Water: a wellspring of conflict?

EDITORS NOTE: This is the first article in a four-part series which explores the role of water in human conflict and politics. The series marks (though is not affiliated with) World Water Day 2016, a UN initiative to promote awareness of water issues. More information on World Water Day can be found here.

By: Paula Hanasz

Dripping tap in India. South Asia is relatively abundant in water resources, but it is not always distributed efficiently or equitably. (Image by Paula Hanasz, 2014)

Water wars; they seem inevitable in an age of non-traditional security threats and problems such as climate change requiring collective action. But water is rarely a single cause of conflict. Certainly, water can be a stress multiplier in a conflict, but violent conflict can also affect the equitable distribution of water – and thus exacerbate tensions. In other words, it’s complicated. Conflict is never straightforward, and neither is water governance.

Nonetheless, the fear of water wars persists. The logic is obvious to the point of a truism: water scarcity combined with rapidly increasing populations and the consistent growth in demand for food and energy will lead to competition between states over freshwater resources. This competition, the thinking goes, is likely to culminate in violent clashes over control of this precious, finite and irreplaceable resource.

Commentators such as Brahma Chellaney have built careers making this very argument. He argues that Asia may be on the brink of water wars fuelled by China’s accelerating consumption of water, energy and food, and its powerful upstream position vis-à-vis weaker, already volatile states on the Mekong and Brahmaputra Rivers (i.e., India and Bangladesh on the former, and Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand on the latter).

Compelling though it is, the water wars thesis has been widely discredited by scholars. No war has ever been solely over water. Rather, hydropolitics – the geopolitics of water – is regarded by academics and policymakers to be complex. It is no longer possible to simply say that water causes conflict.

In recent years, water scholars, including many affiliated with the London Water Research Group based at King’s College, have shown that more often than not, there can be cooperation over a shared river and conflict over it at the same time. The Indus River is a prime example of this. The conflict between India and Pakistan following independence from the British Empire included disputes over the shared rivers of the Indus basin, and eventually resulted in the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. Although the treaty still has its critics in both countries, it continued to function throughout the two wars between India and Pakistan.

Another important point is that water conflict is not always so bad, and water cooperation is not always what it seems. Disputes can force states to negotiate mutually agreeable outcomes, but at the same time, international treaties can cement an inequitable status quo. For example, India signed in 1996 an agreement with Bangladesh over the sharing of waters of the Ganges River, but this arrangement greatly favours India and continues to be a source of resentment within Bangladesh.

Just because water is not unequivocally a wellspring of conflict, that is no reason for complacency. Tensions over shared water resources are real and require our attention. The current conflict in Syria, for example, has been exacerbated by decades of weak governance in the water and agriculture sectors, and a lack of preparedness for severe drought. Water, in other words, is often one piece in a very complex puzzle of conflict.

The puzzle of water-related conflict does not necessarily reveal a picture of states contra states. Firstly, the notion of state’s priorities and approaches to water management as being homogenous is incorrect because subsets of national actors have different values and agendas. Secondly, most water-related violence happens at the sub-national level between tribes, sub-national governance units such as states or municipalities, rural and urban populations, water use sectors, etc.[1]

For example, the disputes between Indian states over shared rivers are arguably more heated and entrenched than water disputes that India has with neighbouring Nepal or Bangladesh. Similarly, disputes can arise between, for instance, industrial water users and agricultural water users, or between urban consumers and environmental conservationists. The Murray-Darling basin in Australia provides an illustration of tensions between water use sectors – farmers at odds with the city of Adelaide and the policymakers in Canberra wishing to reserve some river flow for environmental purposes and Aboriginal cultural rights.

An American water governance expert, Ken Conca, argues that while most conflicts over water occur at the local level – at the scale of a city, say, or the watershed –they are also often driven by powerful global forces. For example, Conca argues that, “[T]he growth of industrial fish farming is fuelled by changing consumer tastes in rich countries. Big hydroelectric projects in remote locations often power industrial processing facilities that plug into the global economy, while bypassing local economies and imposing a heavy burden on local communities”[2]

Another red herring in the puzzle of water conflicts is the issue of scarcity. Looking solely at factors such as the volume of water available per capita does not take into account spatial variability in water resources within countries and the technological or economic adaptation of nations at different levels of development.[3] Some states such as Israel are relatively arid but can still maximise their per capita allocation through technologies such as desalination plants; others, like India, have abundant water resources but lack apparatus and ability to distribute these resources efficiently or equitably.

In other words, water-related disputes do not arise out of a lack of water per se, but rather the misallocation or mismanagement of existing water resources. When the distribution of finite resources is perceived as unjust, that is when disputes begin.

