian state. Additionally, what will we do about Libya? Are we prepared to invest the military resources necessary to stabilise the state? These are questions that will confront Europe relatively quickly. From a long-term perspective, say 20 years, it is clear that Europe will be occupied in the broad neighbourhood; not only are there so many weak states that could potentially become beacons of instability, such as Egypt, but who knows how the situation in the Caucasus and the Sahel will develop. My experience, to paraphrase Macmillan, is that there is no certainty in predicting future events and their impact on international politics. As a consequence, political leaders across the globe will have to remain relatively flexible whilst being able to distinguish between the urgent and the important. What is urgent will not always be the most important issue at hand.
Annabelle is currently based in Switzerland and in her final year of the MA programme in International Relations and Contemporary War at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Having studied International Business in Rome, she is specifically interested in applying her economic background to the sphere of conflict and security. Her main research interest is the interplay between geopolitics and energy security, particularly in the maritime domain.
Daniel Keohane is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zürich. He previously held positions at the Foundation for International Relations (FRIDE) in Brussels and Madrid, the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and the Centre for European Reform in London. His work has been published in journals such as Survival and the Journal of Common Market Studies, and he has conducted studies (both alone and as part of consortia) commissioned by the European Union and NATO.
Russian Su-25 Fighter Jets taking-off in Latakia. Source: Wikimedia
On March 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin unexpectedly announced the withdrawal of Russian forces from Syria as UN-sponsored peace talks began in Geneva. Putin’s withdrawal–however partial–challenged the Obama administration’s long-held quagmire sentence on the Russian role inside Syria. Putin showed that a limited military campaign could preserve the regime from collapse without committing to a costly ground campaign. Taking stock of the Russian intervention thus far, current evidence suggests that Russian influence is unlikely to diminish.
As such, an assessment on where Russia’s influence has mattered the most unveils great insights as to Putin’s end-state agenda. Putin’s Syria strategy is tightly wedded to the eventual outcome of the war, and thus a commitment to an eventual negotiated settlement. Russia intends to maintain a pliable government in Damascus; one that ensures Russian military access inside Syria as a balance to other international powers.
Forcing a Rebel “Reset” to Russia’s Advantage
When the last round of UN-sponsored peace talks on the Syrian conflict collapsed in early February, members of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) scrambled to arrest the spiraling violence through the cessation of violence agreement completed in Munich on February 11. This accord set the conditions for a tenuous peace that has so far held despite numerous violations largely attributed to the Assad regime.
Significantly, the Munich agreement attempted to force a wedge between moderate and hardline Islamist groups–principally between the Al-Nusra Front and other close affiliates. Since Russia vowed to continue its aerial campaign in territories occupied by both hardline and moderate groups, observers suggested that the truce was perhaps designed to force division within rebel ranks. Though evidence suggests that the ties between the Nusra Front and some of its allies such as Ahrar al-Sham are often fluid, the Munich agreement was a significant step towards addressing what role (if any) certain powerful Islamist groups may have in Syria’s future.
Through the Munich agreement, Putin ostensibly bound the United States in ipso facto agreement to the Russian perspective on the fractured opposition. By simply defining all opposition groups as irreconcilable terrorists, the Russian position advanced only two non-negotiable options: continued bombardment or a reprieve under ceasefire conditions; roughly 100 armed rebel groups joined the truce before implementation day on February 27. Ultimately, Russia’s discriminate targeting of the moderate opposition, combined with the regime’s collective punishment, exacted the desired concessions from the rebels and their external supporters.
Putin accurately assessed that the likelihood of the US-led coalition mounting a direct challenge to Russia’s aerial advantage was quite unlikely. Meanwhile, the regime parleyed its victories in Latakia, Deraa, and Aleppo to bolster its territorial gains in the event that the truce collapsed. Washington’s most viable relief to the beleaguered opposition rested on escalating arms provisions as an incentive for greater collaboration and unity among the rebels. This option, however, bore minimal benefit given Russian air superiority and the possibility that it would scuttle the developing ceasefire agreement.
But since the brokered ceasefire went into effect roughly one month ago violence has decreased by nearly 90 percent. This relative calm has also opened the space for peaceful protest as hundreds of thousands of local Syrians have again flowed into the streets demanding Assad’s departure. This return to peaceful assembly, however, occurs at a time when the moderate opposition is beset by dwindling prospects of an outright victory, or a favorable negotiating position in Geneva. This is precisely the outcome desired by Russia as peace talks resume: a militarily waning moderate opposition, undermined by the prominence of Salafi-jihadist groups, and thus pliable in any forthcoming settlement.
Managing Assad’s Potential Return to Intransigence
Prior to the withdrawal announcement, the regime was insulated in western Syria and the moderate opposition was increasingly battered and fractured as Assad appeared to have his way militarily. Assad’s resurgence translated into his regime’s growing intransigence on the diplomatic front. Days before talks resumed in Geneva, regime representatives revived the poisonous question of Assad’s political future, stiffening their position on Assad’s surviving role as head-of-state. Perhaps emboldened by their increasing military leverage, the representatives veered outside the primary focus of the talks, which is largely focused on developing a workable transition process.
These developments and the timing of the Russian withdrawal suggests that Putin’s drawdown may to some level curb regime behavior in Geneva. A slight panic within the regime may prove beneficial, though the fidelity of this particular claim is hard to discern. What appears clear is that the extent of Russia’s withdrawal will remain opaque for several weeks.
A complete departure of the Russian military presence is quite unlikely since the naval base at Tartus and the air base at Hmeimim will remain operational. The Syrian battlefield has certainly served as a testing ground for Russian military hardware. And it was (and will likely remain) an excellent proving ground for Russia’s execution of a high intensity aerial and ground campaign; allowing these capabilities to recede would be a gross error in Putin’s eyes.
The Russian Approach Post-Palmyra
Evidence from Russia’s military operations inside Syria revealed the disproportionate targeting of non-Islamic State aligned rebel groups. Nonetheless, Russian air raids have provided the necessary aerial cover for government troops to advance and retake the historic city of Palmyra which was seized by the Islamic State last May. Meanwhile, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition of Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen militias has in recent months wrested away swathes of territory from the Islamic State in a push towards the group’s de-facto capital in Raqqa.
The United States is intently focused on advancing negotiations between the regime and Syria’s main opposition bloc. Such an outcome, if appropriately harnessed, also provides the elusive ground component required to decisively challenge the Islamic State throughout Syria. That Russia floated the possibility of a federal post-war Syria is quite significant, though such an outcome is contingent on an elusive agreement between all parties involved. Given the current conditions, any power-sharing agreement that sets the outlines of a grand security infrastructure will likely be led by the regime, to Russia’s benefit.
The regime’s recent progress in Palmyra opened a new offensive corridor into Deir al-Zor which may extend north into the Islamic State heartland of Raqqa as conditions warrant. Russia calculates that a regime victory in both Raqqa and Deir al-Zor will secure remnants of the regime if Assad leaves in a transition settlement, however unlikely. What remains unclear is whether the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) has the manpower to effectively achieve this objective without substantial reinforcements from surrogate Shia militias from Iraq and beyond. But as Iran deepens its Syria involvement beyond the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) the regime’s manpower deficits will benefit from these reinforcements.
On the other hand, the United States will continue to face a tough challenge in galvanizing Sunni rebel resistance as regime forces move eastward. And despite the regime’s manpower shortages, Russia is likely to exploit this handicap to maintain its footprint inside Syria. That Russian commitment has slowly transitioned from fighter jet squadrons to close air support via attack helicopters suggests that Russian ground presence will continue.
In the past several days, the weeks-long ceasefire has fallen under immense pressure and mutual violations by both the regime and the armed opposition threaten to tear the deal asunder. Whether the ceasefire survives or falters, Russia’s military role inside Syria is unlikely to recede.