More importantly, water is rarely, if ever, the single cause of conflict. It is, however, a stress multiplier. In the context of other socio-political disruptions, the lack of water or the inequitable distribution of water, can tip the often fragile socio-political stability off-kilter. Even the renowned scholar Aaron Wolf, who proposes the idea that water is largely a vector of cooperation, warns that “The lack of a clean freshwater supply clearly does lead to instability which, in turn, can create an environment more conducive to political or even military conflict.”[4] Wolf adds that “Water-related disputes can also engender civil disobedience, acts of sabotage, and violent protest.”[5]

Resentment about water allocation can combine with and exacerbate other existing tensions. The effects of climate change – another stress multiplier[6] – in conjunction with a population boom could, for example, lead to shortfalls in water supply in the Middle East and contribute to mounting discontent.[7] But environmental stresses alone are not enough to cause conflict.

Both Syria and California have faced severe drought in recent years. But only in Syria has the fabric of society almost completely disintegrated. Why? Mismanagement and lack of foresight have left the country ill prepared to cope with such a drought. In contrast, although the Californian drought is taking its toll too, the broader system of food production which is affected is more resilient to shocks: the USA is better equipped than Syria for dealing with natural disasters and the federal government structure is able to provide somewhat of an economic safety net. Resilience, then, is the factor that determines whether water stress can be contained or whether it will add to other stress multipliers and boil over into conflict.

The relationship between water and conflict flows in more than one direction. Water can be a stress multiplier in conflict, as we just saw, but violent conflict can also exacerbate the water situation. The effects of an existing or ongoing conflict can worsen the access to water for those who need it most, such as internally displaced persons. Water-dependent livelihoods, such as those in irrigated agriculture, could also be disrupted by conflicts that damage infrastructure or blocks access to water sources. This might set off a chain reaction across sectors, exacerbating the conflict further. After all, water security is inextricably linked with food security and, thus, human security.

Once conflict – no matter what its catalyst – encroaches on the availability of and access to environmental resources, it may become intractable. Grievances over control of natural resources may contribute to the onset of conflict, revenues from natural resources may finance conflict, and combatants often target or otherwise damage the environment.

In recent conflicts in Iraq, we have seen dams captured by militias; the threat of destroying the dam is used as a ‘stick’ against downstream population, while the promise of continuous water supply is a ‘carrot’. The ‘weaponisation’ of water and water infrastructure in this way is not a novel tactic; it has been employed by various groups in various parts of the world for centuries. But attacking water infrastructure in war time for military gain is no different from attacking or capturing other civil infrastructure and as such does not strictly fit into the understanding of water-related conflict.

Once violent conflict subsides, peace is often fragile: countries with past resource-related conflicts are, according to Environmental Peacebuilding, more likely to relapse, and to do so twice as quickly. Many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, have been ravaged by conflicts over natural resource extraction, and unable to rebuild social and economic stability through subsequent droughts and famines.

As discussed above, the availability of and access to natural resources such as water can exacerbate or be exacerbated by conflict. The complexity of such conflicts has led to the development of a new discipline – environmental peacebuilding – which “integrates natural resource management in conflict prevention, mitigation, resolution, and recovery to build resilience in communities affected by conflict”

Environmental peacebuilding is a growing field.

In conclusion, wars between nation-states over freshwater resources are unlikely, but sub-state conflicts are not. Moreover, the cause and effect between conflict and water availability are not always clear or unidirectional. The same water resources can simultaneously be a source of conflict and an instrument for cooperation. In the coming decades, we will see more complex disputes develop, not only between groups of people, but also water-use sectors and urban versus rural populations. These resentments over water allocation may function as stress multipliers in other socio-political conflicts, which in turn could worsen the access to water resources for those most vulnerable. The conflicts we do see will certainly be more complex and requiring nuanced approaches, such as those that can be applied based on research within the emerging academic field of environmental peacebuilding.

 

Paula Hanasz is a PhD candidate at the Australian National University, Crawford School of Public Policy. Her thesis examines water security and conflict in the Ganges and Brahmaputra basins. She is interested in how international aid donors use Track II diplomacy to increase transboundary water cooperation. Paula is also an Associate with the Centre for International Water Law and Security at the London Centre of International Law Practice. @paulahanasz

 

Notes:

[1] Aaron Wolf et al, “Managing Water Conflict and Cooperation”, State of the World 2005 (The Worldwatch Institute, 2005), p. 87.

[2] Ken Conca, “The New Face of Water Conflict”, in Navigating Peace (No.3, November 2006), p. 3.

[3] Shira Yoffe et al, “Geography of international water conflict and cooperation: Data sets and applications” in Water Resources Research (Vol. 40, 2004), p. 2.

[4] Aaron Wolf, “Conflict and cooperation along international waterways”, in Water Policy (Vol. 1 #2, 1998), p. 9.

[5] Aaron Wolf et al, “Managing Water Conflict and Cooperation”, State of the World 2005 (The Worldwatch Institute, 2005), p. 88.