Peter Kirechu is Graduate Student at the Mercyhurst Institute for Intelligence Studies where he focuses on civil strife, insurgencies and counterterrorism. Mr. Kirechu was also a 2013 Boren Scholar to Jordan where he studied the security and humanitarian effects of Syria’s civil conflict. @PeterKirechu
This is the second of a series of articles we will be featuring on Strife in the coming week looking at the role of Proxy Warfare in the 21st century by Series Editor Cheng Lai Ki. Previous articles in the series can be found here.
On the eve of the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, it became apparent that Russia was furthering its path towards resurgence. Harshly criticizing Western actions, Russia began a series of interventions, notably in Syria and Ukraine. At home, President Vladimir Putin continues to solidify his rule, dominating elections and polls alike, while Russian nationalism and ultra-nationalism surges. In Europe, Russia has fanned the flames of populist nationalism, heavily supporting right-wing fringe groups in an apparent quest to destabilize Europe’s economic and political unity. Embroiled in a variety of conflicts, it comes as no surprise that Russian private military companies (PMC) have begun to operate not only in Russia, but across the globe. The real question lies in whether or not Russian PMCs will expand in the future, or remain as a sidelined player in Moscow’s arsenal.
In a 2011 address to the State Duma, Putin expressed support for the use of Russian PMCs as a tool for expanding government influence.[1] Despite this admission of support, the legal status of Russian PMCs straddles something of a grey area. Multiple Russian owners of PMCs have addressed these issues in interviews, claiming that Russia inherited their legal system from the Byzantine Empire, thus anything that isn’t explicitly prohibited is allowed.[2] This, however, has not stopped legislators from introducing bills that would fully legalize PMC groups in Russia, particularly of their use for the Russian government. A bill, submitted in 2014 by MP Gennady Nosovko of the Fair Russia party, was recently rejected by the Russian cabinet, citing security and legal issues.[3] While some follow voluntary regulations, PMCs in Russia will remain in the grey zone, neither legal nor prohibited. The future legality of PMCs in Russia is yet still unclear, as the same Nosovko promised future legislation.[4]
Regardless, this legal grey area has not prevented Russian PMCs from advertising their services in Russia and abroad. Overall, the use of PMCs worldwide has been varied. It was not until the 2003 Iraq War that PMCs began to massively grow. On the Russian side, PMCs have largely been confined to operations involving private Russian companies in Africa, the Middle East, and international waterways. The largest of the Russian PMCs, the RSB Group, has a detailed history, boasting operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, the North Caucasus, and Serbia.[5]
The most recent and notable example of Russian PMC operations occurred in Syria, 2013. The PMC group in question was the Slavonic Corps Limited, a Hong Kong registered company led by Director Sergei Kramskoy that primarily employed ex-Russian soldiers.[6] The Slavonic Corps heavily advertised in Russia, coordinated by Vyacheslav Kalashnikov, a lieutenant colonel in the FSB (Russia’s Federal Security Service) reserves who also happens to be the head of another PMC, the Moran Security Group.[7] The origins of this fighting force in Syria is massively convoluted, bearing ties with two separate PMCs and an officer in the FSB. In Moscow, the ex-soldiers were reassured on the legality of the operation, as their new role protecting key assets for the Syria regime was sanctioned by the FSB and the Russian government.[8]
Despite these assurances, the situation on the ground in Syria was far from adequate, with the soldiers severely underequipped and managed by Vadim Gusev, the deputy director of the Moran Security Group.[9] After a number of mishaps and a total of six wounded, the ex-soldiers mutinied and returned after battle with elements of the Syrian rebels.[10] However, once back in Russia, the men were apprehended by FSB, arresting Gusev and an Evgeny Sidorov, both members of the Moran Security Group, on charges of mercenary employment.[11] In the end, the story of the Slavonic Corps is almost unbelievable. A Russian PMC with ties to the FSB hires another Russian PMC to send forces to protect assets in Syria, who in turn are arrested upon return in Syria. With all parties denying or refusing to comment, the situation may never truly become clear. Regardless, these events must be seen as an example of the grey legality of Russian PMCs and the absolute mess that results.
With this turbulent history of Russian PMCs, it is now imperative that we look to the future of these organizations. Today, our understanding of what may come lies within the modern Russian-Ukrainian Conflict. Despite their initial denial, the Russian government had deployed unmarked Russian soldiers, not PMCs as far as it is known, in operations seizing the Crimean Peninsula and supporting Ukrainian separatists, sparking a massive outcry and souring relations with the West.[12] While this narrative may be well known, another element is critical in understanding the future of Russian PMCs. The ‘Night Wolves’ are Russia largest biker gang and the rabid supporters and exporters of Russian ultra-nationalism. In 2014, it was confirmed that the biker gang participated in the seizure of Crimea, assaulting a Ukrainian naval base and gas facility on the Black Sea, and has now created local chapters in Eastern Ukraine supporting the separatists there.[13] The most significant aspect of the Night Wolves is their relationship to President Putin. Alexander Zaldostanov, leader of the Night Wolves, has strong personal ties with Putin, who happens to be an honorary member and has provided over $1 million in grants to the gang.[14]
How exactly do the Night Wolves relate to the future of PMCs? Ultimately, the Night Wolves serves as a greater advantage to Putin and the Russian government than PMCs ever could. Officially, it is difficult to establish a direct tie between the government and the biker gang. With this plausible deniability at hand, the Kremlin has the assurance that the Night Wolves will continue their ideological operations in ways deemed acceptable or crucial to the overarching policies of the government. Furthermore, groups like the Night Wolves can operate offensively whereas official PMCs cannot, otherwise they are branded as mercenaries, something explicitly outlawed in Russian and the international community. In other cases where ideological militias or paramilitary elements cannot reach, Russian troops, whether or not they are marked as so, are more than appropriate. Thus, Russian PMCs are likely to remain on the backburner, unutilized by Putin and the Kremlin, remaining stagnant in their role as private security guards.
Gregory Wilson is a MA Candidate in Intelligence and International Security at King’s College London, specializing in the field of Russian/Soviet intelligence and regional security.
Photo credit: Diaz,J. ‘Russia is developing a drone army – including amphibious models’, SPLOID, January 16, 2014.
This is the first of a series of articles we will be featuring on Strife in the coming week looking at the role of Proxy Warfare in the 21st century by Series Editor Cheng Lai Ki.
The technological advancements over the last decade have allowed for the development of new tactics and strategies for security, intelligence and warfare options. These ‘advancements’ have undoubtedly augmented multiple state capabilities within those domains. In his book, War Made New, military historian Max Boot charts the technological developments supporting warfare throughout human history.[1] Through the lens of the book, an argument can be made that mankind has consistently improved at one thing, warfare. However, a second consistency can be identified. This is an increase in the operational distance and capabilities of states. This phenomenon can be identified through modernised versions of traditional strategies or emerging technology centric methods. Regardless of the method employed, the warfare strategy for states to use either a willing third party actor or remote control ordinance can be categorised under the broader term: ‘proxy warfare’. This series explores this exact phenomenon and the collaboration between a state and its utilisation of non-state (or remote control) actors.
The term ‘proxy’ possesses multiple definitions depending on its associated strategy, tactic and theatre. Within the context of warfare, ‘proxy’ capabilities can be analysed against the three overarching levels of: Strategic, Operational and Tactical.[2] Expanding on the concept of ‘proxy’ capacities of both state and non-state actors has raised several debates over the decades, mainly around the areas of impacts, accountability, effectiveness and oversight. However, the objective here is not the deliberate these considerations but more to explore the broadening scope of ‘proxy’ capabilities themselves; which would range from large state level proxies to small individual private contractors or unmanned ordinances. When applied effectively, ‘proxy’ capabilities could provide benefits such as plausible deniability, increased distance from harm and the augmentation of existing skills. The utilisation of ‘proxies’ is however, not a new phenomenon and has been around for centuries. Its earliest form can be represented by mercenaries. Mercenaries were (and still are) groups of ex-soldiers who contract out their skills to lords and kings with a force-limitation in a certain domain.[3] The trend has only continued to expand and broaden in scale and associative categories through the years, leading to the development of the Private Military and Security Company (PMSC) and probably one of the most classic examples of ‘proxy’ warfare.[4] There are of course other forms, as mentioned, these can be in the forms of a remote control ordinance.
Strategically, ‘proxy’ capabilities can refer to the involvement of entire organisations (state or non-state) as an extension of power to influence distant geopolitics. Although the utilisation of a weaker state by a global super-power could be situated as a ‘proxy’ capability. Such partnerships could not just influence national security policies but also potentially the strategic considerations of other states. Operationally, ‘proxy’ capabilities would refer to the involvement of private organisations as either an extension of power or augmentation of existing capabilities. Traditionally, this can be represented by the involvement of corporate or non-state actors who provide security, intelligence or consultancy services to government agencies that would enhance existing capabilities. Within ‘operational’ domains, ‘proxies’ are fundamentally used to empower existing state-capabilities. For example, consider a state that wants to increase its capabilities to gather intelligence in inaccessible regions, they could deploy unmanned aerial vehicles or commonly referred to as drones for the conduct of surveillance operations.[5] Finally, on a tactical level, the effects of ‘proxy’ capabilities would have been the most evident. This can primarily be represented by the application of unmanned ordinances to tactically support military operations through the provision of critical and live battlefield information or fire support (i.e. Russian Uran-9 Ground Combat Drone).[6] More recently, the world has experience a surge in cyber augmented scenarios attributed to either supporting existing warfare capabilities or espionage operations conducted by states.
Despite the technological augmentations currently available to states, the concept of ‘proxy’ capabilities as explained earlier is not a new phenomenon. However, the number of capabilities that can be encompassed under the concept has now broadened; evident from efforts of awareness initiative such as the Remote Control Project – a project hosted by the Oxford Research Group stationed in London.[7] It is advisable that we under the notion and expansion of what can be considered ‘proxy’ capabilities available to states. State-actors are obtaining more effective ordinances to arm their unmanned systems to conduct more effective information gathering and strike missions. Cybersecurity companies and security/intelligence agencies are collaborating with skilled non-state agents to empower their existing capabilities to tackle advanced persistent treats.
This series explores this consistently broadening cope of ‘proxy’ capabilities within the 21st century and various associated issues towards their respective categories through a three-part series entirely written by Master students currently studying under the King’s College London, War Studies Department. Part One of the series addresses the most traditional form of ‘proxy’ capabilities of involving a third non-state actor to support existing state activities in conflict or contested zones. Gregory Wilson will kick off the series by exploring the role of Russian Private Military Companies and their involvement within pro-Russian activities within recent theatres.
Part Two of the series takes a further step back and explores the technologically enhanced hardware dimensions of ‘proxy’ capabilities through an analysis of surveillance techniques by Saher Naumaan; and followed by a study of the application of unmanned ordinances by various countries by Rian Whitton.
Part Three of the series finally embarks into the most recent form of ‘proxy’ capabilities available to states. Elmer Hernandez first bridges the gap between the physical and cyber realms by analysing how state agencies are collaborating with non-state ‘hackers’ to support their ongoing counter terrorist operations. Finally, this series wraps up with an analysis of the current Investigatory Powers Bill in the United Kingdom and the involvement of private telecommunication companies by Mustafa Batuhan Albas.
The objective of this series is to reveal the broad – and expanding – capabilities for state-actors to have their existing powers augmented through ‘proxy’ capabilities. With modernisation and technological advancements, the world in locked into a cycle of consistent change. These trends slowly distance the capability of states away from symmetrical and more towards asymmetrical strategies. It is therefore vital that we understand these expansive dimensions before it completely redefines state strategies in warfare, intelligence and geopolitics.
Formerly with the Singapore Armed Forces, Cheng is currently reading for an MA in International Intelligence and Security at King’s College London where his academic interest revolves around private military and security companies and their roles as security by proxy in the contemporary security theatre. During his military service, he was a senior tactical and operational instructor for the Armour Formation. He was the researcher and coordinator for the 2016 King’s College London Crisis Simulation that replicated tensions in the South China Sea.
[1] Boot, M. War Made New: Weapons, Warriors and the Making of the Modern World, (New York: Gotham Books), 2012.
[2] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the Untied States, (25 March 2013).
[3] Singer, P. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of Privatized Military Industry, (New York: Cornel University Press), 2003.
[4] Kinsey, C. Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies, (New York: Routledge), 2006.
[5] Kreps, S & Kaag, J. Drone Warfare, (Cambridge: Polity), 2014.
No shots were fired, but Tuesday, January 26 may very well mark the official beginning of the ‘open phase’ of Russia’s ongoing destabilization campaign directed against the German government, part of an undeclared hybrid war that abruptly came into the focus of public awareness. The East-West confrontation seemed to be a historical phenomenon, the Cold War a memory of the past – but right now there is at least an icy current in Western European capitals.
On January 26, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov decided to engage in the ongoing Russian media campaign covering the alleged rape of a 13-year-old girl in Berlin, Germany. Several days earlier the state-run Russian TV station Channel One used its prominent evening news[1] platform to present the purported case of a young girl ‘Lisa’ – a dual German and Russian citizen – who allegedly had been abducted and repeatedly raped by migrants. This report fitted perfectly into the dark picture that the Russian media had already painted over the last weeks – of a Germany losing control over its own country due to overwhelming masses of migrants, and no longer being able to secure public safety. Together with a barrage of similar reports and commentaries over the following days it incited an unprecedented outrage among the Russian-speaking minority in Germany. Though the Berlin police quickly released a press statement[2] declaring that the young girl indeed had been missing for a short period of time, but there was no evidence of an abduction or sexual assault, the social media were in uproar, dismissing the press release as an attempt to cover-up the incident. The Russian embassy even sent a note verbale (a diplomatic letter) to the German Foreign Ministry demanding a full investigation into the case – in an overall aggressive tone, according to the German periodical Der Spiegel[3].
Then, Minister Lavrov took the stage. In his annual press conference[4] he referred to ‘enormous problems caused by migrants,’ and effectively accused the German authorities of a cover-up of the affair, demanding they not ‘gloss over’ reality for political purposes. To ensure Russia’s stance was understood by all in this case, he mentioned the alleged victim as ‘a Russian girl’ and ‘our girl Lisa.’ That apparently went too far even for German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who disposed of these accusations as ‘political propaganda[5]’ and summoned Russian Ambassador Vladimir Grinin.
Nevertheless, even though the Berlin police repeatedly made clear that the girl had been in hiding for several hours for domestic reasons and that there was no evidence at all supporting the claim of an abduction, the propaganda continued. Russian media proceeded to keep the case alive, and social media were used to mobilise Russians and Germans of Russian descent to participate in large-scale demonstrations in Berlin[6] and several other German cities the next weekend. Following the incitement of a Russian-backed organization and calls disseminated via Facebook and text messages,[7] thousands of protesters – by far most of them with Russian migration background – addressed the alleged need to protect the German people against attacks from migrants. These protest had a strikingly homogenous appearance, though. In most cases all speeches were in Russian, but all the protest signs were written in German and even looked very similar[8], though used in cities several hundred kilometers apart. As the rallies were so obviously orchestrated, many German print[9] and TV[10] media outlets picked up these activities and broached the issue of Russian propaganda in Germany[11].