[6] National Research Council of the National Academies, Himalayan Glaciers: Climate Change, Water Resources, and Water Security (Washington D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2012), p. 89.

[7] Kurt M. Campbell et al, The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Center for a New American Security, 2007), pp. 60-61.

Organised crime and terrorism Part III: Letters from Dubai: D-Company’ and the ‘93 Mumbai terror attacks

This is the third piece in Strife’s four-part series exploring the relationship between organised crime and terrorism in a 21st century security environment. The first and second parts can be found here and here, respectively.

By: Andrea Varsori

The aftermath of the bomb near the headquarters of the Shiv Sena. Source: India Times

Rags-to-riches criminal overlords do not normally lack ambition; yet, most of them do not aim to claim the title of ‘Protectors of the Faith’. Their daily worries are mostly concerned with assuring that their network of businesses runs smoothly, that officials are sufficiently bribed or intimidated, and that all their underlings actually remain loyal. However, even the most business-minded criminal bosses can develop a sense of allegiance to their own community, be it ethnic or religious. In times of sectarian violence, these overlords may decide to act to defend their people. This decision may be completely at odds with the logic of the criminal enterprise: it entails a potential backlash from the authorities and the larger public. During sectarian conflicts, however, their reputation is at stake: inaction may spark doubts about a boss’ ability to project his own power, thus encouraging rivals to try to take over his networks. The boss’ community may also feel betrayed, and may begin to sabotage the boss’ illicit trade and favour someone else. There is no simple way to solve this problem.

Dawood Ibrahim probably never had this kind of thoughts before December 1992. At that time, Ibrahim was one of the most powerful citizens of Mumbai, although he was no longer a resident. He was born in the southern part of the city in 1955, the eldest son in a low-income family of ten. After dropping out of school, he gradually resorted to extortions and robbing, eventually ending up smuggling goods in local markets. The major boost to his career arrived while in jail: there, in fact, he managed to earn the trust of Haji Mastan and Yusuf Patel, two of the most important smugglers of the city.[1] Having understood Dawood’s ambition, they entrusted him with their business before retiring. By the time Dawood was free again, he had thus gained access to Mastan’s and Patel’s resources. Starting from there, he used both ruthless violence and cunning to profit from the weaknesses of the most important gang in Mumbai, led by Pathans from Afghanistan. By 1982, he had managed to kill the new leader of this gang; however, the Mumbai police was often able to prove his complicity in most of his gang’s crimes, and he was visiting prison quite often. On 4 May 1984, he jumped bail and fled to Dubai.[2]

In Dubai, then a major haven for smugglers, he managed to build a massive network of illegal and legal businesses. This network included both Muslims and Hindus, as it had often been the case in earlier criminal gangs of Mumbai. What became known as ‘D-Company’ — from the first letter of Dawood — smuggled in gold, silver, electronic goods, and textiles; it extorted protection from businessmen and occasionally solved disputes between them.[3] In Dubai, Ibrahim built for himself a luxurious mansion, where he organised lavish parties, inviting Mumbai’s most famous celebrities, cricketers, and politicians. His story was that of a boy from Dongri who had successfully taken control of entire criminal enterprises and who had silenced rival Hindu dons: in Mumbai, Muslims in the slums started to see him as an empowering model, as a vindicator of the Islamic minority. He could not return to his own city, however, as he knew that the police was waiting for him. This constraint became a problem for him and his associates when the Mumbai riots began in December 1992.

It all started in Ayodhya, 1,460km northeast of Mumbai. In this region, Hindu mythology claimed that Ram, one of the avatars of Vishnu, was born; a temple stood on the exact place of Ram’s birth. In 1523, Mahmud of Ghazni, commander of an army of Muslim invaders from Central Asia, conquered the area and destroyed the temple of Ram. In its place, he built the Babri Masjid, or Babur’s Mosque, in honour of the first Moghul Emperor. The memory of these events contributed to embittered relations between Hindus and Muslims in the area. In the 1980s, the Hindu Sangh Parivar (HSP), an umbrella organisation including several Hindu nationalist groups, aimed to revive the dispute. The members of its various branches claimed that the mosque had to be closed and destroyed, in order to build a new, bigger temple to Ram. The victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), itself a part of HSP, at the local state elections in 1991 decided the fate of the mosque. One year later, the government transferred the property of the land on which the Masjid stood to a Hindu organisation charged with constructing a new temple; volunteers destroyed all buildings surrounding the mosque.[4] On 6 December 1992, a crowd of 150,000 Hindu nationalist militants summoned by the main leaders managed to overcome a weak police presence and razed to the ground the Babri Masjid.[5]

This was an insult for many Indian Muslims. The destruction of the mosque in Ayodhya was followed by six days of intense riots. In Mumbai, Muslim mobs started targeting temples; the police, in a desperate attempt to control the violence, fired on looters, while Hindus retaliated on mosques.[6] This cycle of riots in Mumbai left 227 dead: around two-thirds of the victims were Muslims, while only 15% of the whole city population at that time was Islamic.[7] In January 1993, a new sequence of riots occurred: this time, the troubles lasted for ten days, and caused 557 dead and more than 2.000 injured[8]. As in the December riots, the Islamic population had been disproportionally hit by the violence.