Though highlighted only in the wake of recent events, this kind of disinformation is not a new phenomenon. Several Eastern European states – especially the Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with their background as a former Soviet Union region and now member states of NATO – complain about a long-term media propaganda campaign mainly addressing their respective substantial Russian minorities and targeted to manipulate this audience.
These attempts are part of an overarching strategy. Starting from the classic Clausewitzian definition, War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. These other means, he added, may include all physical and moral instruments available. The Russian Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, developed this strategic approach further by adapting the understanding of modern war to the environment of the 21st Century. In an article for the Russian-language Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er[12] (or Military-Industrial Courier) in 2013, he expressed thoughts on the role of nonmilitary means for achieving political and strategic goals and their importance as an instrument to support (or even supplant) military means in certain situations and environments. He pointed out that the experience of the last few years supports the assessment that even a thriving state can be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war – all within the course of only a few months or even days.[13]
Gerasimov explicitly stressed that the focus of applied methods of conflict has altered the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures — especially when applied in coordination with the potential of mass demonstrations. Russia obviously followed this strategy of ‘Hybrid war,’ dubbed the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ by US historian Mark Galeotti.[14] The massive disinformation campaign preceding and accompanying the occupation of the Crimean peninsula by Russian forces, and the not-yet fully acknowledged participation of Russia in the Ukrainian civil war serve as prominent examples.
This did not go unnoticed. The German domestic intelligence service stated in its annual report[15] that Russian intelligence services try to influence politics and the general public in Germany. Both NATO[16] and the European Union[17] are aware of this threat, but so far have limited their response to the creation of small specialized units tasked to monitor and document this kind of state-driven and/or state-sponsored disinformation. This handful of analysts is in no way able to effectively counter the Russian propaganda. The general population and the media, on the other hand, were preoccupied with concerns regarding Islamist terrorism, the increasing numbers of refugees, and the ominous rise of right-wing extremism.
This changed within a week.
Perhaps Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov acted prematurely. Perhaps he miscalculated the timing of his offensive, or overestimated the resentment against refugees among the German population. Either way, his move made clear that Russia is operating within a strategy of hybrid warfare – and that the campaign of such a war is also directed against Germany. With a new awareness among German media of Russian tactics, however, the odds of success may have shifted.
Dr. Daniel H. Heinke is at the Institute for Police and Security Research (IPoS), University of Applied Sciences (Public Administration) Bremen, Germany, and an Associate Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) at King’s College London. You can see more at: http://works.bepress.com/daniel_heinke.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen.
The possible (re)emergence of states within NATO, at a time of renewed international tensions and widespread concern over the capabilities and commitments of existing member states, means that any such country seeking recognition will have to answer a fundamental question: will the combined capabilities and commitments of the two resulting successor states be greater or smaller than those of the existing parent state? In the run up to the Scottish referendum last year for instance, this was discussed, with some voices in the United States expressing their concern at the possible impact on the military capabilities of Washington’s first and foremost partner. The Atlantic Council, a US-based think-tank published a comparative study of Scotland and Catalonia, which praised the latter, emphasizing plans for naval specialization which fit with perceived US and NATO needs. At the political level, US President Barack Obama expressed his hope that voters would support Scotland staying in the UK, while remaining silent on Catalan independence and deploying USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) to Barcelona a few days before the 9 November semi-official referendum.
The report by the Atlantic Council, and President Obama’s different attitude towards Scotland and Catalonia, are a reminder that each case is different. The (re)emergence of a state within NATO is neither good nor bad in and of itself. It would be as irresponsible to oppose any such internal expansion without a detailed look at the particular case as it would be to blindly welcome it without applying the same careful examinatio. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate, both in general and abstract terms, drawing on the case of Catalonia and Spain as a reference.
GDP. A state’s investment in defence is a measure of its total GDP multiplied by the coefficient determined by its political institutions. The division of an existing state can affect the size of the two resulting economies in different ways. On the one hand, it can lead to smaller and thus less efficient domestic markets. On the other, it can prompt more agile, dynamic, outward-oriented economies. Separation can put an end to the so called “rational underdevelopment” of some regions and to hard-to-justify discriminatory policies in areas like infrastructure, and regional and industrial policy.
A split can have a negative impact, at least in the short run, on both resulting economies if political risk assessments rise, or uncertainty remains over aspects such as the allocation of the national debt. If one of the successor states used to be a net payer to the common treasury (that is, it paid more in taxes than it received in public spending) and the other was a net recipient (it used to pay less than it received), then some questions arise. The short-term question is whether the additional post-independence growth in the net payer will compensate for the drop in the net recipien. In the longer run, the issue is whether the latter will benefit from more rational economic policies and an improved work ethic once it no longer enjoys funds from the former. Both Spain proper and Scotland are net recipients, while Catalonia’s yearly net fiscal transfers to the former are estimated at around 8 percent of the GDP in the last 15 years.
In the case of Catalonia, in 2000, 57 percent of Catalan exports were bound for the Spanish market, with the remaining 43 percent sent abroad; while in 2014, the percentages had reversed. In previous years, boycotts against Catalan products have been organized in Spain proper. The idea behind the boycotts was to prompt Catalan businesses and trade unions to oppose moves for further devolution (in particular the 2006 reform of Catalonia’s “Statute of Autonomy”, a law defining the powers of the regional authorities), for fear of losing market share in Spain proper, with the resulting negative impact on employment. However, rather than diminishing support for independence, such moves have largely backfired, while providing added momentum to the drive for internationalization.Regulated industries (such as banking) still under Madrid’s yoke remain shy when it comes to expanding abroad, but the myriad small and medium-sized enterprises accounting for much of Catalonia’s economic tissue less so, with quite a few having become “pocket multinationals”, that is not very large corporations which are nevertheless present in a wide range of countries. A post-independence boycott by consumers in Spain proper remains a possibility, and would have a negative short-term impact on Catalan GDP, however this would not translate into lower longer-term economic growth, rather the contrary. The reason is that, just like with the boycotts against the 2006 reform of the “Statute of Autonomy”, they would prompt businesses to expand in other countries, thus gaining size and competitiveness. Furthermore, in an independent Catalonia this trend would also involve those industries currently regulated by Madrid, such as infrastructure management and banking, which to date have internationalized to a very small degree. We should also remember that, while Spain’s Castilian core may remain hostile to the new state, Valencia and the Balearic Islands are likely to take a much more nuanced approach. In addition to sharing a language with Catalonia, their economic structure is similar. They also suffer a large fiscal deficit (difference between taxes paid and public spending received) and a lack of infrastructure investment, while their economy is based on small and medium-sized enterprises, which have been excluded by successive Spanish governments from the defence industry and related sectors such as airspace. A third consideration is that the value of Catalan exports to Spain proper include the value added by exporters plus the value of the intermediate goods used to produce them (that is, commodities, energy, and components, bought in Catalonia or abroad by Catalan companies to produce goods bound for Spain proper). Thus, taking the latter out, the effective percentage of Catalan GDP included in exports to Spain proper is lower, 22.5% of the GDP.
Concerning Spain proper, there are no Catalan plans for a boycott, and the independence movement has rather been careful and stress its desire to see good bilateral relations after separation. In that event, as Catalonia opens up further to world trade, and Spanish enterprises lose their current advantage in terms of common legislation and considerable overlap in the mass media sphere, they will face stronger competition from third-country producers in the Catalan market. This could be beneficial for Spanish companies, by forcing them to become more competitive. It would also promote their internationalization in two ways: thanks to this greater competitiveness forced by greater competition in the Catalan market, and due to a loss of market share in Catalonia pushing them to seek alternative markets.
In the short term, however, it is the loss of Catalan subsidies that may have the strongest impact on the economy of Spain proper, which has become structurally dependent on easy money from Catalonia and could suffer a significant GDP loss as these funds dried out. Although the EU and the IMF may push for a gradual easing out of financial flows, with some transitional agreements, Catalan independence would sooner or later mean that the more than 16 billion euros transferred to Spain proper every year would not longer be there. This would not necessarily be bad in the longer term. It could release Spanish entrepreneurial spirits and force a more rational set of economic policies, with for example greater infrastructure spending in industrial areas, more business-friendly tax regulations, and greater competition. Having said this, it is however likely to prompt further defence cuts in the short run. Ideally, this should prompt a fundamental transformation of Spain’s Armed Forces into a smaller, but non-political, agile, and better prepared military. Section 8.1 of Spain’s 1978 constitution reads “The mission of the Armed Forces … is … to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional order”. This passage, believed to have actually been drafted by the military themselves, is widely understood to mean that Spain’s Armed Forces can be used to prevent Catalan independence, and seemed to be on Defence Minister Pedro Morenes’ mind when he said, in the run up to the 27 September election to the Catalan Parliament, that there would be no military intervention “as long as everybody does their duty”. If to the possibility of a military intervention in Catalonia we add the regular harassment of Gibraltar at sea, we can observe two very serious distractions for the Spanish Armed Forces.
Ski Company, First Pyrenees Regiment, training during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). This elite unit was set up by mountain sports enthusiasts and served under the Catalan Government.†
Defence investment and procurement. Due to economies of scale, it could be argued that successor states will need to invest more simply to achieve the same capabilities as the parent state. In some cases, it could even be argued that some or all successor states will not be able to afford expensive hardware. On the other hand, this may facilitate greater integration and coordination with allies, with less duplication and fewer prestige projects. It may also lead to a renewed emphasis on maintenance and training, stressing not nominal capabilities, but real, deployable capabilities (which a country can effectively transport, deploy, and maintain).
In the case of Spain, procurement is deeply imbalanced, with the country embarking on expensive projects mainly motivated by a mixture of prestige and industrial policy, rather than operational considerations. The result: a large gap between nominal and real capabilities, problems in deploying and sustaining forces far from her shores, and a lack of funds for training, maintenance, and operations, with the bulk of defence spending going into personnel and procurement. To be fair, these problems are not unique to Spain. For example, the German deployment in Afghanistan was plagued by equipment failures, with a 2014 official report explaining that “only 42 of Germany’s 109 Eurofighters are available for immediate use because of fuselage defects. The navy faces similar problems with only 4 of its 22 Sea Lynx helicopters and 3 of its 21 Sea Kings currently operational.” However, the case of Spain is perhaps even more extreme, going beyond a lack of proper maintenance. A study on “Southern Europe Defence in Times of Austerity” noted that “[t]he Spanish military industrial base ranks tenth in the world and sixth in Europe thanks in part to its stake in EAD, one of the leading global aircraft companies. This means that any major cut in military investment projects in Italy and Spain directly affects their national economies and aggravates the domestic economic crisis environment. This disparity could explain why the Spanish and Italian governments chose to primarily reduce personnel and operations/maintenance programmes rather than investment programmes, whereas the Portuguese and Greek governments reduced defence expenditures across the board.”
Catalonia’s national security community is keenly aware of such problems, as reflected in successive unofficial white papers by the Military Studies Society (SEM). Its latest on defence budgets, published in June, lays down a set of serious, realistic budgetary guidelines for an independent Catalonia, based on the experience of NATO allies. The text stresses that operations (expenditures covering costs for deployed operations outside member state’s territory) and equipment maintenance have “been a problem common to many Western armed forces” due to a lack of “available resources in this area” of maintenance, prompted by the “excessive costs of acquisition programs.” The white paper strongly emphasizes that “The Catalan Defence Forces (CDF) cannot make these mistakes,” and recommends that “the percentage of the defence budget devoted to operations and maintenance should be between 35 and 40 percen.” For Catalonia, starting from scratch after 300 years without her own armed forces, this is a golden opportunity to avoid past mistakes, by both the Spanish military and those of many allies. The result should be a more agile, balanced military, where equipment is purchased according to perceived needs, rather than by industry lobbying, and then properly maintained.
Turning to the legitimate question of whether Catalan defence budgets will be large enough to sustain acquisition programs in areas like strategic airlift, a quick look at the numbers shows this should not be a problem. Catalonia currently accounts for roughly 20 percent of Spanish GDP, Madrid in turn spending 0.6 percent on defence. An independent Catalonia following NATO guidelines, as suggested by the SEM, would thus be spending the equivalent of 0.4 percent of current Spanish GDP. Adding in the expected long-term greater economic growth from the end of fiscal transfers, irrational economic policies, and sabotage to key infrastructures, it is not easy to imagine total Catalan defence spending surpassing the figure for today’s Spain. Spain may well find herself unable to sustain current levels of defence spending, however, since much of these capabilities are either not being properly maintained and used in training, or are directed towards fellow NATO member states (UK) or American allies (Morocco), it is not something that should concern alliance planners much.
Intra-alliance conflict (between successor states, or between the existing parent state and other partners). Concerning post-independence relations between successor states, at one end of the spectrum we could imagine two good neighbours leaving behind tensions and now able and eager to work together, both bilaterally and within wider permanent alliances and ad-hoc coalitions. At the other end of the spectrum, two hostile states with unresolved disputes and at least one failing to rule out a resort to force, prompting most of their capabilities to be addressed at each other rather than available to allies.
When the parent state has persistently been employing non-lethal force against a fellow NATO member state, the question arises whether once reduced in size it will persist in this policy, now with fewer resources, or whether it will abandon such an approach. In the latter case, the impact on the alliance’s capabilities will be doubly positive, since capabilities devoted to intra-alliance conflict will now be available to NATO, as will be those employed by the other member state to defend itself.
In Spain’s case, the country seems able to work with some of her former colonies, as shown by the successful incorporation of some 30 Portuguese commandos in the Spanish Legion’s detachment deployed in Iraq in a training and mentoring capacity. Unfortunately, this seems to be the exception rather than the rule, with Madrid unable or unwilling to recognize Gibraltar’s right to decide her own future, and the ensuing policy of constant harassment. In 2015, from 1 January to 23 June, the Spanish Navy had engaged in 23 violations of British territorial waters, while absent from BALTOPS201 , in a reminder that in a world with limited resources, failing to rule out the use of force against a fellow ally puts a dent on any potential contribution to NATO. It also has an impact on that ally’s contribution. Thus, when measuring Spain’s net contribution to the Atlantic alliance, we should subtract all the assets and capabilities devoted to the harassment of Gibraltar, plus the corresponding British assets and capabilities employed to defend the people of the Rock. Catalonia, having excellent relations with Gibraltar and the United Kingdom, which the national security community sees as a key partner, does not suffer such handicap. The new state will not have to spend a cent on disturbing the life and property of her Majesty’s subject
Ceuta and Melill, two cities located in North Africa, the former right in front of Gibraltar, administered by Spain but claimed by Morocco, also merit a mention. While this conflict is more low key, a significant portion of Spanish forces are deployed with their defence in mind. Since Morocco is a US Ally, again we would have to subtract them when measuring Madrid’s potential contribution to NATO. Not a problem for Catalonia, which is not party to any territorial conflict with the North African country. To add insult to injury, Ceuta has become the main logistic support base for the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean and North-East Atlantic, with Madrid blatantly disregarding Western sanctions in the wake of the Crimean crisis. In 2014 for instance, Russian warships docked at Ceuta on 13 occasions, while nine such visits have taken place in the first six months of 2015. By opening up Ceuta to Moscow, Madrid has forfeited the claim that it is in NATO’s interest to see Catalonia, including key ports like Tarragona and Barcelona, remain in Spanish hands.