As the riots went on, Dawood Ibrahim kept receiving discomforting news. Furious rioters were explicitly targeting Muslim men and women; after days of communal violence, angry mobs began to protest against him, shouting “Dawood to death.”[9] They felt betrayed: he seemed distant, powerless, and unable to protect them. This belief could become rapidly damaging to Dawood’s reputation and business. As the riots abated, sectarian tension did not decrease: by the end of January 1993, Dawood had finally decided to exact revenge for the riots.

He ultimately did not need to do much. He helped to hold meetings in Dubai with powerful Mumbai Muslim criminals, along with representatives of the “concerned Muslims” from the Arab world. He permitted weapons and explosives to be smuggled in India through the routes he controlled. Last, but not least, he provided the connection with the Pakistani secret services, the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI).

The plan to hit Mumbai proceeded. On the afternoon of Friday, 12 March 1993, a group of affiliates of Dawood’s smuggling networks struck the city with the widest and most complex set of bombing ever seen in a single city and on a single day. Ten explosions rocked the city between 1.28pm and 3.35pm. The bombs targeted different core points, from the Mumbai Stock Exchange, to the Katha Bazaar, the city’s largest wholesale market for grain and spice, and then to the Plaza Cinema, one of the symbols of the city’s burgeoning movie industry. At the end of the day, 257 persons were dead and 713 more were injured.[10]

Naturally, one of the targets was also the headquarters of the Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena party, a part of the HSP. The Shiv Sena had a prominent role in advocating the destruction of the Babri Masjid and in fostering anti-Muslim propaganda. A bomb exploded near an oil pump, on the side of the main building: four people died, no members of the Shiv Sena were among them. Nonetheless, the location of the bomb made very clear what was the target and the sectarian allegiance of those who had placed it. Communal riots could have been the first logical consequence.

Fortunately, police forces managed to avert this potential outcome. Moreover, the brutality and breadth of the attacks had shocked most Mumbai citizens into terror, rather than rage. As soon as the smoke from the explosions had settled, however, the police started connecting the dots. It was apparent from the beginning that this act of terrorism required a complex organization and uncommon skills. On 15 March, the Times of India claimed that “hi-tech terrorism” had arrived in India.[11] At that time, this type of terrorism had several harbingers; apart from the LTTE (the Tamil Tigers), most of them were Islamic fundamentalist organizations.

Right from the beginning, however, Dawood’s fame turned against him: his name was the first to appear in the theories that tried to explain the attacks.[12] The lack of training and discipline on the part of the terrorists also helped the police tremendously. During the bombings, in fact, some of them were reaching by van the buildings that hosted the city and the Maharashtra state administration, with the intent of murdering every BJP member they could find. As they passed near one of the target locations, however, a bomb exploded, and they abruptly decided to abort the mission.[13] Therefore, they left their van behind, filled with weapons and explosives. When the police found the vehicle, it became a decisive lead for the investigators, as the van’s owner was a relative of Tiger Memon.

As the Mumbai police officers soon discovered, Memon was the centrepiece of the bombing plot. The son of a part-time worker, second among six, he grew up in a decaying, crowded building in Pydhonie – a mostly Muslim zone of South Mumbai. After a failed attempt as a bank cashier, he started his criminal career as a chauffeur for local smugglers. He was quickly noticed for his recklessness and his knowledge of the city; this earned him an invitation to Dubai, where he became a gold carrier. In a few years, he took charge of all smuggling operations from Mumbai; a sumptuous wedding in 1985 and the opening of an office in the city’s financial quarters definitively confirmed his rise.[14]

Tiger Memon had been the true organiser and motivator behind the attacks. He supported from the beginning Dawood’s decision to retaliate for the anti-Muslim riots. He was in charge of smuggling the weapons and he knew exactly how they could best reach Mumbai: by arriving on the coast, 250km south of the city.[15] He profited from the same techniques, connections, and intelligence that he used when transporting gold and electronic goods. He also selected the people that could deliver the bombs: they were all members of his network. After choosing his affiliates, he organised their military training in Pakistan; he visited the training camp for some days, according to one of the participants.[16] Most importantly, after giving his men a final rousing speech, the evening before the attacks, he left on a 4am flight to Dubai to join his large family.[17]