Defence industrial policy and international defence industry cooperation. Smaller domestic weapons markets can be cited as having a potentially negative impact. On the other hand, in those states where the dominant nationality has excluded another from the defence industry, the resulting end to the defence industry “apartheid” may enable weapons development and production to take root. In particular, where the excluded territory used to have an arms industry earlier in its history, and retains a significant civilian industrial base, as is the case in Catalonia.
The issue for third countries — in particular those involved in international consortia featuring the existing parent state — is the net impact. This may depend on possible synergies with existing civilian industries in the territory previously excluded from arms production.
Successive Spanish governments have excluded Catalan enterprises from the defence industry and many dual sectors, while subsidizing production in areas like Seville (Airbus Group), with little or no industrial tradition. A 2015 official report on Spain’s security and defence industry provides details of 47 companies, none of which is based in Catalonia, with only three in Valencia Region. Madrid has also strived to keep Catalonia isolated from southern France, home to most of the country’s aircraft industries. An end to this defence policy “apartheid” would allow Catalan enterprises to expand into the defence—and dual—industries, in a move which would benefit maritime democracies, including partners in the F-35 consortium. Spanish industry would contract, but this would liberate the country’s partners from the extra costs involved in manufacturing in regions with no industrial traditio. A look at FDI (foreign direct investment) reveals a completely different geography from that of the defence industry programs jointly sponsored by Spain’s Defence and Industry Ministries. In the second quarter of 2015, 35.1 percent of Spain-bound industrial FDI went to Catalonia, while none of Spain’s at least 300 8×8 wheeled infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) based on General Dynamics’ Piranha 5 will be manufactured in Catalonia. The initial order is expected to be worth EUR1.5 billion.
The location of Airbus Group’s plant in Seville, in the southern region of Andalusia, where there is little private industry, does not make sense. From a French perspective, a Catalan town would seem more logical, since French aeronautical industry is concentrated around Toulouse, close to Catalonia. This would also benefit UK taxpayers, given the significant connection between the Spanish and British defence industries, to a large extent due to the two countries’ cooperation in aircraft projects. According to the official Spanish report on 2014 weapons exports, the United Kingdom ranked first among the country’s customers, with purchases worth 862.7 million euros, 26.9 percent of the total. The report explains that three aerial refuelling tankers accounted for 573,9 million euros and a transport airplane for 121.8 million euros, with a portion of the balance coming from parts for the EF-2000 fighter and the A400M military transport plane. As we can see, this is not trade in finished weapons systems, but rather intra-industry trade among countries cooperating in joint projects, where the distribution of the work involved is often related to the volume of orders from each defence ministry. Therefore, by excluding Catalan industry and imposing manufacture in areas like Seville, with little tradition of private industry, Madrid is raising the total cost of production of these aircraft.
Cohesion, internal security. When an existing state resorts to force, or the threat of force, to retain its present territory and population, a portion of its security and defence capabilities will have to be devoted to this task, and thus unavailable to NATO. Distracted by the need to coerce part of their population into remaining, collective defence may not be a priority.
This is the case in Spain, where the military granted itself the duty and right to employ force to keep the country together in the 1978 Constitution. The 2006 Statute of Autonomy, Catalonia’s last attempt to find a reasonable accommodation within Spain, also prompted sabre rattling, and on 17 May 2015 Catalan police caught three Spanish soldiers stealing an independence flag in Figueres. Stealing flags is obviously not the best way to train for NATO operations, while wasting Catalan police’s time does not contribute to the fight against Jihadist terrori. Every minute spent by Catalan police officers investigating such deeds is a minute not spent fighting against international terrorism and organized crime. The extent to which the resort to force to prevent Catalan self-determination distracts and perverts Spanish defence policy is clear from available statistic. While the defence budget has shrunk by 32 percent since 2008 (68 percent according to some sources, but this may not fully take into account defence spending from other departments’ budgets, for example the Industry Ministry to fund weapons programs involving domestic manufacturing, as well as extra-budgetary liabilities), that of the National Intelligence Centre (CNI) grew by 9.7 percent in 2015. Details may not be available on open sources, but it is suspected that the bulk of this increase is devoted to the “dirty war” against the Catalan independence movement.
Catalonia, on the other hand, has made clear from the outset that Val d’Aran, with her own language and culture, was free to join the new state or go her own way. No Catalan military capabilities will be needed to keep inside those who want out. Whether Spain without Catalonia will stop seeing the military as a political actor is not clear at this stage. Ideally this change should take place, releasing military capabilities currently not available to the Atlantic alliance.
Citizens’ loyalty: Draft and reserves. If some citizens within the parent state feel little loyalty, or even a measure of hostility towards it, for whatever reasons (justified or otherwise), there may be a gap between its theoretical manpower pool and the actual number of deployable citizens, be they regular or reserve. While the parent state may resort to a purely professional military to avoid this problem, it may then translate into a lower degree of political support for defence policies.
This is clearly the case in Spain, where there is little love between the state’s Castilian core and many of her non-Castilian citizens, leading to a downward spiral where the more the centre uses—or threatens to use—force against those wishing to leave, the less the latter feel bound to support the former’s resort to force as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy. Many Catalan citizens who feel alienated by the Spanish military may well wish to support their Catalan counterpart, for example by joining the reserves, making the combined manpower pool available to the two successor states larger.
Transitional issues: Inheriting defence assets and personnel. Downsizing and building one’s military. In addition to wider economic issues, the transition from parent state to successor states also features some aspects specific to the military. Among them, the distribution of existing defence assets and personnel and the accompanying downsizing of the parent state’s and (re)creation of the successor states’ armed forces.
Concerning the distribution of Spanish military assets, preliminary defence planning in Catalonia has featured two views, with some analysts favouring the taking over of some naval and air assets, while others prefer to avoid systems not necessarily best suited to Catalan and allied needs. With regard to Spanish military personnel wishing to join Catalonia’s Armed Forces, the issue is highly sensitive and has not been publicly discussed by the Catalan Government. However, both the Catalan Government and parties have stressed that Spanish Government employees in Catalonia will keep their jobs after independence, and in so doing they have not excluded any category. The Advisory Council on the National Transition, a government agency tasked with preparing a number of white papers to prepare for independence, also refers to Spanish Government workers without excluding the military, although again without referring to them explicitly. Some members of the Spanish military may have discreetly enquired about the possibility of joining Catalonia’s Armed Forces, but they are unlikely to do anything which may put their jobs at risk until this possibility is a real one. We could also mention that when Catalan Police, the Mossos d’Esquadra, began to expand in the 1980s to become responsible for most public security duties, Spanish Police and Civil Guard (a constabulary-type force) officers in Catalonia were given the chance to join. Catalonia may also need to provide for those members of the Spanish military who do not wish to follow this route but who refuse to follow orders contrary to international law and fear subsequent reprisals.
Conclusions. The factors discussed are only a sample of those that may have an impact on state succession within NATO, resulting in greater or lesser capabilities and commitments towards the alliance. This work should ideally be followed by more extensive research and case studies, but should at least serve the purpose of underlining that, no matter how distressing the (re)emergence of states can sometimes be, the consequences to defence policy should be approached rigorously. It is also a reminder that any new state wishing to be recognized by existing states will have to explain to the international community how it will not only defend itself but also its allies and partners. Even more so at a time of increasing tensions, a country’s contribution to collective security is bound to be one of the main factors determining its recognition, or lack thereof, by the international community.
In the case of Catalonia, preliminary defence planning is geared towards the creation of a modern, capable, and agile military, ready to protect the country’s territory and population and make a powerful, positive contribution to NATO. This scenario could also give Spain the chance to reform her own military, in which case the Atlantic alliance would gain two net security contributors. However, it is still too early to say whether Catalan independence will prompt a rationalization of Spanish defence policy and thus a positive contribution to NATO from Madrid.