Later judiciary proceedings confirmed Tiger Memon’s role. The final judgement on the bombings arrived on 21 March 2013, with a sentence by the Supreme Court of India, which upheld prison sentences for most of the accused. Dawood Ibrahim and Tiger Memon, however, have not yet faced trial: they have gone into hiding, possibly in Pakistan; Dawood’s new house has been traced to Karachi as late as 2006.[18] Still, their departure from Dubai and the greater attention on the part of the authorities have taken their toll on Ibrahim’s and Memon’s criminal network. The decision to help to stage the attacks has divided the ‘D-Company’ along religious lines: in 1996, Chhota Rajan, one of Dawood’s main subordinates, formed his own gang in retaliation for the 1993 bombings. Rajan was Hindu, as most of his own affiliates: the schism caused a flare-up of gang-related homicides in Mumbai, with more than a hundred people dead.[19]

Dawood’s decision to act, then, caused permanent damages to his criminal syndicate. Sectarian division has certainly harmed ‘D-Company’s’ activity after infighting broke out in the late 1990s. The public nature of the 1993 terrorist attack, moreover, provided too much unwanted attention for a criminal organisation. Dawood’s choice can be explained by paying attention to the dual nature of his role as a ‘Don’: he had been both the man in charge for a criminal firm’s success and the potential avenger of the Muslim minorities of Mumbai. He decided to act to fulfil the latter role, instead of the former. The fact that he is not serving a prison sentence in India shows that he had some guarantees on his own personal safety. In this perspective, a crisis of his own criminal network may have seemed as a reasonable price to pay.

 

 

Andrea is an MPhil candidate at the Department of War Studies. His research project focuses on security issues in mega-cities: in particular, he is interested in the role of the urban environment in shaping organized criminal and political violence. He tweets at @Andrea_Varsori

 

Notes:

[1] Zaidi, S. H., Black Friday. The True Story of the Bombay Bomb Blasts, New Delhi, Penguin Books, 2002, pp. 21-23.

[2] Zaidi, p. 25.

[3] Zaidi, p. 26-27.

[4]McLeod, J., The History of India, Santa Barbara, CA, Greenwood Publishing, 2015, p. 194.

[5] Stein, B., D. Arnold, A History of India, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 2010, pp. 411-412.

[6] Padgaonkar, D. (ed.), When Bombay Burned, New Delhi, UBS Publishers, 1993, pp. IX-XI.

[7] Padgaonkar, p. XVI.

[8] Padgaonkar, pp. 42-100.

[9]  Zaidi, p. 21.

[10] Zaidi, pp. 1-17.

[11] High-tech Terrorism, The Times of India, March 15, 1993.

[12] Hypotheses about his involvement started to appear on that same Friday and right afterwards. Zaidi, p. 104; Padgaonkar, p. 169.

[13] Zaidi, p. 94.

[14] Zaidi, pp. 31-36.

[15] Zaidi, pp. 40-52.

[16] Zaidi, pp. 61-62.

[17] Zaidi, p. 82.

[18] Khan, A., Tiger Memon wanted to bomb plane at Sahar Airport to avenge Mumbai riots, says 1993 bomb blasts accused, India Today, August 1, 2015. Available on http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/tiger-memon-wanted-to-bomb-plane-at-sahar-airport-to-avenge-mumbai-riots/1/455519.html .

[19] Swami, P., Mumbai’s Mafia Wars, Frontline, Vol. 16, March-April 1999. Available on http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1607/16070420.htm .

A creative mind? An early assessment of Modi’s foreign policy

By Zoha Waseem:

As Narendra Modi prepares to depart for the 6^th summit of BRICS during what will be the Indian Prime Minister’s first international appearance since being voted into office in May this year, many will observe closely to dissect his meetings with his Brazilian, Russian, Chinese and South African counterparts. Modi’s foreign policy, a matter that has been the subject of much speculation, was also the subject of the Chairman of the Indian National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran’s talk at King’s College London, ‘Indian Foreign Policy under Prime Minister Modi: An early assessment’, on Friday, July 11. On the domestic front, Mr. Modi has been blatantly vocal and articulate about his goals for India, but his intentions towards the Asian neighbourhood have been less transparent. Mr. Saran, who holds a commendable record as a respected Indian diplomat for four decades now, attempted to break these down.

After acknowledging the positive developments between India’s relations with Bhutan and Bangladesh, Mr. Saran turned his focus to her dynamics with Washington. The negative legacy of this relationship, and a certain amount of bitterness that lingers on between the two countries, was worsened by the decade-long visa restriction irritant (which was quickly reversed following Modi’s victory). Despite this, Mr. Saran observed, the United States is bound to remain a preferred partner for India, although Modi’s visit to the US later this year will reveal more on this account.

This brings us to another key question: how will India deal with China? In Modi’s views, previous Indian governments have taken a weak posture towards China, which needs to be changed. Under Modi, India is likely to have a more robust stance that will safeguard Indian interests first but, according to Saran, will be balanced with a stronger economic relationship as the Prime Minister has long been fascinated by the Chinese economic model, which could be an area he would likely want to expand upon

Mr. Saran argued that to strengthen the defence policy vis-à-vis China, India is likely to build closer relations with the US and Japan. There is thus a possibility of stronger security ties with Tokyo, coupled with a furtherance of shared defence interests, while maintaining the slowly developing industrial relations ahead.

The possibility of regional cooperation with China is also going to be influenced by the Pakistan factor. By Mr. Saran’s analysis, although the Chinese have been previously unwilling to speak about Pakistan with India, this attitude is gradually changing. While Mr. Saran did not specify to what extent this is going to be discussed between the two neighbours, it can be assumed that Chinese grievances with Pakistan for not taking stronger action against the Uyghur militants affiliated with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), on the territory bordering China, is likely to be a common ground for discussions between New Delhi and Beijing.

Despite Mr. Saran’s optimism, Modi should not be quick in expecting a frank cooperation from China as the latter’s relationship with Islamabad – fair-weathered as it may be on security matters – is unlikely to be strained on economic and energy fronts.

While Modi’s policies vis-à-vis East Asia will be moulded long-term, Afghanistan is likely to be a critical and immediate issue in the foreseeable future, which will naturally influence the Indo-Pak relationship ahead.

On the non-military foundations of this relationship, Islamabad has requested for the supply of power and petroleum from India. This request, as per Saran, made by the civilian government may not be something the Pakistani army is particularly happy about. Regardless, ties between the two governments are going to remain a subject of apprehension ahead of the uncertainty surrounding what might happen in Afghanistan.

Concerning military assistance to Kabul, Mr. Saran maintained that while India is going to continue providing aid and training to the Afghan military and police forces, boots on ground is not an option New Delhi is likely to pursue.

Coming to the pressing question of the terrorist threat from Pakistan, Mr. Saran referred to previous statements from Delhi that have recognised that Pakistan’s internal threat of terrorism is far greater than otherwise understood abroad. But while there are efforts on the part of the Pakistani army to fight non-state actors in North Waziristan, India – like many within Pakistan – is concerned about the lack of efforts being made to target groups that have particular agendas against her.

Coincidentally, Saran’s concerns on this regard were voiced at King’s soon after a seminar was held at the Lahore High Court by Hafiz Saeed in which the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief, while praising Operation Zarb-e-Azb (the on-going Pakistani military’s operation against terrorists in North Waziristan, FATA), said that the United States and NATO are ‘bound to be defeated in this region’. This was Saeed’s second address to the Lahore High Court this year. In May, he was invited as a chief guest at the Lahore High Court Bar Association. One month later, the US blacklisted JuD as a foreign terrorist organisation and a charity front for the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Mr. Saran warned that despite a willingness in India to push ahead with the peace dialogue with Pakistan, should there be another Mumbai-style attack on its soil, orchestrated by any group in Pakistan, the ability to take the Indo-Pak friendship forward would be stalled once again and the forbearance shown by the Indian Congress – the previous administration – may not be likely anymore. The Bharatiya Janata Party(BJP) government has already made clear its intentions towards taking a robust response to any terrorist attack. Whether this is pure political rhetoric or a strategy that will be practised, are theories that can only be tested should New Delhi be confronted with the repeat of such an event. Only then will Modi’s threshold be truly gauged.

Moving on to the Gulf, Mr. Saran analysed that the region is important to India for two reasons. First, the obvious remittance factor, and second, most importantly, the threat of sectarian conflicts spilling over to India. The risk of the latter is being realised by a couple of recent developments in Iraq: the abduction of 46 Indian nurses by ISIS in Tikrit (released last week) and the kidnapping of 39 Indian construction workers near Mosul in June.

The growing sectarian divide in the Gulf region (coupled with that in Pakistan), according to Mr. Saran, poses risks for an otherwise peacefully co-existing Sunni-Shia population of India (its peaceful coexistence has by no means been an absolute condition and should be read here in relation to and in comparison with that in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the broader Middle East). While there have been no major recent sectarian struggles in India, there have been a few sporadic clashes erupting. This is likely to be further aggravated by the fact that recent news now reveals that at least 18 Indian citizens have travelled to Iraq and Syria to fight as ‘jihadis’.

Asked if Modi’s lack of experience on the international stage could hamper India’s foreign relations, Mr. Saran assured that even during his tenure as Chief Minister of Gujarat, Modi had made several visits to China, Japan and other countries. Besides Nehru, not many Indian prime ministers have had foreign exposure prior to being voted into office, but they have been assisted by selected advisors. Moreover, as was demonstrated by his invitation to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for his swearing-in ceremony, Mr. Saran insisted that Narendra Modi has ‘a creative mind’, implying that Modi’s lack of past presence in Delhi and abroad should not be taken for granted.