Alex Calvo, a guest professor at Nagoya University (Japan), focuses on security and defence policy, international law, and military history, in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region. He tweets at Alex__Calvo and his work, which includes “China’s Air Defense Identification Zone: Concept, Issues at Stake and Regional Impact”, Naval War College Press Working Papers, No 1, US Naval War College, 23 December 2013, is available at http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Working-Papers/Documents/WP1-Calvo.aspx, can be found at https://nagoya-u.academia.edu/AlexCalvo
Hebatalla Taha is a Research Analyst for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London where she focuses on the Middle-East and North Africa.
Jack Curran-Persell: Earlier this month, you wrote a very interesting article for IISS on the situation for IDPs in Iraq. With the UN estimating over 3 million Iraqis have been displaced, could you explain what the current situation is like for these people?
Hebatalla Taha: Conditions for IDPs in Iraq have been dire. In the article, I focused on how ISIS in particular limits the movement of civilians in areas under its control, but there are actually various armed groups and actors across Iraq that make any movement across the country quite difficult. This is especially the case for IDPs in Anbar province, who represent 40% of displaced people in Iraq. Many head to Baghdad, which has one of the highest IDP populations alongside Anbar, but some are unable to enter and remain trapped in Anbar province. In Anbar there is humanitarian presence due to the high security risks, which restricts assistance to IDPs there. Other IDPs from provinces such as Diyala or Salah al-Din tend to go to Kurdish areas and Kirkuk.
According to the International Organisation for Migration, 70% of IDPs are living in private settings, such as homes that they are renting, with families, or hotels; 19% are in ad-hoc buildings, and another 8% in camps.
Funding for Iraqi IDPs is also becoming an issue. The UN’s 2015 appeal for Iraq is still 90% underfunded, and because of this, it has had to shut down, or scale back, various programmes assisting IDPs. Such conditions are related to the decision by many displaced people to flee the country altogether, whether to Europe or elsewhere, seeing no prospects for improvement.
What is the attitude of the Baghdad government, ISIS, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to those fleeing conflict in Iraq?
Regarding the attitudes towards IDPs, the government is worried about ISIS-linked infiltrators within refugee groups–especially in Baghdad which tends to have the highest number of monthly fatalities due to frequent bombings, many of which claimed by ISIS. Therefore the Baghdad government has implemented heavy restrictions and background checks, and the process often requires a long wait and sponsors. The Bzeibiz bridge between Anbar and Baghdad is mostly closed, according to UNOCHA, and only people who require medical treatment are actually allowed to cross into Baghdad.
The KRG is similar in that it is worried about ISIS operatives launching attacks in its territories, but it also cites economic reasons. The KRG says it is cash-strapped and doesn’t have the resources to deal with the influx of refugees. The situation is exacerbated by the KRG’s own rivalry with the Baghdad government; it feels that Baghdad is not sharing the burden. The political dynamics between the KRG and Baghdad are also affecting ‘contested’ areas such as Kirkuk, where the Kurds fear ‘Arabisation’ by IDPs and both sides are suspicious of one another’s actions in Kirkuk.
ISIS has tried to prevent people from leaving the territory under its control, placing explosives around cities, confiscating identity cards, and executing people who are caught trying to flee. Its bureaucracy has allowed people to leave in the past but under particular conditions, such as leaving their families hostage, giving up their homes, or paying large sums of money. ISIS is using the plight of the displaced people as a recruitment tactic. It uses images of Sunni IDPs struggling to enter Baghdad in its audio-visual material with the message, lamenting their inability to enter various provinces, including their own capital. It tries to depict itself as the only actor defending Sunnis and therefore they should to their homes in areas under ISIS control, or even volunteer to join the group.”
So Sunni people fleeing undermines ISIS’s image of a cohesive Islamic state-building project?
Very much so. And you can see this in recent propaganda videos directed at refugees leaving Iraq. A recent video urged refugees to join the ‘caliphate’, rather than fleeing to what it regards as a xenophobic Europe. Indeed, the fact that many people are fleeing ISIS contradicts the image of itself as a coherent state which it has been trying to project. Having people to govern over is essential for ISIS’s vision.
You mention at the end of your article that fleeing has become increasingly difficult because of a crackdown on internal resistance groups. How effective have groups such as the Mosul Brigade been and what types of resistance have they been putting up?
Information on resistance groups in Mosul is difficult to obtain and verify; this is the case with most of the information coming out of Mosul in general. That is why is it’s difficult to assess the impact or magnitude of such an internal resistance, or to speculate as to whether it is an organised resistance movement, Some claim they are coordinating with the Iraqi security forces and the coalition, but others appear to be individuals reacting to the violence perpetrated by ISIS or settling scores with ISIS fighters.
My guess would be that it is a combination of both. One of the main indicators that there is significant internal resistance in Mosul is that ISIS has actually instigated these heavy crackdowns in Mosul, executing hundreds of people (some sources have cited figures as high as 2,000). The make-up of those who have been executed is also telling: most are linked to the Iraqi security forces, who are thought to have been behind many of the attacks against ISIS fighters.
It has been exactly a year since the first UK airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq. How effective have these US-led air strikes in Iraq and Syria been?
The airstrikes on their own do not have a decisive effect, but combined with ground operations, they have assisted Kurdish groups in regaining significant swathes of territory in northern Iraq and restricting expansion by ISIS. In the operation against Tikrit in March 2015, for example, which was led by the Hashed al-Shabi militia, the belated airstrikes by the US-led coalition were in fact key in expelling ISIS from the city. The airstrikes have not been as effective in Syria, aside from assisting Kurdish groups in the north, such as the well-known battle for Kobani. This is linked to the more complicated dynamics of the Syrian crisis: there is a lot more happening than just ISIS.
What do you make of the recent Russian military commitment to Syria in order to support Assad supposedly against ISIS?
It is a disturbing development especially since the conflict contains many actors beyond Bashar al-Assad and ISIS, and, as you were suggesting, the first airstrikes didn’t target ISIS, but rather, rebel groups.
Tragically, I think this will most likely only enable the war to drag on longer, with severe humanitarian effects—ones that we already witnessing and that will not simply go away.
Away from Iraq and Syria, how much progress are ISIS making in areas such as Libya or Yemen?
In Yemen, ISIS-linked groups that have slowly emerged throughout the past year appear to be making progress in the chaos of the current war. A recent report from a journalist based in Aden noted that ISIS seem to be more organised than Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and has been successful in directing some of Al-Qaeda’s recruits and infiltrating its support bases. This is important because it suggests that the situation is changing. Earlier, ISIS-linked groups (which usually call themselves ‘Wilayet Sanaa’ or ‘Wilayet Aden’ or others based on the province) did not seem to be as organised as AQAP and were unable to challenge it. Most of the attacks by ISIS-linked groups in Yemen have been against the Houthi or Shia mosques in Sanaa, although there have been other smaller-scale incidents elsewhere, such as in the south.
In Libya, ISIS-linked groups are one of many groups vying for control, including various jihadi organisations and Islamist groups. ISIS-linked operatives have taken advantage of the chaotic war to establish a presence there and create a ‘jihadi front’ in North Africa—to which many foreign fighters have fled. It is important to emphasise that although the group has expanded due to foreign fighters, it has failed to gain many recruits from within Libya. So overall, within Libya’s military and political context, ISIS remains quite marginal.
In Egypt, the situation is different because there is a functioning state and a functioning army, but the ISIS-linked group, Wilayet Sinai in North Sinai has posed a serious threat, and its capacity has continued to grow, despite escalating crackdowns by the army.