 

________________

Mr. Shyam Saran was hosted at King’s College London by the Department of War Studies and King’s India Institute.

Zoha Waseem is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and Associate Editor at Strife. You can follower her on Twitter @ZohaWaseem.

"On the real terms of equality"

By Jill S. Russell:

Surveying the landscape of current news stories on women is grim. There were the raped and lynched Indian girls, the stoned pregnant Pakistani woman, Farzana Parveen, a victim of honour killing and the 270 kidnapped Nigerian schoolgirls. The list continues with threats to lash Iranian actress Leila Hatami; the pregnant Merium Ibrahim, a Sudanese slated for execution for marrying a Christian; Iraqi child brides, everything in Saudi Arabia, the too many women everywhere who are cut,[1] trafficked across the globe for sex, and the question of whether women should serve across all functions in the armed forces of leading Western liberal democracies. Worse than they appear in detail, they seem to share a common thread regarding the place and state of women in the world, which is the assumption that women’s choices can and should be decided for by others. Whether by family, neighbours, society, culture or governance, any aspect of our behaviour, dress, feelings or actions are at the whim of others.

I cannot speak to much of these problems from personal experience, although I hope others will. But in my small corner of the world, I am deeply concerned with the political issues regarding women and military service and what it represents about our place in society and governance. Some will balk at my inclusion of the matter of service in combat roles in this rogue’s roll call, but it is wholly representative of the principle. The presumption being against them, women must argue FOR inclusion, the decision about which will be made by others. On the basis of zero empirical evidence regarding military effectiveness, women were excluded, and now that bizarre historical anomaly has assumed the status of wisdom. Sorry, it’s not, contort yourself all you want. What passes for evidence now too often boils down to the pull-ups and arguments of cohesion that are based in fluff. The fate of the western world will not be decided by a single exercise – to exclude women for the pull-up is so silly on its face I do not understand how it can be argued seriously. More pointedly, the latter hew and cry over cohesion neglects the absolute raw truth that cohesion is forged in shared experience, so true that it almost invariably breaks down every seeming established structure of distrust.[2] There’s more on women in the military, combat, and war, but these are the worst examples of illogic which man the barriers to integration. Of greatest importance, however, the prohibition is odious for its betrayal of the political beliefs of the system we like to hold out to others. We are not all equal under the law. It is both tragic and a bit frightening – if my rights can be constrained in this matter on the basis of my biology, then what is to stop the state in other areas? And if the liberal west cannot throw off the shackles of this moribund ideology of inequality then there is little hope.

None of this is about being against men. I am a woman in military history and contemporary security affairs, I don’t have a problem with men. Quite the contrary, having grown up playing sports with boys, I find men generally rather easy and pleasant to get on with. Throughout my adulthood I have eschewed the title of feminist – on principle I am earnestly and fervently a humanist, we are all the same. I would prefer to keep to my own work in logistics and public order, and out of this debate. But I am well and truly distressed that this sentiment, this assumed sovereignty of one half of the population over the other, because they were born cloven and not cleft,[3] has such vigour in the world.

If hell hath no fury like a woman scorned, imagine what happens when she knows military strategy? You only have to take a real look at international security and war studies to see the ladies are on the rise. I’m not certain at what point I would be driven to become She Guevara, and I won’t speak for the rest, but at some point this becomes intolerable. I’m not certain how many more photos of girls hanging from trees or similar I am willing to abide.

As I said, though, I prefer to get on with my own work.

 

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Jill S. Russell is a regular contributor to Strife, Kings of War and Small Wars. She is currently writing her doctoral dissertation on American military logistics and strategic culture, with a side project in the London Riots of 2011. You can follow her on Twitter @jsargentr. 

 

NOTES

[1] This is the term chosen by a woman who was the subject of what we refer to here as FGM. I shall respect her wishes on how she would like the practice to be described.
[2] This may be the better explanation for Stockholm Syndrome, that the experience of shared dramatic events or time creates cohesion notwithstanding the matter of formal antagonism between individuals.
[3] Paraphrasing my mother, who unleashed ‘had been born cleft and not cloven’ upon a school principal when he mentioned that my sister’s language was not appropriate for a young lady, her point being that she was none too pleased to hear that had her child been a young man he would not have been in trouble. She’s a corporate litigator by profession. You don’t ever want to be deposed by her. Ever.

Women Maoists in India face harassment and torture in rebel ranks and mainstream culture

By Daphne Holmes:

Maoist women in India face a sexism double whammy: in mainstream Indian culture, and within the alternative Maosit culture to which they have dedicated their lives. All too many women join rebel Maoist groups to help overthrow India’s semi-colonial, semi-feudal government only to discover that they have jumped out of the frying pan and into the fire.

Life has never been easy for most women in India. Relentless and grinding poverty, and widespread displacement of locals from their land by big-business interests, are problems that hit women as hard as or harder than they do men. But women also suffer from the gender inequality that is inherent in Indian culture. So it is little wonder that many women have joined the effort to create a better world through a ‘people’s war’.

For many of India’s women Maoists, however, life in the ranks of the rebel forces can mean physical abuse, sexual exploitation and harassment and, in some cases, torture. Even worse, some women, upon surrendering to authorities, find they get no sympathy, just more exploitation. Some have allegedly been gang-raped by police while in custody.

In the news

In recent years there have been several news stories about atrocities against women and girls within the Maoist rebel groups. These experiences have persuaded many women to give up fighting the ‘good fight’ and return to mainstream society.

For instance, back in March of 2010 two female Maoist cadres, who surrendered in the Keonjhar district of Orissa, alleged mental and physical abuse by their seniors. Police officials reported that the two had told them that other women cadres were being tortured. and that Maoist forces molested women and girls during their raids in villages in the night.

More recently, two women Maoists surrendered to Malkangiri district police, claiming they had been harassed and tortured by senior ultras. They had originally been persuaded to join the Maoist organisation by leaders who were impressed by their social and creative skills. The women put those skills to use attracting others into the organisation through cultural activities. Women are often used for these purposes, though many are fully trained in weapons and tactical maneuvers as well.

It seems that women just can’t catch a break. Furthermore, a November 2013 BBC News India piece quoted a former rebel commander from the eastern state of Bihar: ‘We had women from 16 to 40 years of age in our group. Almost all those I knew had experienced some form of sexual abuse or exploitation when they had stepped outside their homes to work or at the hands of security forces.’ The former commander noted that, although the women had originally joined the Maoist organisations to seek revenge against abuses in mainstream society, many had become disillusioned and were leaving the ranks – in large part because of abuse by their organisations’ male leaders.

Women’s growing role as insurgents and counter-insurgents

India’s Maoists are sometimes also known as ‘Naxalites’, a reference to the Naxalbari insurrection conducted by radical Maoist peasants in West Bengal in 1967. The present Communist Party of India was founded in September of 2004, a merger of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People’s War (People’s War Group), and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI). They operate mostly in India’s central and eastern regions, demanding land and jobs for the poor. Ultimately the Maoists want to establish a communist society by overthrowing the Indian government. Not surprisingly they are officially designated by various governing bodies of India as a ‘terrorist organisation’ and an ‘unlawful association’.

In recent years an increasing number of women have joined ‘the movement’; a phenomenon that most analysts attribute to the worsening conditions in rural India. In fact female commanders have come to constitute almost half of the armed cadre of Maoists. And, although it is difficult to get a head count of the women killed in encounters, it’s safe to say that as their participation grows, more female casualties are likely.

But despite their bravery in battle and their willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice for the cause, women still have difficulty getting respect from their fellow fighters, or from the authorities to whom some surrender when life as a rebel becomes unbearable.

Of course women aren’t the only ones who are brutalised when Maoists clash with law enforcement. In fact, attempts are being made to alleviate some of the problems, such as hiring women police officers to help address some of the human rights violations in Maoist-affected areas. Recently a survey was conducted in 322 locations across India, for the purpose of assessing public perception of women police officers. The results were presented in February 2014 during a conference held in Guwahati by the director who noted that there had been multiple complaints against “rude policemen who participate in human rights abuses”. Survey respondents indicated that they believed a female officer could handle any situation in a better manner than a man, and could also communicate more effectively with locals.

That’s just a drop in the bucket. It fails to address the problems that women rebels face within their organisations, and does not even begin to tackle the deep-seated problems that gave rise to the rebellions in the first place.

It could happen anywhere

Much of the world remains unaware of the suffering faced by India’s female Maoist rebels. It’s an issue that makes the news only occasionally and doesn’t capture worldwide headlines, as much as genocide or natural disasters or even celebrity sex scandals. Moreover, many people are unsympathetic to the Maoist political ideology as well as the rebels’ tactics, so Maoist women in India may not present as the most sympathetic victims in the eyes of many people.

Yet the fact remains that India, the world’s largest democracy, has serious internal problems that won’t be fixed easily, rebels or no rebels. A female Maoist being raped or tortured in India – whether at the hands of her fellow freedom fighters or by mainstream law enforcement – cannot simply be dismissed as “someone else’s problem”. What happens to her can and does happen everywhere in the world.

 

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This guest post was contributed by Daphne Holmes. Daphne is a writer from Arrest Records.com based out of Dallas, Texas who writes on crime, violence and bullying. You can reach her at daphneholmes9@gmail.com.