While many of these groups have adopted tactics used by ISIS, such as beheadings, they don’t merely reflect an expansion by ISIS into these territories. Both sides effectively benefit from this partnership. ISIS can give the impression that it is unstoppable, undefeatable, and is everywhere. Its local affiliates – predominantly opportunistic groups – gain notoriety by leveraging ISIS’s name, which helps them win over recruits and possibly get funding or weapons. This is also discernible in who the ISIS-linked groups view as the main adversary in each of the different contexts, i.e. the army in North Sinai in Egypt, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Libya Dawn coalition in Libya.
In your opinion, how does a state like Libya which is effectively a failed state benefit groups like ISIS?
Armed groups such as ISIS thrive in that atmosphere of a political and security vacuum, and their emergence is fundamentally linked to the state of war. This state of war provides obvious logistical advantages, such as the ability to smuggle foreign fighters into the country, and the lack of a functioning security apparatus enables them to organise, expand, etc., but they also benefit from the political reasons that lead to the descent into a failed state. ISIS-affiliated groups, as I mentioned, are not created by ISIS, but are informed by the political crises governing each of the countries.
Thank you.
Jack Curran-Persell is currently completing an MA in Conflict, Security, and Development within the War Studies Department at King’s College London.
Latvian tanks in operation during NATO Operation Sabre Strike, 2013. Photo: Gatis Diezins, RYC (CC 2.0).
Russia’s President Putin statement a fortnight ago made on a conference with Finland’s President Sauli Niiniste sent a signal that Moscow is aware of NATO’s recent activities near Russia’s borders in Eastern Europe, and in the case of an attack Russia will strike back at the source of the attack.
Eastern European states, such as the Baltic States Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, are looking to put their NATO membership to use as fears rise over further Russian expansionism. The Baltic authorities have expressed deep concerns over Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the recent Russian military activity in the Baltic Sea and Baltic airspace. In May 2015 the Baltic countries made a joint request for a permanent detachment of NATO troops within their borders to serve as a counterweight to Russia’s military activities. United States deployed troops to the Baltic region and Poland following the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Germany has promised to deploy rotating troops to Estonia in early 2016. Also, NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system drones will be used in Baltic airspace from 2017.
Indeed, NATO continues to ramp up its presence in the region. NATO allies are taking up air patrols for a four-month rotation in the Baltic region. Until the end of August fighter jets from Belgium, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom are on duty in the Baltic air policing mission against Russian aggression. Scores of ships and aircraft from 17 countries recently took part in Baltic Sea naval drills as part of exercise ‘BALTOPS’, involving 5600 servicemen between 5-20 June. The NATO and U.S Army Europe-led ‘Saber Strike’ operation in the three Baltic States and Poland wound down on 19 June. It is the largest such operation since 2010, with more than 6000 troops from 13 NATO allies[1]. Indeed, the Baltic states seem determined to increase NATO’s presence in the area.
But should the Baltic States really feel threatened?
This seems to be a view widely held by officials in the area. Lithuanian Defense Minister Juozas Olekas wants to station heavy US equipment in Lithuania, after Polish and Lithuanian governments stated that they are currently in discussion with Washington about a potential increase of US military presence in Eastern Europe.
In turn, a Russian Defense Minister official has said that the cozying up of the Baltic region with NATO has left Russia with no option but to seek military re-arrangements on its strategic Western front, such as Kaliningrad and Belarus. These standoffs do not help to build good relationships.
Background of NATO expansion: the Baltic States
The NATO enlargement in eastern Europe originally occurred in the absence of the threat that produced NATO in the first place. It occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Russia was left weak and unstable.
NATO took cautious steps towards its expansion to the east of Europe. In 1999 the Alliance perceived the three countries out of the Visegrad group (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) as the most significant potential members in eastern Europe. The three former Warsaw Pact countries were left economically and military weak after the dissolution of the USSR; by joining NATO and then the European Union Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic established security, integration into the European community, and signaled the formal end of the Soviet domination which had lasted approximately half a century. None of the Visegrad group countries border Russia and therefore the 1999 expansion did not constitute a direct threat to Russia.[2]
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all had aspirations to join NATO right after the break up of the Soviet Union. Since gaining independence in 1991 the Baltic Trio for more than a decade tried as hard as they could to move further away from Russia towards Europe and the West. They succeeded in 2004 by joining both the European Union and NATO.
Russia’s reaction to their joining NATO was anger. One of the most important issues was that NATO expansion in the Baltic region would inevitably increase the likelihood that the Alliance would station troops closer to Russia’s borders than ever before. Border disputes between the Baltic States and Russia added danger to the overall situation. Lastly, a particular concern was the large number of long-term Soviet citizens who are disenfranchised in independent Estonia and Latvia – to this day they experience problems with obtaining Estonian and Latvian citizenship.[3]
NATO, the Baltics and Russia today
NATO activities in the Baltic States today is a demonstration of Western strength, rather than a response to a direct identified threat. The suspension of all practical cooperation between NATO and Russia, including the NATO-Russia Council, only contributes to further tensions between the Alliance and Kremlin.
Of course, the Soviet past plays a major role in the reaction towards Russia coming from the Baltic States. By looking at Ukraine’s fate, the Baltic trio feels threatened by Russia. The Ukraine conflict demonstrated that Russia believes that the existence of ‘ethnic Russians’ abroad can justify intervention in former Soviet states. The fears over Russia fomenting rebellion among ethnic Russians in the Baltic states has led to NATO shifting its focus from Russia’s military activities to its information war. Indeed, Lithuanian President’s Dalia Grybaiskaite and Latvia’s interior minister Mikhail Kozlovskis recently raised concerns that Kremlin may try to influence and form a pro-Moscow rebellion in the Baltic states, just as they did in Eastern Ukraine, by manipulating the media.
Despite the significant part of the Baltic population that has ethnic Russian origin, the situation is different to Ukraine. Firstly, the ethnic Russian population is decreasing. From 1989 to 2011, the amount of ethnic Russians in Latvia decreased from 34% to 26.9%, in Lithuania from 9.4 % to 5.4%, and in Estonia from 30.3% to 25.5%. In comparison, the Russia-speaking population in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine makes up more than half of the population of Ukraine.
Secondly, modern Russian-speakers residing in the Baltic region are also different from their Russian counterparts. The Baltic Russian diaspora in each of the Baltic countries has its own characteristics. The Latvian Russian community is more or less united; the other two Baltic Russian communities are not. This makes it difficult for Russia to be able to formulate attractive policies or influence through propaganda for Baltic Russian-speaking communities, let alone to form a rebellion.[4]
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the Baltic States are concerned with Russia’s military activity and capability. While conflict is still ongoing in Ukraine, the Baltic States will feel threatened by Russian expansionism and will use their NATO membership as much as they can. Despite the fact that Russia has repeatedly stated that it has no interest in invading the Baltic States.
Although the Baltic states are unlikely to follow Ukraine’s fate of becoming the battlefield of the great powers. The authorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania authorities are right to be wary. Russia may state that it has no interest in invading the Baltic States, but the 50-year long Soviet past, and the more recent actions of Russia in Eastern Ukraine play an important part in heightening the fear and suspicion of the Baltic States towards Russian bear, the bear that has been edging closer and closer in recent years.
Leyla Aliyeva studied International Politics at Middlesex University and is currently an LLM student at the same university. Her particular focus is on post-USSR and Eastern European countries with a specific focus on human rights and minority rights. She also worked at the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre as an intern and worked on serious human rights violations in former Soviet states.
For a more detailed look at the way that Russia’s relations with the world have changed since the Ukraine crisis, check out our recent 4-part series entitled ‘Russia and the World following Ukraine‘.
NOTES
[1] Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States
[2] (1995) NATO and the Baltic States, American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 17:5, 22-22,
[3] (1995) NATO and the Baltic States, American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 17:5, 22-22,
[4] Victoria V. Panova (2015) , Russia’s ‘Soft’ Policies towards the Baltic States Latvian Institute of International Affairs p.86
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